Reputation and imperfect information

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1982, Pages 253-279

  Kreps, David M ^a   Wilson, Robert ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44149093434     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers
2. The role of investment in entry-deterence
3. Does it pay to maintain a reputation
4. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players Parts I II and III
5. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players Parts I II and III
6. Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players Parts I II and III
7. On the Chain-Store Paradox and Predation: Reputation for Toughness
8. Sequential equilibria
9. Extensive games and the problem of information
10. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information An Equilibrium Analysis
11. Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
12. Strong evolutionary equilibria and the war of attrition
13. Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
14. Sequences of games with varying opponents
15. Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
16. Spieltheretische behandlung eines oligopolmodells mit nachfragetragheit
17. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
18. The chain-store paradox
19. Entry capacity investment and oligopolistic pricing