Bank capital and risk: Is voluntary disclosure enough?

Journal of Financial Services Research

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 145-160

  Estrella, Arturo ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; bank supervision; incentive compatible

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344683419     PISSN: 09208550     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:FINA.0000037544.40421.68     Document Type: Article

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