The future of social security

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 197-218

  Gonzalez Eiras, Martín ^a   Niepelt, Dirk ^b,c,d,e  

^a UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

^b Study Center Gerzensee   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^d STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^e CEPR   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Labor supply; Markov perfect equilibrium; Probabilistic voting; Saving; Social security

Indexed keywords

EID: 44249117129     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.10.005     Document Type: Article

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