Pegged exchange rate regimes - A trap

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 817-835

  Aizenman, Joshua ^a   Glick, Reuven ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO   (United States)

Author keywords

Credibility; Crises; Discretion; Duration; Monetary regime change; Pegged exchange rate

Indexed keywords

EID: 43749085980     PISSN: 00222879     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00138.x     Document Type: Short Survey

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