Reflections on some sources and methods of international criminal and humanitarian law

International Criminal Law Review

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 121-136

  Bantekas, Ilias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 43249162087     PISSN: 1567536X     EISSN: 15718123     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/157181206777066736     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. 1907 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1 Bevans 631.
2. T. Graditzky, Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 322 International Review of the Red Cross (1998), 29.
3. This seems to have been the conclusion of the ICJ in its judgment in Hungary v. Slovakia (Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (27 Sep. 1997), ICJ Reports (1997), 7, paras. 112-13.
4. ICTR Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 Sep. 1998), paras. 510-16.
5. ICTR Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber Judgment (6 Dec. 1999), para. 58
6. ICTY Prosecutor v. Krstic, Trial Chamber Judgment (2 Aug. 2001), para. 554;
7. ICTY Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Trial Chamber Judgment (14 Dec. 1999).
8. See ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Trial Chamber Judgment (10 Dec. 1998)
9. 38 ILM (1999), 317, para. 184.
10. The persistent objector doctrine allows a State that has persistently objected to a particular rule of customary international law, from the formative stages of the rule's birth, to avoid any or all of its legal consequences. The doctrine does not apply to customary rules that have attained the status of jus cogens. See J. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, 56 BYIL (1985), 1.
11. A. Cassese, The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky? 11 EJIL (2000), 187.
12. ICTY Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Trial Chamber Judgment (14 January 2000), para. 527.
13. See I. Bantekas, Principles of Direct and Superior Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law (2002), pp. 14-18.
14. See the classic work by A. D. McNair, The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised Nations, 33 BYIL (1957), 1.
15. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgment (15 July 1999), [Tadic Appeals judgment] paras. 109, 114. This judgment seems to have ended the matter in the context of the ICTY, but only 6 years after it was established.
16. Nicaragua v. USA, (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua), Merits, ICJ Reports (1985).
17. Public Prosecutor v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 277;
18. Demjanjuk, In Re, 457 US 1016(1986);
19. R. v. Finta, 82 ILR 441;
20. Barbie case, 78 ILR 136.
21. ICTY Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment (15 July 1999), paras. 194 et seq;
22. see also ICTY Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Trial Chamber Judgment (29 Nov. 2002).
23. See numerous instances in the 1980s where the Council adopted resolutions, in I. Bantekas, The International Law of Terrorist Financing, 97 AJIL (2003), 315.
24. SC Res. 1378 (28 Sep. 2001).
25. SC Res. 1422 (12 July 2002).
26. A. Mokhtar, The Fine Art of Arm Twisting: The US, Resolution 1422 and Security Council Deferral Power under the Rome Statute, 3 ICLR (2003), 295. Obviously, the removal of US peacekeepers may have jeopardised peace and security in Bosnia, but the granting of immunity does no justice either.
27. See, however, M. Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN; A Dialectical View, 6 EJIL (1995), 325.
28. In contrast, the Appellate Body of the WTO in Report on EC-Bananas III case, para. 10, stated the following: "Customary international law applies generally to the economic relations between WTO members. Such international law applies to the extent that the WTO treaty agreements do not "contract out" from it." Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (25 Sep. 1997).