Feedback information and contributions to not-for-profit enterprises: Experimental investigations and implications for large-scale fund-raising

Public Finance Review

Volumn 32, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 512-527

  Jones, Michael ^a,c   McKee, Michael ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^c SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES   (United States)

Author keywords

Laboratory experiments; Not for profit funding; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

EID: 4344572060     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1091142104267064     Document Type: Review

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