Values, objectivity, and relationalism

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 75-90

  Moore, Adam D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4444263851     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:INQU.0000040014.27357.03     Document Type: Review

References (46)

1. Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 8.
2. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
3. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
4. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
5. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
6. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
7. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
8. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
9. See Ibid., pp. 1-24. See also James Griffin, Well Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), W. Quinn, Morality and Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), Bernard Gert, "Rationality, Human Nature, and Lists," Ethics 100 (January 1990), Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), Don Hubin "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy 98(9), (2001), and "Converging on Values," Analysis 59 (1999), and Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 85-88.
10. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson ed. (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books 1968), pp. 120 & 216.
11. W.D. Ross, "The Nature of Goodness," Readings in Ethical Theory, Wilfried Sellers and John Hospers eds. (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, Inc. 1970), p. 22.
12. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, P.H. Nidditch ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 415-416.
13. David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 25.
14. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
15. Ibid., pp. 27-28.
16. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
17. Ibid., p. 39.
18. David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
19. Eric Mack, "Moral Individualism: Agent-Relativity and Deontic Restraints," Social Philosophy & Policy 7 (1989), p. 95.
20. Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 232.
21. See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
22. Foot, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
23. See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 139.
24. Gauthier, op. cit., p. 47.
25. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 38. See also David Blink, "Moral Realism and the Skeptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), pp. 111-125.
26. J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 38. See also David Blink, "Moral Realism and the Skeptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), pp. 111-125.
27. Lomasky, op. cit., p. 238.
28. Mackie, op. cit., p. 38.
29. See Mack op. cit., pp. 83-93 . See also Christine Korsgaard, "The Reasons We can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neural Values," Altruism, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr., Jeffrey Paul eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 24-51.
30. See Mack op. cit., pp. 83-93 . See also Christine Korsgaard, "The Reasons We can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neural Values," Altruism, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr., Jeffrey Paul eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 24-51.
31. Mack, op. cit., p. 84.
32. See Nagel, op. cit., p 153.
33. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 98.
34. Ibid., p. 102.
35. Mack, op. cit., p. 86.
36. I b i d.
37. Ibid., p. 88.
38. I b i d.
39. Christine Korsgaard "Two Distinctions in Goodness," The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), p. 171.
40. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
41. Ibid., p. 170.
42. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 156.
43. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 414.
44. Foot, op. cit., p. 24.
45. See also W.K. Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind 48 (1939), pp. 464-477.
46. See Quinn, op. cit. I am indebted to Fred D. Miller Jr., Travis Cook, Edward Feser, Richard Timberlake, George Selgin, Kimberly Moore, Don Hubin, and the editor of the Journal of Value Inquiry, Thomas Magnell, for their suggestions and comments.