Micro- and macro-level validation in agent-based simulation: Reproduction of human-like behaviors and thinking in a sequential bargaining game

JASSS

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 2008, Pages

  Takadama, Keiki ^a   Kawai, Tetsuro ^a   Koyama, Yuhsuke ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Agent modeling; Agent based simulation; Micro and macro level validation; Reinforcement learning; Sequential bargaining game

Indexed keywords

EID: 44349162856     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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