The moral belief problem

Ratio

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 249-260

  Sinclair, Neil ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43249163613     PISSN: 00340006     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00323.x     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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15. Velleman, D. (2000). 'On the Aim of Belief', in The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press
16. Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge Ma.: Harvard University Press
17. Whyte, J. T. (1990). 'Success Semantics', Analysis 50, pp. 149-57