A mereological characterization of physicalism

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 243-266

  Pineda, David ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GIRONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43249157292     PISSN: 02698595     EISSN: 14699281     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02698590600960929     Document Type: Article

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