Neuroscience, intentionality and free will: Reply to habermas

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 69-76

  Searle, John R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Determinism; Epistemic dualism; Levels of description; Neurobiology

Indexed keywords

EID: 43249132233     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869790601170169     Document Type: Article

References (4)

1. BECCHIO, CRISTINA, MAURO ADENZATO, and BRUNO G. BARA. 2006. How the brain understands intention: Different neural circuits identify the componential features of motor and prior intentions. Consciousness and Cognition 15: 64-74.
2. JEANNEROD, MARC. 2006. Motor cognition: What actions teii to the seif. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. SEARLE, JOHN R. 2005. The self as a problem in philosophy and neurobiology. In The iost seif: Pathoiogies of the brain and identity, edited by Todd E. Feinburg and Julian Paul Keenan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. SEARLE, JOHN R. 2006. Freedom and neurobioiogy: Reflections on free wiii, ianguage, and poiiticai power. New York: Columbia University Press.