Earmarked: The political economy of agricultural research appropriations

Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 194-213

  Law, Marc T ^a   Tonon, Joseph M ^b   Miller, Gary J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT   (United States)

^b Washington University ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349195495     PISSN: 10587195     EISSN: 14679353     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9353.2008.00400.x     Document Type: Article

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