New approach to bidding strategies of generating companies in day ahead energy market

Energy Conversion and Management

Volumn 49, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1493-1499

  Soleymani, S ^a,b   Ranjbar, A M ^a,b   Shirani, A R ^b  

^a SHARIF UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Iran)

^b NIROO RESEARCH INSTITUTE   (Iran)

Author keywords

Day ahead energy market; Deregulation; Game theory; Nash equilibrium point; Optimal bidding strategy; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

DEREGULATION; ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; RISK MANAGEMENT; STRATEGIC PLANNING;

ENERGY MARKETS; NASH EQUILIBRIUM POINT; OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY; RISK AVERSION;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 42749095868     PISSN: 01968904     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enconman.2007.12.033     Document Type: Article

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