Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 471-477

  Schipper, Burkhard C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Aggregate taking strategy; Imitation; Lattice theory; Price taking behavior; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344621712     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400170     Document Type: Article

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