Who chooses to inflation target?

Economics Letters

Volumn 99, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 410-413

  Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo S ^a   Carvalho, Alexandre ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO   (Brazil)

^b IBMEC Business School   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Inflation targeting

Indexed keywords

EID: 42649137869     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.022     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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8. Posen A. Why Central Bank Independence does not cause low inflation: there is no institutional fix for politics. In: O 'Brian R. (Ed). Finance and International Economy vol.7 (1993), Oxford University Press, Oxford
9. Reinhart C., and Rogoff K. The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a reinterpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 1 (2004) 1-48