Asset markets as an equilibrium selection mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1993, Pages 485-504

  Van Huyck, John B ^a   Battalio, Raymond C ^a   Beil, Richard O ^b  

^a TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949168719     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1993.1026     Document Type: Article

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