Consolidation or second revolution? The emergence of the new right in Hungary

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 191-231

  Bozóki, András ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43449083784     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: 17439116     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523270802003046     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, 'How Countries Democratize, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.56, No.4 (1991), pp.579-616;
2. Charles Gati, 'The Mirage of Democracy' Transition, Vol.2, No.6 (1996), pp.6-12;
3. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonion Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
4. Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990).
5. Adam Michnik, 'The Velvet Restoration', Transition, Vol.2, No.6 (1996), pp.13-16.
6. Ágnes Czakó and Endre Sík, 'A hálózati tóke a posztkommunista Magyarorsźgon (Network capital in post-Communist Hungary)', Mozgó Világ, Vol.20, No.6 (1994), pp.17-25.
7. Roman Frydman, Kenneth Murphy and Andrzej Rapaczynksi, 'Az elvtársi arcú kapitalizmus (Comarade-faced capitalism)', Magyar Hírlap 8 March 1996.
8. János Kádár ruled Hungary in the period of communist dictatorship, between 1956 and 1988; he died in July 1989.
9. Mark Granovetter, 'A gyenge kötések ereje: A hálozatelmélet 'felülvizsgáalata' (The strength of weak bonds: A reappraisal of network theory)', in Róbert Angelusz and Márton Tardos (eds.), Társdalmak rejtett hálózata (The hidden networks of societies) (Budapest: Magyar Közvéleménykutató Intézet, 1991), pp.371-400.
10. Jason McDonald, 'Transition to Utopia: A Reinterpretation of Economics, Ideas, and Politics in Hungary, 1984 to 1990', East European Politics and Societies, Vol.7, No.2 (1993), pp.203-39.
11. Gáspár Miklo's Tamś, 'A válság' (The crisis), Népszabadság, 27 Sept. 1995.
12. Gyula Tellër, 'A härom rëszmagyarorszäg' (The three partial Hungary), Szäzadvëg, Vol.1, No.1 (1996), pp.52-66.
13. Maurizio Cotta, 'Structuring the Party System after the Dictatorship: Coalitions, Alliances, Fusions and Splits during the Transition and Post-transition Stages', in Geoffrey Pridham and Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Stablising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), pp.69-99.
14. László Békési, 'Kormányozni vagy ideálokat szolgálni' (To govern or to follow ideals), Népszabadság, 17 Oct. 1995.
15. Tamás Sárközy, 'Kormányzás a "politika és "szakma" ütközéspontjában' (Governing at the crossroads of 'politics' and 'profession'), in Sándor Kurtán, Sándor Péter and László Vass (eds.), Magyarország politikai évkönyve (The political yearbook of Hungary) (Budapest: DKMKA, 1996), pp.193-207.
16. Cf. Gáspŕ Miklós Tamás, 'Azúj establishement' (The new establishment), Magyar Narancs, 29 Sept. 1994, pp.12-13;
17. András Körösényi, 'Kényszerkoalícióvagy természetes szo"vetség?' (Forced coalition or natural alliance?), in Csaba Gombär et al. (eds.), Kérdójelek: A magyar kormány, 1994-95 (Question marks: The Hungarian government 1994-95) (Budapest: Korridor, 1995), pp.260-80.
18. They wanted to have the referendum on the land issue together with the NATO referendum in November 1997, but the effort was rejected by the ruling coalition.
19. Cf. Gáspár Miklós Tamás, '́U j osztálypolitika' (New class politics), Népszabadság, 18 Nov. 1998.
20. Lśzló Kövér, a leading Fidesz politician, used this expression in the campaign of 2000.
21. The appointment of former party cashier Lajos Simicska of Fidesz to the post of president of APEH (the Hungarian tax authority) caused the biggest outcry.
22. The programme of the Orbän cabinet as accepted by the Parliament on 28 June 1998 (translated by the author).
23. For more details see András Bozó ki, 'A hatékony állam titka' (The key of an efficient state), Magyar Narancs, 6 July 1998.
24. Ibid.
25. This view was represented by the Smallholders' Party, Fidesz, the SZDSZ, and the MSZDP during the 'four yes' referendum in the autumn of 1989.
26. József Debreczeni called the attitude of the Orbán government towards constitutionalism as equivalent to the attitude of a tricky lawyer: See József Debreczeni, Orbán Viktor (Viktor Orbán) (Budapest: Osiris, 2002), p.121.
27. For example Tamás Deutsch, Pál Pepó and József Torgyán.
28. Hungary signed the accession treaty with NATO on 12 March 1999 in Independence, USA.
29. This also appeared in the Hungarian political folklore: Hungarian citizens started to tell more and more jokes about Orbán.
30. For details see Péter Tögyessy, Elégedtelenségek egyensúlya (The equilibrium of dissatisfactions) (Budapest: Helikon, 1999).
31. Halting the building of the national theatre and cutting off the government's financial contribution to the building of the fourth line of the Budapest underground received negative responses from voters; the possibility of such a reception had been forecast before the 2002 general elections by public opinion polls: 'Miért szeretik vagy nem szeretik a Fideszt' (Why Fidesz is supported and why it is not), HVG, 29 March 2002.
32. This was the case in relation to the building of the fourth line of the Budapest underground.
33. For example, Ferenc Mádl became president of the republic, Ibolya Dávid, János Martonyi, Ervin Demeter ministers and Erzsébet Pusztai state secretary, and Mrs. Etelka Pataki Barsi, György Csóti, Géza Jeszenszky and Tamás Katona ambassadors.
34. This idea was supported by Bĺa Pokol of the FKGP and Róbert Répássy of Fidesz-MPP; however, it was rejected by the constitutional court.
35. An expression used by Lśzló Kövér in the 2002 campaign.
36. Ibid.
37. In its 1998 campaign, Fidesz - MPP emphasized that its programme is not a party programme, but a 'contract with the citizens', that is a social programme that emerged through the dialogue of Fidesz-MPP and the citizens.
38. Cf. '[A] Magyar Köztársaság Kormáanyának programja' ([The] programme of the government of the Republic of Hungary), in Sándor Kurtán et al., Magyarország politikai évkónyve (The political yearbook of Hungary) (Budapest: DKMKA, 1999), pp.903-66.
39. Edit Szerdahelyi, 'A felfelé törekvókról' (About those heading upward), Thalassa, Spring 1992, p.121.
40. Ibid.
41. Sándor Márai, Egy polgár vallomása (Confessions of a middle-class citizen) (Budapest: Akadémia-Helikon, 1990; first published 1934).
42. The halting of the Sulinet programme of Internet for schools and that of the National Curriculum (NAT).
43. In spring 1998 leader of Fidesz-MPP Viktor Orbän stated during his election campaign that his party was putting together an 'emergency plan' to be used in case of election fraud.
44. For details see András Bozóki and Péter Kelemen, 'Merre tovább liberálisok' (Which way to go, liberals?), Beszélo Vol.7, Nos.7-8 (2002), pp.36-9.
45. The handing-over ceremony of the House of Terror was the moment when the supporters of Fidesz-MPP and MIËP joined forces. At that point it became obvious that some of the sympathizers of MIËP would vote for Fidesz in the general election. It might also be the occasion that turned most voters in the political centre to vote for the left. On the campaign of Fidesz-MPP, see Csaba Tóth and Gábor Török, 'A tematizáló Fidesz' (Thematizing Fidesz , in Miklós Sk̈ösd and Máaria Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a határ? Kampánystratégiák és kampányetika, 2002 (Where is the limit? Campaign strategy and campaign ethics, 2002) (Budapest: Ë let Irodalom, 2002), pp.186-92.
46. For details see Gáabor Törö k, 'Haśvadászat: választási kampány a médiában' (Looking for the effect: election campaign in the media), Politikatudományi Szemle, Vol.11, Nos.1-2 (2002), pp.73-92;
47. Balázs Kiss, 'Marketingszemlélet a kampanyban (Marketing in elections campaigns)', in Süks̈d and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a hatŕ?, pp.17-45.
48. For the campaign of the MSZP, see Ferenc Baja, 'Evaluating the 2002 election campaign', in ibid., pp.484-91;
49. Zoltán Lakner, 'Határok nélkü l: MSZP-kampány a kettéhasadt országban (Without limits: The campaign of the MSZP in a divided country)', in ibid., pp.109-25.
50. The government was paying for newspaper commercials under the title 'Record of the Parliament' and it was using public funds to finance the commercials.
51. Endre Dányi and Miklós Sükösd, 'Fekete PR és politikai vïrusmarketing: Interaktív kommunikaációs eszközök a kampányban (Black PR and political virusmarketing: Interactive communication in the campaign)', in Sükösd and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a határ?, pp.276-94; Viktória Lugosi, 'Jobboldali räoplapdömping a kampányban (The Right's extended use of political flyers in the campaign)', in ibid., pp.241-63.
52. György Petócz, 'Forza Hungaria! Olasz-Magyar pärhumamok (Forza Hungaria! Italian and Hungarian parallels)', in Sükösd and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a határ?, pp.232-40.
53. For the speech of Viktor Orbán delivered at the University of Physical Education on 9 April 2002, see the Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet, 10 April 2002.
54. Special trains were set up to transport the participants coming from the countryside to Fidesz's campaign event at Kossuth Square; the sound system was operated by the army; the pro-government press spoke of one and a half million participants, three or four times more than the real number of those present. Yet, a crowd of 300,000 or 500,000 still counted as huge and well surpassed the number of people who attended the anti-Csurka demonstration of the Democratic Charter in 1992.
55. For details on Orbán's speech at Kossuth Square, see Népszabadság, 15 April 2002.
56. See Népszabadság, 15 April 2002.
57. The Status Law was augmented by the agreement reached by Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Nâstase and Hungarian Prime Ministerer Viktor Orbán on 22 December 2001 that made it possible for citizens of Romania who were not of ethnic Hungarian origin to seek jobs legally in Hungary.
58. In his March 2002 campaign trip Lászláo Kövér condemned those who doubted in the feasibility of the government's plan to organize the Olympic Games in Budapest in 2012 on several occasions; he expressed it such a way that it could be interpreted as a call for these people's suicide by hanging themselves.
59. See Orbán's speech, 'Ten years after', delivered at an international conference in Vienna, July 1999.
60. Cf. Gyula Tellér, 'A rendszerváltozás két útja' (Two roads of regime change), in Kurtän et al. (eds.), Magyarország politikai évkönyve, pp.17-28.
61. Cf. András Bozóki, 'Politikai közösség vagy kulturális közösség? Az Orbán-kormány demokráciafelfogása' (Political or cultural community? The Orbán government's view of democracy), in Sükösd and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a határ?, pp.161-85.
62. See the evaluation of the Bokros austerity package in Tamás Bauer, 'Válságoktól a konszolidációig: Az MSZP-SZDSZ kormánytöbbség 1995́-ben' (From crises to consolidation: The governmental majority of the SZDSZ and the MSZP in 1995), in Sándor Kurtán et al. (eds.), Magyarország politikai évkönyve (The political yearbook of Hungary) (Budapest: DKMKA, 1996), pp.72-9;
63. Ferenc Rabár, 'Volt-e gazdasági korszakváltás 1995-ben' (Did an economic regime change take place in 1995?) in ibid., pp.255-60;
64. András Vértes, 'A fordulat és tényezói' (The turnabout and its factors), in ibid., pp.276-80.
65. Marta Tocsik, a lawyer engaged at a very high fee to negotiate compensation payments following the privatization of municipal assets, then transferred the fee - or much of it - to the Socialist Party; she was later charged with fraud.
66. At the EU accession negotiations Hungary could not close the chapter on communication rights until the summer of 2002 because the Orbán government, together with MIÉ P, did not want the advisory boards of the public service media to work on parity even though the country reports of the EU repeatedly urged the settlement of the issue.
67. According to the 1998 decision of the Constitutional Court, MIÉP could form a parliamentary fraction with the number of MPs elected even if it did not reach the 15-member minimum that is the criterion of fraction formation in the House rules. This decision was correct and stemmed from the spirit of democracy since the House rules cannot overwrite the will of the citizens. However, the membership of the fraction was reduced in the meantime, and thus it did not reach the number of the elected MIEṔ MPs. However, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly did not initiate the break-up of the MIEṔ fraction since it was in the interest of the parties of the ruling coalition to keep that fraction alive. On the 'opposition' role of the MIEṔ, see András Bozóki and Borbála Kriza, 'Pártrendszer és közbeszéd: A félig lojális partook' (Party system and public discourse: Semi-loyal parties), in Kurtän Sándor et al. (eds.), Magyarország politikai évkönyve (The political yearbook of Hungary) (Budapest: DKMKA, 2002), pp.288-307.
68. For details see Elizabeth Barrett, 'Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in Hungary', in Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy (Budapest and New York: Open Society Institute, 2002), pp.236-87.
69. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 Oct. 2001.
70. To declare a city's candidacy for organizing the Olympic Games there is no need either to collect signatures or follow any other kind of 'popular initiative'.
71. Cf. László Kéri, Orbán Viktor (Viktor Orban) (Budapest: Századvég, 1994); József Debreczeni, Orbán Viktor (Viktor Orbán) (Budapest: Osiris, 2002).
72. For details see Péter Kende, 'Két magyar politikai közösség' (Two Hungarian political communities), Politikatudományi Szemle, Vol.11, Nos.1-2 (2002), pp.121-33.
73. Viktor Orbán, László Kövér, Lajos Simicska, András Wermer, János Áder and Attila Vŕhegyi belonged to the inner circle of the party leadership; Tamás Deutsch, Zoltán Pokorni, István Stumpf and József Szájer were on the periphery of the inner circle; other politicians of Fidesz did not take part in making political decisions within the organization.
74. Cf. Gábor Czene, 'Isten útjait fürkészve: Az egyházak a választási kampányban' (Figuring out God's will: Churches in the election campaign), in Sükösd and Vásárhelyi i (eds.), Hol a határ?, pp.455-60.
75. Most of them could be found in the Hungarian Civic Co-operation Association and the Batthyány Circle of Professors; Ferenc Mádl, elected President of the Republic in 2000, belonged to these people.
76. For more details see Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
77. Cf. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
78. On its perception, see Guy Lázár, 'Jólét vagy szabadság? Közvéleménykutatások a rendszerva vaĺtaásról (Well-being or freedom? Public opinion polls about the regime change)', Mozgó Világ, Vol.19, No.8 (1993), pp.39-51.
79. For more details, see András Bozóki, 'Rhetoric of Action', in András Bozóki (ed.), Intellectuals and Politics in Central Europe (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 1999), pp.263-83.
80. András Körösényi, 'Parlamentaris vagy 'elnöki' kormányzäs? Az Orbán-kormány összehasonlácitó politológiai perspektívábó l (Parliamentary or 'presidential' governance? The Orbán government from a comparative political perspective)', Századvég, Vol.5, No.3 (2001), pp.3-38.
81. György Petócz, 'Forza Hungaria! Olasz-Magyar párhumamok (Forza Hungaria! Italian and Hungarian parallels)', in Sk̈ösd and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Hol a határ?, pp.232-40.
82. For more details, see the speech of Viktor Orbán delivered at the University of Physical Education on 9 April 2002, reported in Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet, 10 April 2002.
83. Cf. András Körösényi, 'Vezérdemokrácia és az antik orátorok (Leader democracy and ancient orators)', in Máté Szabó (ed.), Demokrácia ś politikatudomány a 21. században (Democracy and political science in the 21st century) (Budapest: Rejtjel, 2002), pp.54-76.
84. See, for example, Jóssef Debreczeni's interview with Viktor Orbán after the elections, in Debreczeni, Orbán Viktor.
85. For more details see Zoltán Lakner, 'Körökbe zárva' (Encircled),É let és Irodalom, 27 September 2002.
86. Such groups were formed or reactivated, such as the Conscience '88, Hungarian Irredenta Movement, and the civic groups such as Alliance for the Nation, the Go Hungary! Movement, Movement of the Youth of April and so on. Cf. László Tamás Papp, 'Action Hongrie', Élet és Irodalom, 2 Aug. 2002; on the ambivalent relationship of the civic circles to Fidesz, see Istvń Elek, 'Amatŕségés anarchia a polgári körökben' (Amateurism and anarchy in the civic circles) interview by Lajos Pogonyi, Népszabadság, 1 Oct. 2002.
87. Despite two defeats of 2002 and 2006, Orbán still has a chance to return as prime minister in 2010 although he is increasingly criticized by members of his own party.