Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems

Journal of Monetary Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 542-553

  Mills Jr , David C ^a   Nesmith, Travis D ^a  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank behavior; Interbank payments; Securities settlement; Strategic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 43049181936     PISSN: 03043932     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2008.01.002     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Furfine C. Interbank exposures: quantifying the risk of contagion. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35 1 (2003) 111-128
4. Green E.J. Money and debt in the structure of payments. Bank of Japan Monetary and Economic Studies 215 (1997) 63-87
5. Kahn C.M., McAndrews J., and Roberds W. Settlement risk under gross and net settlement. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 35 4 (2003) 591-608
6. Martin, A., McAndrews, J., 2008. Liquidity-saving mechanisms. Journal of Monetary Economics, this issue, doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2007.12.011.
7. Mills Jr. D.C., and Nesmith T.D. Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board 62 (2007) 1-38
8. Richards H.W. Daylight overdraft fees and the federal reserve's payment system risk policy. Federal Reserve Bulletin 81 12 (1995) 1065-1077