Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 1992, Pages 278-305

  Binmore, Kenneth G ^a,b   Samuelson, Larry ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44049110303     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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3. Survey of repeated games
4. Cooperation and bounded recall
5. The evolution of cooperation
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7. Social contract III: Evolution and utilitarianism
8. No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game
9. Evolutionary stability in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game
10. Repeated Game Explanations of Commitment and Cooperation
11. Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games
12. The Strength of a Little Perfection
13. Evolutionary Stable Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
14. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
15. Essays on Cooperation and Competition
16. The Evolution of Cooperation Revisited
17. Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
18. Efficiency in evolutionary games: Darwin, Nash, and the secret handshake
19. Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
20. Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive-games