Contemporary banking theory

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 1993, Pages 2-50

  Bhattacharya, Sudipto ^a   Thakor, Anjan V ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELHI   (India)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949162410     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jfin.1993.1001     Document Type: Article

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