Police and criminal law in the treaty of Lisbon: A new dimension for the community method

European Constitutional Law Review

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 20-40

  Ladenburger, Clemens ^a  

^a EUROPEAN COMMISSION   (Belgium)

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EID: 44349155978     PISSN: 15740196     EISSN: 17445515     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1574019608000205     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. See Art. 2, points 63 to 68 of the Treaty of Lisbon = Arts. 61 to 69 H of the future 'Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union' (FEU) as the EC Treaty will be renamed.
2. For a similar analysis see G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh, 'Quelle Europe pénale dans le traité constitutionnel ?', in M. Dony and E. Bribosia (eds.), Commentaire de la Constitution de l'Union européenne (Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2005) p. 321 et seq.
3. and see in particular discussion note CONV 69/02 in which the Secretariat first confronted the European Convention with these problems (accessible via ).
4. Joint Action 98/733/JHA; Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA.
5. COM (2004)328 final.
6. COM (2005) 475 final.
7. COM (2001)664 final.
8. COM (2006)817 final.
9. Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
10. Poland - decision of 27.4.2005, P 1/05
11. Germany - decision of 18.7.2005, 2 BvR 2236/04
12. Cyprus - 7.11.2005, Appl. No. 294/2005.
13. See the provisions on transposition and applicability in Arts. 59-62 of the Commission's proposal for a Decision replacing the Europol Convention.
14. For instance, a double legal basis is necessary for the establishment of the important Schengen Information System II (SIS II). Similarly, the Union's policy on drug abuse is split up between the first pillar for issues related to health (and notably the prevention of drug abuse) and the third pillar for judicial and police co-operation to combat drug crimes. On this issue, see also G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh, 'Quelle Europe pénale dans le traité constitutionnel?', in M. Dony and E. Bribosia (eds.), Commentaire de la Constitution de l'Union européenne (Bruxelles, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles 2005) p. 321 et seq.
15. See C-176/03 Commission v. Council, [2005] ECR I-7879, the communication of the Commission COM (2005)583 final interpreting that judgment, and the judgment of 23 Oct. 2007 in Case C-440/05, Commission v. Council (n.y.r.).
16. European Parliament v. Council of the European Union (C-317/04) and Commission of the European Communities (C-318/04), [2006] ECR I-4721.
17. C-301/06 Ireland v. European Parliament and Council.
18. See the judgment supra n. 4
19. see on this judgment also Christian Tomuschat, 'Inconsistencies - The German Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant', Euconst (2006) p. 209.
20. See, more generally, C. Ladenburger, 'Towards a Post-national Constitution - Federal, Confederal or Genuinely sui generis? - Introductory comments on the Convention method, and on some features of an improved Constitutional Charter', ERPL/REDP (2004) p. 75.
21. For a summary of the meeting, see CONV 97/02.
22. Discussion note CONV 69/02.
23. With a quite explicit mandate (see CONV 258/02).
24. CONV 426/02.
25. See CONV 614/03.
26. Analysed in CONV 644/03.
27. For a summary of the meeting, see CONV 677/03.
28. See CONV 727/03.
29. For a summary of the meeting, see CONV 783/03.
30. See CONV 836/03
31. See Presidency proposal for the Naples Ministerial Conclave, IGC 52/03 and IGC 52/03 ADD 1 (Annex 14 to 16), as well as Presidency proposals for the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004, in particular IGC 81/04 (Annex 23 to 27), but also IGC 83/04 (Annex 12), IGC 84/04 (Annex 12) and IGC 85/04 (Annex 12).
32. See also Presidency proposal for the European Council of 12 and 13 Dec. 2003, IGC 60/03 ADD 1 (Annex 18 to 21); working document from the Presidency for the Meeting of 'focal points' on 4 May 2004, IGC 73/04 (Annex 20 to 23): Presidency proposals following the meeting of 'focal points' on 4 May 2004, IGC 76/04 (Annex 17 to 19); Presidency proposal for the Ministerial Meeting on 17 and 18 May 2004, IGC 75/04 (Annex 8 and 9); Presidency proposal following the Ministerial meeting on 24 May 2004, IGC 79/04 (Annex 21 to 23).
33. See below.
34. The special 'opt-out/opt-in' regime in the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland, introduced in Amsterdam for title IV of the EC Treaty, was extended to certain aspects of police co-operation; the existing Protocol on the position of Denmark, exluding Denmark wholly from Title IV, was extended to the entire area of the former Third Pillar, and it was amended to offer Denmark the possibility to switch to the same position as the UK and Ireland.
35. Subject to Art. 230(5) FEU, discussed below.
36. See however Declaration No. 36 to the Treaty of Lisbon, confirming that member states may, in these areas, negotiate and conclude international agreements insofar as they comply with Union law. The concrete legal effects, if any, of this declaration will need to be examined.
37. For more details as to the challenges for the Commission, see M. Petite and C. Ladenburger, 'The Evolution in the Role and Powers of the European Commission', in D. Curtin, A. Kellermann, S. Blockmans (eds.), The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press 2005) p. 309 at p. 316-319.
38. Similarly, W. Bogensberger, 'Die EU-Verfassung nimmt das Strafrecht in die Pflicht', Journal für Strafrecht (3/2005) p. 73.
39. See Art. 240 B FEU (= Article 35(5) TEU).
40. See Art. 69 E FEU.
41. See Art. 69 F(3) FEU.
42. See Art. 69 H FEU.
43. See Art. III-270(3) and (4) and Article III-271(3) and (4) of the Constitution: Referrall to the European Council suspends the decision-making process and the European Council can prevent the adoption of the act in question by requesting that a new draft be submitted. However, a continued blocking of the decision-making process is excluded: If the European Council does not act within four months or if, after having requested that a new draft be submitted, the act in question is not adopted within twelve months, it automatically becomes possible to proceed within the frame-work of enhanced co-operation, on the condition that at least one third of the member states wish to do so. Note that the amount of member states needed under the Reform Treaty is nine.
44. I.e., the Co-ordinating Committee consisting of senior officials, provided for by Art. 36 EU.
45. See Art. 61 C FEU.
46. See supra n. 12.
47. Ireland is put in brackets here. This is because the provisions discussed in this section had been requested politically only by the UK. ireland felt in the end obliged to join the Treaty status of the UK in most respects, for legal reasons.
48. Cf. also G. de Kerchove and A. Weyembergh, supra n. 2, at p. 346 et seq.
49. This possibility is alluded to in Art. 69 E 'where appropriate in liaison with Europol', and in Art. 69 G 'where appropriate in liaison with Eurojust'.
50. The Council acts unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a quarter of the member states, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.