An economic theory of leadership turnover

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 88, Issue 12, 2004, Pages 2361-2382

  Gallego, M ^a   Pitchik, C ^b  

^a WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coup d' tat; Dictator; Dynamic; Hazard rate; Infinite horizon; Kingmakers; Stochastic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 4444299709     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.008     Document Type: Article

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