The semantic principles underlying saint Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics of being

Medieval Philosophy and Theology

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 87-141

  Klima, Gyula ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

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EID: 42649103788     PISSN: 10570608     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/medievalpt1996515     Document Type: Article

References (155)

1. For pregnant expressions of the keen awareness of isolation in many contemporary Thomists, the numerous essays devoted to this problem in D. W. Hudson and D. W. Moran, eds, Notre Dame, Ind, University of Notre Dame Press contemporary Thomists, see the numerous essays devoted to this problem in D. W. Hudson and D. W. Moran, eds., The Future of Thomism, American Maritain Association Publications (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992)
2. Of course, one cannot ignore the tremendous amount of good work done by philoso- phers, apparently also of some analytic background (e.g, Bochenski, Henry, Geach, Kenny, Krctzmann, McInemy, Stump, Veatch, Weidemann, just to name a few, without aiming at completeness, to overcome this language barrier. However, as far as I know, no comprehensive attempt has been made to date to state those formal semantic principles, which as such, regardless of the metaphysical contents of their particular instances, by reason of their formality, constitute the very form of discourse presupposed in Aquinas's and I would add, also his contemporaries, metaphysical discussions. I hope the statement and discussion of these principles below will also shed some more light on exactly how I conceive of the separation of metaphysical from formal semantic principles philoso- phers, apparently also of some analytic background (e.g., Bochenski, Henry, Geach, Kenny, Krctzmann, McInemy, Stump, Veatch, Weidemann, just to name a few, without aiming at completeness), to overcome this "language barrier." However, as far as I know, no comprehensive attempt has been made to date to state those formal semantic principles, which as such, regardless of the metaphysical contents of their particular instances, by reason of their formality, constitute the very form of discourse presupposed in Aquinas's (and I would add, also his contemporaries') metaphysical discussions. I hope the statement and discussion of these principles below will also shed some more light on exactly how I conceive of the separation of metaphysical from formal semantic principles
3. For this point, which of course does not define the proper subject matter of metaphysics but is a consequencew of the fact that metaphysics is the study of being qua being, In meta. 1b. 4, Ic. 5. References to Aristotle are given by referring to Aquinas's commentaries. For St. Thomas's works I used the supplemental to R. Busa (ed.), Index Thomisticus, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980). of metaphysics but is a consequencew of the fact that metaphysics is the study of being qua being, see In meta. 1b. 4, Ic. 5. References to Aristotle are given by referring to Aquinas's commentaries. For St. Thomas's works I used the supplemental volumes to R. Busa (ed.), Index Thomisticus, S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980)
4. Cf. In meta. lb. 4, lc. 7
5. It is important to realize in this connection that the main thrust of Aristotle's arguments is that those who deny the first principle (i.e, the principle of noncontradiction) cannot possibly mean what they say. It is also important in this regard to consider what Aristotle and St. Thomas, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics (hereafter PA) and in several other places, say about the order of questions to be answered by a demonstrative science. The question of what a thing is (quid est, is preceded by the question of whether the thing is (an est, but even this question presupposes that we know what is meant by the name of the thing in question quid significatur per nomen, antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitio-nes. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per no Aristotle's arguments is that those who deny the first principle (i.e., the principle of noncontradiction) cannot possibly mean what they say. It is also important in this regard to consider what Aristotle and St. Thomas, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics (hereafter PA) and in several other places, say about the order of questions to be answered by a demonstrative science. The question of what a thing is (quid est?) is preceded by the question of whether the thing is (an est?), but even this question presupposes that we know what is meant by the name of the thing in question (quid significatur per nomen). Cf. "antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitio-nes. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen. Propter quod etiam Philosophus in iv Metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia docet incipere a significatione nominum" (In PA lb. 1, lc. 2, n. 5)
6. For the significance of this order in the proofs for God's existence, see STI, q. 2, a. 2; STI, q. 2, a. 2
7. ScG lb. 1, c. 12
8. df whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now"
9. quoted by M. Devitt, "The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics," Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994): 545-72, at 548
10. Fregean connotations aside, throughout this article, by a sense of an analogical term I simply mean one of its several but related significations. The clarification of. the notion of signification, however, is one of the tasks of the subsequent discussion. analogical term I simply mean one of its several but related significations. The clarification of. the notion of "signification, " however, is one of the tasks of the subsequent discussion
11. Thus, in this article I am not going to deal per se with the medieval theory of supposition in general or Aquinas's version of it in particular. I am going to touch on Aquinas's (and his contemporaries') conception of the relationship between signification and supposition only to the extent that an account of this relationship is needed for understanding Aquinas's treatment of the notion of being. n. 54 below. theory of supposition in general or Aquinas's version of it in particular. I am going to touch on Aquinas's (and his contemporaries') conception of the relationship between signification and supposition only to the extent that an account of this relationship is needed for understanding Aquinas's treatment of the notion of being. Cf. n. 54 below
12. Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan, otherwise indicated (as I have done here), translations in this article are mine. trans. J. T. Oesterle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962), p. 25. Unless otherwise indicated (as I have done here), translations in this article are mine
13. SN1 d.19, q.5, a.l
14. Cf. 2SNd. 34, q. 1, a. 1
15. 1SN d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1
16. 2SN d. 37, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 and 3
17. De ente c. 1
18. QDP q. 7, a. 2, ad 1
19. QDM q. 1, a. 1, ad 19
20. QDL 9, q. 2, a. 2
21. In meta. Ib. 4, lc. 1, Ib. 5, 1c. 9, lb. 6, lc. 2, lb. 6, lc. 4, lb. 9, lc. 11, Ib. 11, lc. 8; lc. 11, Ib. 11, lc. 8
22. ST1 q. 3, a. 4, ad 2, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2
23. ST1 2, q. 36, a. 1
24. ScG Ib. l, c. 12, lb. 1, c. 58, Ib. 3, c. 9, Ib 3, c. 8, n. 13
25. Cf. also T. de Vio Cajetan, Commentary on Being and Essence, trans. L. J. Kendzierski and F. C. Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), c. 1; Kendzierski and F. C. Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), c. 1
26. C. Alamannus, Summa Philosophiae (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1888), Tom.1. sect. 2, 5, 1; sect. 2, 5, 1
27. R. W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), part 2, chap. 4, and part 3, chap. 8. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), part 2, chap. 4, and part 3, chap. 8
28. 2SNd. 34, q. 1, a. 1
29. In meta. Ib. 5, Ic. 9
30. Of course, Aquinas's doctrine of analogy in general is in itself a huge and hotly debated topic. Nevertheless, the details of that doctrine, describing exactly how the various analogous senses of an analogous term are related to one another and to the things named analogously, need not be considered here. As we shall below, all we need in the present context is to realize that a secondary sense of an analogous term may be expressed by adding some diminishing qualification to the same term in its primary sense, that is, that a secondary sense of an analogous term is the result of some modification of the primary sense. However, we need not consider in detail exactly how such modifications can occur; that is, we need not consider what are the different modes of analogy, which is the focus of the debates. For a masterly exposition of the issues involved, R. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961 and hotly debated topic. Nevertheless, the details of that doctrine, describing exactly how the various analogous senses of an analogous term are related to one another and to the things named analogously, need not be considered here. As we shall see below, all we need in the present context is to realize that a secondary sense of an analogous term may be expressed by adding some diminishing qualification to the same term in its primary sense, that is, that a secondary sense of an analogous term is the result of some modification of the primary sense. However, we need not consider in detail exactly how such modifications can occur; that is, we need not consider what are the different modes of analogy, which is the focus of the debates. For a masterly exposition of the issues involved, see R. McInerny, The Logic of Analogy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961)
31. Recently Professor Mclnerny has also kindly given me the opportunity to consult the manuscript of his new book under preparation (Aquinas and Analogy), which presents a detailed, although also debatable, criticism of Cajetan's interpretation of analogy. also E. J. Ashworth, Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan, Dialogue, 31 (1992): 399, consult the manuscript of his new book under preparation (Aquinas and Analogy), which presents a detailed, although also debatable, criticism of Cajetan's interpretation of analogy. Cf. also E. J. Ashworth, "Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan," Dialogue, 31 (1992): 399
32. and "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-century Logic: Aquinas Context, Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 94. in Context," Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 94
33. In meta. Ib. 4, lc. 1, n. 15
34. In Peri Ib. 2, Ic. 2, n. 3
35. For a more comprehensive discussion of, and further references to, the medieval literature on this fallacy (in connection with St. Thomas's use of the related theoretical apparatus in his theology of the Incarnation), G. Klima, Libellus pro Sapiente: A Criticism of Allan Bäck's Argument against St. Thomas Aquinas' Theory of the Incarnation, The New Scholasticism, 58 (1984): 207-19. medieval literature on this fallacy (in connection with St. Thomas's use of the related theoretical apparatus in his theology of the Incarnation), see G. Klima, "Libellus pro Sapiente: A Criticism of Allan Bäck's Argument against St. Thomas Aquinas' Theory of the Incarnation," The New Scholasticism, 58 (1984): 207-19
36. A minor work whose authenticity recently has been vindicated. See Father (very conveniently printed at the end of each volume) of his monumental Busa's note at the end of the list of works included in the supplements (very conveniently printed at the end of each volume) of his monumental Index Thomisticus
37. De Fallaciis c. 13
38. Cf. "Unum enim eodem modo dicitur aliquid sicut et ens; unde sicut ens, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, idest secundum rationem, ut patet in 40 Metaphysicae, ita etiam negatio est unum secundum quid, scilicet secundum rationem (In Peri Ib. 2, Ic. 2, n. 3). ipsum non ens, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum quid, idest secundum rationem, ut patet in 40 Metaphysicae, ita etiam negatio est unum secundum quid, scilicet secundum rationem" (In Peri Ib. 2, Ic. 2, n. 3)
39. In PA lb. 2, lc. 6, n. 2
40. Cf. In PA lb. 1, lc. 2, n. 5: " antequam sciatur de aliquo an sit, sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitiones. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen. Propter quod etiam Philosophus in iv Metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia docet incipere a significatione nominum. non potest sciri proprie de eo quid est: non entium enim non sunt definitiones. Unde quaestio, an est, praecedit quaestionem, quid est. Sed non potest ostendi de aliquo an sit, nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen. Propter quod etiam Philosophus in iv Metaphysicae, in disputatione contra negantes principia docet incipere a significatione nominum."
41. Of course, syncategorematic terms do not have such ultimate significata in themselves, as their function is not to signify but only to cosignify (consignificare, n. 68 of E. J. Ashworth, Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy, Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 1991, 39-67 in themselves, as their function is not to signify but only to cosignify (consignificare). See n. 68 of E. J. Ashworth, "Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1 (1991): 39-67
42. For a formal treatment of syncategorematic terms along these lines, see V of G. Klima, Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Medieval and Modern (Budapest: Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988), but we are not concerned here with syncategorematic terms. Essay V of G. Klima, Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Medieval and Modern (Budapest: Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1988), but we are not concerned here with syncategorematic terms
43. Resp. ad lect. Vercell. de art. 108, q. 1
44. Cf. "Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de significata per nomen ST1 q. 13, a. 4 re significata per nomen" (ST1 q. 13, a. 4)
45. In meta. Ib. 4, lc. 16, n. 733
46. 1SN d. 2, q. 1, a. 3. in corpore
47. Or, using medieval terminology, we can know the quid nominis without knowing the quid rei. The distinction itself is most aptly characterized by Aquinas's famous commentator, Cajetan, in the following way: Just as the quid rei is the thing's quiddity, so the quid nominis is the quiddity of the name: but a name, as it is the sign of the passions that are objectively in the soul from bk. 1. of Aristotle's Perihermeneias, does not have any other quiddity but this, namely, that it is a sign of a thing understood or thought of. But a sign, as such, is relative to what is signified: so to know the quid nominis is nothing, but to know what the name, as a sign, is related to, as what is signified. Such a knowledge, however, can be acquired by the accidental properties of what is signified, as well as by its common, or by its essential properties, or simply by a gesture, or whatever else you like. For example, if we ask a Greek about the meaning of knowing the quid rei. The distinction itself is most aptly characterized by Aquinas's famous commentator, Cajetan, in the following way: Just as the quid rei is the thing's quiddity, so the quid nominis is the quiddity of the name: but a name, as it is the sign of the passions that are objectively in the soul (from bk. 1. of Aristotle's Perihermeneias), does not have any other quiddity but this, namely, that it is a sign of a thing understood or thought of. But a sign, as such, is relative to what is signified: so to know the quid nominis is nothing, but to know what the name, as a sign, is related to, as what is signified. Such a knowledge, however, can be acquired by the accidental properties of what is signified, as well as by its common, or by its essential properties, or simply by a gesture, or whatever else you like. For example, if we ask a Greek about the meaning of anthropos, if he points to a man, at once we know the quid nominis, and similarly in other cases. But to those asking about the quid rei, it is necessary to give what belongs to the thing adequately, in the first mode of perseity [i.e., in virtue of its essence - for the four modes of "perseity," i.e., of predication per se; see In PA Ib. 1, lc. 10]
48. This is the essential difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei: namely, that the quid nominis is the relation of the name to what it signifies; but the quid rei is the essence of the thing related or signified. And from this difference follow all the rest that are usually enumerated: namely, that the quid nominis is of nonentities, complexes, by accidental, common, and external properties; while the quid rei is of incomplex entities [grasped] by their proper, essential properties. For a word's relation can be terminated to non-existents, and complexes, and it can be clarified by accidental and similar properties, but the thing's essence can be known only by proper, essential properties of incomplex things, Sicut quid rei est quidditas rei, ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem, cum sit nota earum quae sunt obiective in anima passionum ex primo Perihermeneias, non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc, quod est signum al rei: namely, that the quid nominis is the relation of the name to what it signifies; but the quid rei is the essence of the thing related or signified. And from this difference follow all the rest that are usually enumerated: namely, that the quid nominis is of nonentities, complexes, by accidental, common, and external properties; while the quid rei is of incomplex entities [grasped] by their proper, essential properties. For a word's relation can be terminated to non-existents, and complexes, and it can be clarified by accidental and similar properties, but the thing's essence can be known only by proper, essential properties of incomplex things. [Sicut quid rei est quidditas rei, ita quid nominis est quidditas nominis: nomen autem, cum sit nota earum quae sunt obiective in anima passionum (ex primo Perihermeneias), non habet aliam quidditatem nisi hanc, quod est signum alicuius rei intellectae seu cogitatae. Signum autem ut sic, relativum est ad signatum: unde cognoscere quid nominis nihil est aliud, quam cognoscere ad quid tale nomen habet relationem ut signum ad signatum. Talis autem cognitio potest acquiri per accidentalia illius signati, per communia, per essentialia, per nutus, et quibusvis aliis modis. Sicut a Graeco quaerentibus nobis quid nominis anthropos, si digito ostendatur homo iam percipimus quid nominis, et similiter de aliis. Interrogantibus vero quid rei oportet assignare id quod convenit rei significatae in primo modo perseitatis adaequate. Et haec est essentialis differentia inter quid nominis et quid rei, scilicet quod quid nominis est relatio nominis ad signatum; quid rei vero est rei relatae seu significatae essentia. Et ex hac differentia sequuntur omnes aliae quae dici solent: puta quod quid nominis sit non entium, complexorum, per accidentalia, per communia, per extranea; quid rei vero est entium incomplexorum per propria et essentialia. Relatio enim vocis potest terminari ad non entia in rerum natura, et complexa, et declarari per accidentalia et huiusmodi, essentia autem rei non nisi per propria essentialia habetur de entibus incomplexis.] T. de Vio Cajetanus, "Super Librum De Ente et Essentia Sancti Thomae," in Opuscula Omnia (Bergomi, It.:Typis Comini Venturae, 1590), p. 299
49. This is basically what accounts for the futility of all reductionist attempts to explain away talk about mental acts in terms of a purely physicalistic language, regardless of whether what we speak about as mental acts are in fact only brain processes, that is, modifications of matter, or something else, distinct from such material modifications attempts to explain away talk about mental acts in terms of a purely physicalistic language, regardless of whether what we speak about as mental acts are in fact only brain processes, that is, modifications of matter, or something else, distinct from such material modifications
50. In any case, this is how Aquinas, along with many other medieval authors, would interpret the standard Porphyrean definition: species est praedicabile in quid de pluribus solo numero differentibus, insofar as the relation of predicability of many things is what definitively characterizes a universal as such, whereas a universal as such is nothing but an abstract, universal concept which, again, as such, is an act of human awareness that makes humans aware of the nature of particulars in abstraction from the individuating conditions with which it only can exist in particulars. De ente c. 4 would interpret the standard Porphyrean definition: "species est praedicabile in quid de pluribus solo numero differentibus," insofar as the relation of predicability of many things is what definitively characterizes a universal as such, whereas a universal as such is nothing but an abstract, universal concept which, again, as such, is an act of human awareness that makes humans aware of the nature of particulars in abstraction from the individuating conditions with which it only can exist in particulars. Cf. De ente c. 4
51. For a discussion and formal semantic reconstruction of the details of Aquinas's rather intricate doctrine of concepts (which, again, we need not consider here), especially with respect to their relationships to their subjects, to their objects, and to what St. Thomas calls natura absolute considerate, G. Klima, 'Socrates est species': Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatment of a Paralogism, in Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 1993), pp. 489-504. Aquinas's rather intricate doctrine of concepts (which, again, we need not consider here), especially with respect to their relationships to their subjects, to their objects, and to what St. Thomas calls natura absolute considerate, see G. Klima, "'Socrates est species': Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas's Treatment of a Paralogism," in Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 1993), pp. 489-504
52. This is why the form of the thing that corresponds to the concept, or ratio, of the mind is also called a ratio: Forma vero quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia, In meta. lb. 8, lc. 1, n. 1678 ratio, of the mind is also called a ratio: "Forma vero quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia." (In meta. lb. 8, lc. 1, n. 1678)
53. In the sense of human being - in general, the medieval concept of homo, signifying the species of humans, was not regarded as gender specific as signifying the species of humans, was not regarded as gender specific
54. ST1 q. 85, a. 2, ad 2
55. 2SNd. 17, q. 1, a. 1
56. In Peri lb. 1, lc. 5, n. 22
57. Cf., for example, L. M. de Rijk, "Introduction," to P. (Assen, Neth.: 1956), pp. 37-38; Abaelard, Dialectica (Assen, Neth.: 1956), pp. 37-38
58. D. P. Henry, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (London: 1972), pp. 55-56
59. P. T. Geach, "Nominalism," God and the Soul (London: 1969)
60. Cf., for example, "Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem, quae est in vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus, compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: uncle accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et matcriac, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, composition, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico, Socrates est homo, Veritas huius enuntiationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hic homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subiectum: et similiter est in aliis In meta. lb. 9 oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus . compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: uncle accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenentur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut eius quod se habet per modum formae et matcriac, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum, respondeat quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, composition!, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico, Socrates est homo, Veritas huius enuntiationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hic homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subiectum: et similiter est in aliis" (In meta. lb. 9, lc. 11, n. 1898)
61. For more on this subject see the comments on rule (1) in section VI
62. In fact, that the ultimate significata of common terms need not necessarily be regarded metaphysically as forms in all cases was a commonplace also for thinkers who otherwise were committed to a hylomorphist metaphysics. As St. Thomas wrote, Dicendum est quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae QDP q. 7, a. 10, ad 8 necessarily be regarded metaphysically as forms in all cases was a commonplace also for thinkers who otherwise were committed to a hylomorphist metaphysics. As St. Thomas wrote, "Dicendum est quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae" (QDP q. 7, a. 10, ad 8)
63. Cf. also, for example, "Verum ne fallaris cum audis denominativum a denominante oriri, et credas propter formae vocabulum quod res denominans debet esse forma eius quod denominatur, scito quod formae nomine in hac materia intelligimus omne illud a quo aliquid dicitur tale, sive illud sit secundum rem accidens, sive substantia, sive materia, sive forma. Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Scripta Philosophica: Commentaria in Praedicamenta Arislolelis, ed. M. H. Laurent (Rome: Angelicum, 1939), p. 18. forma denominante oriri, et credas propter formae vocabulum quod res denominans debet esse forma eius quod denominatur, scito quod formae nomine in hac materia intelligimus omne illud a quo aliquid dicitur tale, sive illud sit secundum rem accidens, sive substantia, sive materia, sive forma." Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Scripta Philosophica: Commentaria in Praedicamenta Arislolelis, ed. M. H. Laurent (Rome: Angelicum, 1939), p. 18
64. In general, it is precisely this point that lies at the bottom of the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic denomination. also Nam, sicut dicit Commentator, duodecimo Metaphysicae, grammaticus videt in multis differre dispositionem et dispositum, et sic movetur ad imponendum eis nomina diversa, ut 'albedo' et 'album, et quia non est ejus inquirere an in omnibus vel in quibus sic differant dispositio et dispositum, ipse secundum similitudinem ad illa in quibus manifeste differunt imponit etiam aliis nomina per modum dispositionis et dispositi, seu determinationis et determinabilis, vel etiam determinati, derivando ab abstracto concretum vel e converso, relinquens metaphysico considerationem an illa nomina supponant pro eodem vel pro diversis, propter quern diversum modum significandi grammaticalem illa nomina habent diversos modos praedicandi, Jean Buridan, Lectura de Summa Logicae: De Praedicabilibus c. 7, n. 4, H. Hubien's unpublished edition distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic denomination. Cf. also "Nam, sicut dicit Commentator, duodecimo Metaphysicae, grammaticus videt in multis differre dispositionem et dispositum, et sic movetur ad imponendum eis nomina diversa, ut 'albedo' et 'album'; et quia non est ejus inquirere an in omnibus vel in quibus sic differant dispositio et dispositum, ipse secundum similitudinem ad illa in quibus manifeste differunt imponit etiam aliis nomina per modum dispositionis et dispositi, seu determinationis et determinabilis, vel etiam determinati, derivando ab abstracto concretum vel e converso, relinquens metaphysico considerationem an illa nomina supponant pro eodem vel pro diversis, propter quern diversum modum significandi grammaticalem illa nomina habent diversos modos praedicandi. (Jean Buridan, Lectura de Summa Logicae: De Praedicabilibus c. 7, n. 4, H. Hubien's unpublished edition)
65. An excellent historical summary of the debate with ample further references is provided by D. A. Callus, Forms, Unicity and Plurality of, in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Catholic University of America New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79 references is provided by D. A. Callus, "Forms, Unicity and Plurality of," in New Catholic Encyclopedia, Catholic University of America (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79)
66. See, for example, De ente c. 5
67. Without intending to go too much into technicalities, let me just give here a brief indication of how this claim can be made exact in a formal semantic system. If P is a common predicate, then the ultimate significate of P in respect of an individual u at a time t may be assigned by the semantic function SGT in a model in the following way: SGT(P)(u)(t)ΕW{0, where W is the domain of the model, t is some time, and 0 is a zero entity (O¬in;W, The case SGT(P)(u)(t, 0 represents the situation that P signifies nothing in u, as, for example, the predicate 'red' signifies nothing in respect of the number 2. It is also reasonable to stipulate that SGT(P)(0)(t, 0. Then, if the set of things that are actual at a certain time t, A(t, is a subset of W, in accordance with the inherence theory of predication we can say that the predication of P of an individual u at a certain time t in a present-tense sentence (i.e, the copula of which consignifies the time t of the utterance) is tru here a brief indication of how this claim can be made exact in a formal semantic system. If P is a common predicate, then the ultimate significate of P in respect of an individual u at a time t may be assigned by the semantic function SGT in a model in the following way: SGT(P)(u)(t)ΕW{0}, where W is the domain of the model, t is some time, and 0 is a zero entity (O¬in;W). The case SGT(P)(u)(t) = 0 represents the situation that P signifies nothing in u, as, for example, the predicate 'red' signifies nothing in respect of the number 2. It is also reasonable to stipulate that SGT(P)(0)(t) = 0. Then, if the set of things that are actual at a certain time t, A(t), is a subset of W, in accordance with the inherence theory of predication we can say that the predication of P of an individual u at a certain time t in a present-tense sentence (i.e., the copula of which consignifies the time t of the utterance) is true if and only if SGT(P)(u)(t)ΕA(t). Now this much of semantics can certainly stay in place whether in a particular model SGT(P)(u) (t) = u or SGT(P)(u)(t) ≠ u. But the former case represents precisely the simple ontology in which the significate of P in u at t is not an entity distinct from u but is u itself. In such an ontology, for example, the predicate 'round' in respect of a round thing, say, a billiard ball, would signify the ball itself, but in respect of, say, a cube, it would signify nothing (SGT('round') (ball) (t) = ball, SGT('round')(cube)(t) = 0). Nevertheless, in general, I do not intend to go into technicalities here. I will only indicate in the notes how the semantic principles could be given exact formulations in a model-theoretical framework
68. For a complete semantic system constructed along these lines to represent St. Thomas's ontology, G. Klima, On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science, Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila, R.Työrinoja, and S. Ebbesen, 2, series B19 (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1990), 210-221. St. Thomas's ontology, see G. Klima, "On Being and Essence in St. Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science," Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, ed. S. Knuuttila, R.Työrinoja, and S. Ebbesen, vol. 2, series B19 (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Society, 1990), 210-221
69. For the issue of the independence of this semantic construction from that particular ontology, Essay V of my Ars Artium. particular ontology, see Essay V of my Ars Artium
70. See, for example, ST1 q. 3, a. 3
71. Quodl. 2, q. 2, a. 2[4]
72. However, I think it is also interesting to note here that the possibility of identifying everything with substance even in the case of material substances was considered already by a medieval philosopher, John of Mirecourt, who denied all sorts of metaphysical distinctions corresponding to semantic distinctions in rebus, even the distinction between substance and accident. In fact, it is somewhat ironical that it took an arch-nominalist like Jean Buridan, someone who himself reduced the number of distinct ontological categories to three (namely, to substance, quantity, and quality, to deploy several metaphysical arguments against this obscure and dangerous doctrine. M. M. Adams, Things versus 'Hows, in How Things Are, ed. J. Bogen and J. E. McGuire Dordrecht, Neth, Reidel, 1985, pp. 175-88, esp. pp. 179-80 of identifying everything with substance even in the case of material substances was considered already by a medieval philosopher, John of Mirecourt, who denied all sorts of metaphysical distinctions corresponding to semantic distinctions in rebus, even the distinction between substance and accident. In fact, it is somewhat ironical that it took an "arch-nominalist" like Jean Buridan, someone who himself reduced the number of distinct ontological categories to three (namely, to substance, quantity, and quality), to deploy several metaphysical arguments against this "obscure and dangerous" doctrine. Cf. M. M. Adams, "Things versus 'Hows,'" in How Things Are, ed. J. Bogen and J. E. McGuire (Dordrecht, Neth.: Reidel, 1985), pp. 175-88, esp. pp. 179-80
73. Of course, there are substantial differences between Aquinas's and Buridan's (and probably also Mirecourt's) approach to semantics. The point, however, is that for both of them, semantics does not dictate to ontology: however differently we may pick out things for our consideration, whether we do pick out distinct things or just the same thing differently is not determined by semantics, and so this has to be determined by careful metaphysical considerations. For more on this issue and the particular differences between Aquinas's and Buridan's approach to semantics, G. Klima, Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy, in Logical Semiotics, S, European Journal for Semiotic Studies, 3:4 1991, 587-618 Buridan's (and probably also Mirecourt's) approach to semantics. The point, however, is that for both of them, semantics does not dictate to ontology: however differently we may pick out things for our consideration, whether we do pick out distinct things or just the same thing differently is not determined by semantics, and so this has to be determined by careful metaphysical considerations. For more on this issue and the particular differences between Aquinas's and Buridan's approach to semantics, see G. Klima, "Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy," in Logical Semiotics, S - European Journal for Semiotic Studies, 3:4 (1991): 587-618
74. 2SN d. 37, q. 1, a. 2
75. For formal reconstructions of the relevant medieval ideas and ample references to and discussion of the enormous amount of contemporary literature they generated, Essays II, IV of my Ars Artium references to and discussion of the enormous amount of contemporary literature they generated, see Essays II - IV of my Ars Artium
76. 3SNd. 6, q. 1, a. 3
77. It is important to note here that although St. Thomas sometimes also contrasts id a quo with id ad quod nomen imponitur to distinguish the etymology of a name from its proper signification the stock example being lapis; e.g, ST1. q. 13, a. 2, ad 2., we must not confuse the two distinctions contrasts id a quo with id ad quod nomen imponitur to distinguish the etymology of a name from its proper signification (the stock example being "lapis"; cf., e.g., ST1. q. 13, a. 2, ad 2. ), we must not confuse the two distinctions
78. As St. Thomas himself pointed out: "nomen dicitur ab aliquo imponi dupliciter: aut ex parte imponentis nomen, aut ex parte rei cui imponitur. Ex parte autem rei nomen dicitur ab illo imponi per quod completur ratio rei quam nomen significat; et haec est differentia specifica illius rei. Et hoc est quod principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut VII Metaphys. dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab effectu, qui est laedere pedem. Et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen, sed illud loco cuius hoc ponitur QDV q. 4, a. 1, ad 8 dupliciter: aut ex parte imponentis nomen, aut ex parte rei cui imponitur. Ex parte autem rei nomen dicitur ab illo imponi per quod completur ratio rei quam nomen significat; et haec est differentia specifica illius rei. Et hoc est quod principaliter significatur per nomen. Sed quia differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae, quandoque utimur accidentibus vel effectibus loco earum, ut VII Metaphys. dicitur; et secundum hoc nominamus rem; et sic illud quod loco differentiae essentialis sumitur, est a quo imponitur nomen ex parte imponentis, sicut lapis imponitur ab effectu, qui est laedere pedem. Et hoc non oportet esse principaliter significatum per nomen, sed illud loco cuius hoc ponitur" (QDV q. 4, a. 1, ad 8)
79. Thus, id a quo nomen lapidis imponitur, ex parte rei, is the ratio seu natura lapidis, that is, the nature of stones, sometimes also referred to as lapideitas, namely, what is signified by the term lapis, whatever it is, and whether we know it in terms of an essential definition or not; whereas id a quo nomen lapidis imponitur, ex parte imponentis, is the accidental property of stones that they tend to hurt the foot (laedere pedem), which may have provided the motivation for so naming them. (Whether Isidore of Seville's etymology is actually correct or not is irrelevant here.) For a more detailed discussion of the two distinctions and references to their earlier history, Ashworth, Signification, pp. 39-67, esp. pp. 47-50. natura lapidis, that is, the nature of stones, sometimes also referred to as lapideitas, namely, what is signified by the term lapis, whatever it is, and whether we know it in terms of an essential definition or not; whereas id a quo nomen lapidis imponitur, ex parte imponentis, is the accidental property of stones that they tend to hurt the foot (laedere pedem), which may have provided the motivation for so naming them. (Whether Isidore of Seville's etymology is actually correct or not is irrelevant here.) For a more detailed discussion of the two distinctions and references to their earlier history, see Ashworth, "Signification," pp. 39-67, esp. pp. 47-50
80. I say "normally" because it is only in some special context made to refer to what it normally signifies. As Aquinas says, Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen 'homo, idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus 'homo' non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, Homo est secies, ST1 q. 39, a. 4; ST3 q. 16, a. 7, Of course, those familiar with medieval logic will immediately recognize here a case of simple supposition, as opposed to personal supposition. However, as I said before, in this article I do not intend to go into the technicalities of supposition theory. Following Aquinas's practice, when I will speak abou that a term is made to refer to what it normally signifies. As Aquinas says, "Quia enim forma significata per hoc nomen 'homo', idest humanitas, realiter dividitur in diversis suppositis, per se supponit pro persona; etiamsi nihil addatur quod determinet ipsum ad personam, quae est suppositum distinctum. Unitas autem sive communitas humanae naturae non est secundum rem, sed solum secundum considerationem, unde iste terminus 'homo' non supponit pro natura communi, nisi propter exigentiam alicuius additi, ut cum dicitur, 'Homo est secies'" (ST1 q. 39, a. 4; cf. ST3 q. 16, a. 7). Of course, those familiar with medieval logic will immediately recognize here a case of simple supposition, as opposed to personal supposition. However, as I said before, in this article I do not intend to go into the technicalities of supposition theory. Following Aquinas's practice, when I will speak about a term's supposita without any qualification, I will intend the term's personal supposita
81. Cf. "Respondeo dicendum, quod natura et suppositum naturae in differunt re et ratione, sicut in compositis; in quibusdam autem ratione et non re, sicut in divinis 3SN d. 11, q. 1, a. 4, in corp quibusdam differunt re et ratione, sicut in compositis; in quibusdam autem ratione et non re, sicut in divinis" (3SN d. 11, q. 1, a. 4, in corp)
82. Cf. also "propter divinam simplicitatem, consideratur duplex realis in divinis eorum quae differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formae et materiae, sequitur quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut deitas et deus. Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subiecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quidquid attribuitur deo, est eius essentia, et propter hoc sapientia et virtus idem sunt in deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia ST1 q. 40, a. 1, ad 1 identitas in divinis eorum quae differunt in rebus creatis. Quia enim divina simplicitas excludit compositionem formae et materiae, sequitur quod in divinis idem est abstractum et concretum, ut deitas et deus. Quia vero divina simplicitas excludit compositionem subiecti et accidentis, sequitur quod quidquid attribuitur deo, est eius essentia, et propter hoc sapientia et virtus idem sunt in deo, quia ambo sunt in divina essentia" (ST1 q. 40, a. 1, ad 1)
83. We should also add, "relative to the time and modality of the we need not consider these complications here. however, the passage referred to in n. 53 below and the related discussion in the text. In any case, using the notation introduced in n. 40, we could state this rule concerning assertoric (i.e., nonmodal, nonampliative) propositions in a formal system as follows: SUP(P) (t)Ε{u: SGT(P) (u) (t)ΕA(t)}, provided {u: SGT(P) (u) (t)ΕA(t)) ≠ Ø, otherwise SUP(P) (t) = 0, where t is the time connoted by the copula of the proposition. From this and from the rules of n. 40, it can be seen that an affirmative proposition whose subject supposits for nothing will have to be false. copula." But we need not consider these complications here. Cf., however, the passage referred to in n. 53 below and the related discussion in the text. In any case, using the notation introduced in n. 40, we could state this rule concerning assertoric (i.e., nonmodal, nonampliative) propositions in a formal system as follows: SUP(P) (t)Ε{u: SGT(P) (u) (t)ΕA(t)}, provided {u: SGT(P) (u) (t)ΕA(t)) ≠ Ø, otherwise SUP(P) (t) = 0, where t is the time connoted by the copula of the proposition. From this and from the rules of n. 40, it can be seen that an affirmative proposition whose subject supposits for nothing will have to be false
84. Accordingly, if [P] is the abstract counterpart of P, then we can say that SGT([P, u)(t, SGT(P)(u)(t, and SUP([P, t, SGT(P)(SUP(P)(t, t, if SGT(P)(SUP(P)(t, t)ΕA(t, otherwise SUP([P, t, 0. Thus, in a model representing Aquinas's metaphysics, the following will hold: SGT('God, SUP('God, t, t, SUP('deity, t, SUP('God, t, whereas SGT('man, SUP('man, t, t, SUP('humanity, t) ≠ SUP('man, t, But of course other models may represent different metaphysics. In particular, the same semantic system permits even the case when SGT('man, SUP('man, t, t, SUP('humanity, t, SUP'man, t that SGT([P])(u)(t) = SGT(P)(u)(t), and SUP([P])(t) = SGT(P)(SUP(P)(t))(t), if SGT(P)(SUP(P)(t))(t)ΕA(t), otherwise SUP([P])(t) = 0. Thus, in a model representing Aquinas's metaphysics, the following will hold: SGT('God') (SUP('God')(t))(t) = SUP('deity')(t) = SUP('God')(t); whereas SGT('man') (SUP('man')(t))(t) = SUP('humanity') (t) ≠ SUP('man')(t). But of course other models may represent different metaphysics. In particular, the same semantic system permits even the case when SGT('man')(SUP('man')(t))(t) = SUP('humanity')(t) = SUP('man')(t)
85. Formally, if CON(m,t)(P) is the concept to which P is subordinated in a mind m at a certain time t - that is, the immediate significate of P in m at t - and CON(m, t) (P) (u) (t) is what is represented by this concept in respect of the particular u at time t, then the ultimate significate of P in u at t can be defined as follows: SGT(P)(u)(t) = CON(m,t)(P)(u)(t). Notice how this formulation allows for conceptual change and hence for change of meaning of P. For details in this regard Essay V of my Ars Artium. mind m at a certain time t - that is, the immediate significate of P in m at t - and CON(m, t) (P) (u) (t) is what is represented by this concept in respect of the particular u at time t, then the ultimate significate of P in u at t can be defined as follows: SGT(P)(u)(t) = CON(m,t)(P)(u)(t). Notice how this formulation allows for conceptual change and hence for change of meaning of P. For details in this regard see Essay V of my Ars Artium
86. Cf. n. 40 above
87. Cf. "et sicut in rebus, quae extra animam sunt, dicitur aliquid in aliquid in potentia, ita in actibus animae et privationibus, quae sunt res rationis tantum (In meta. Ib. 5, lc. 9, n. 13). actu et aliquid in potentia, ita in actibus animae et privationibus, quae sunt res rationis tantum" (In meta. Ib. 5, lc. 9, n. 13)
88. Cf. n. 47 above
89. Cf., for example, In Peri lb. 1. lc. 5
90. Especially since St. Thomas never addressed ex professo the issue of suppositio, the medieval theory of reference. However, that he knew well and applied consciously the theoretical apparatus of the sophistae, the teachers of logic of the Faculty of Arts, is obvious from his references to their doctrine in the following places: 1SN d. 21, q. 1, a. la, ad 2-um; ST1 q. 31, a. 3, ad 3-um; ST1 q. 39, a. 4, obj. 1; ST1 q. 39, a. 5, ad 5-um suppositio, the medieval theory of reference. However, that he knew well and applied consciously the theoretical apparatus of the sophistae, the teachers of logic of the Faculty of Arts, is obvious from his references to their doctrine in the following places: 1SN d. 21, q. 1, a. la, ad 2-um; ST1 q. 31, a. 3, ad 3-um; ST1 q. 39, a. 4, obj. 1; ST1 q. 39, a. 5, ad 5-um
91. For a discussion of Aquinas's doctrine in relation to the logical theory of his contemporaries, pp of his contemporaries, see Ashworth, "Signification," pp. 39-67
92. Also, for a discussion of ampliatio in particular, see G. Klima, Directions in Free Logic: Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic, in New Directions in Free Logic, ed. K. Lambert (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Akademia Verlag, forthcoming). "Old Directions in Free Logic: Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic," in New Directions in Free Logic, ed. K. Lambert (Sankt Augustin bei Bonn: Akademia Verlag, forthcoming)
93. Although Peter of Spain, for example, regards natural supposition as the kind of supposition a term has absolutely (per se, apparently even outside the context of a proposition. But even according to him, within a propositional context the actual (what he calls accidental) supposition of a term is determined by the context. Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. de Rijk Assen, Neth, Van Gorcum, 1972, p. 81. For some discussion and further references Klima, Old Directions in Free Logic kind of supposition a term has absolutely (per se), apparently even outside the context of a proposition. But even according to him, within a propositional context the actual (what he calls accidental) supposition of a term is determined by the context. See Peter of Spain, Tractatus, ed. L. M. de Rijk (Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1972), p. 81. For some discussion and further references see Klima, "Old Directions in Free Logic."
94. Cf. n. 48
95. Cf., for example, the detailed discussion of denomination by Cajetan: debet denominativum differre a nomine formae denominantis in significatione. Hoc enim esset differre non solo casu sed significatione [interpunction mine]. Et consequenter diffinitione et essentia idem significat album et albedo, quum (ut infra docet Aristoteles) album puram qualitatem significat [cf. with this In meta. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 894]. Differentia autem in modo significandi inventa inter denominativum et denominans non excluditur per ly solo casu, quoniam talis differentia comes est differentiae secundum casum (Scripla Philosophica, pp. 16-17). "non debet denominativum differre a nomine formae denominantis in significatione. Hoc enim esset differre non solo casu sed significatione [interpunction mine]. Et consequenter diffinitione et essentia idem significat album et albedo, quum (ut infra docet Aristoteles) album puram qualitatem significat [cf. with this In meta. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 894]. Differentia autem in modo significandi inventa inter denominativum et denominans non excluditur per ly solo casu, quoniam talis differentia comes est differentiae secundum casum" (Scripla Philosophica, pp. 16-17)
96. For this point, see again n. 40
97. See again nn. 47 and 48
98. For a detailed discussion of these complexities, see G. Klima, "Latin as a Formal Language: Outlines of a Buridanian Semantics," Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin, 61 (1991): 78-106
99. Nevertheless, see Essay IV of my Ars Artium; or G. Klima and G. Sandu, Numerical Quantifiers in Game-Theoretical Semantics, Theoria 56 (1990): 173-92. "Numerical Quantifiers in Game-Theoretical Semantics," Theoria 56 (1990): 173-92
100. Of course verbs in this theory are to be analyzed into a copula and a participle. In fact, even in languages like Russian or Hungarian, in which no copula is needed for the formation of present-tense categoricals although the two languages belong to different families of languages, the well-formedness of sentences in the past and future tenses requires the addition of the appropriate forms of the verb corresponding to the verb 'be, This indicates that on the conceptual level a copula is present also in the present-tense sentences, even if it is unmarked in their surface syntax participle. In fact, even in languages like Russian or Hungarian, in which no copula is needed for the formation of present-tense categoricals (although the two languages belong to different families of languages), the well-formedness of sentences in the past and future tenses requires the addition of the appropriate forms of the verb corresponding to the verb 'be'. This indicates that on the conceptual level a copula is present also in the present-tense sentences, even if it is unmarked in their surface syntax
101. Cf. "Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ponit alium modum entis, esse et est, significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet quod esse significat quia aliquod dictum est verum. Unde Veritas propositionis potest dici Veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando, sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album. Et similiter dicimus, quod non est diameter incommensurabilis lateri quadrati, quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem In meta. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 895 secundum quod esse et est, significant compositionem propositionis, quam facit intellectus componens et dividens. Unde dicit, quod esse significat veritatem rei. Vel sicut alia translatio melius habet quod esse significat quia aliquod dictum est verum. Unde Veritas propositionis potest dici Veritas rei per causam. Nam ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Cum enim dicimus aliquid esse, significamus propositionem esse veram. Et cum dicimus non esse, significamus non esse veram; et hoc sive in affirmando, sive in negando. In affirmando quidem, sicut dicimus quod Socrates est albus, quia hoc verum est. In negando vero, ut Socrates non est albus, quia hoc est verum, scilicet ipsum esse non album. Et similiter dicimus, quod non est diameter incommensurabilis lateri quadrati, quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem" (In meta. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 895)
102. For the early medieval theory of such sentential nominalizations, called appellatio dicti, L. M. deRijk, ed., Logica Modernorum, II. 1.2 (Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1967). appellatio dicti, see L. M. deRijk, ed., Logica Modernorum, II. 1.2 (Assen, Neth.: Van Gorcum, 1967)
103. 2') (SGT('blind')) (SUP(S) (t)) (t); that is, when we say that a blindness is, the predicate of this sentence signifies the same as what is signified by the copula of the sentence by which we assert that an S is blind, precisely as Aquinas says (see In mela. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 896, quoted just below)
104. In meta. lb. 5, lc. 9, n. 896
105. QDL 9, q. 2, a. 2, in corp
106. Although here I take only privations as my examples of beings of reason, it is not only privations that were regarded as such by St. Thomas. Indeed, according to him, the proper subject matter of logic consists of beings of reason of a different sort: relations of reason. For a thoroughgoing discussion of St. Thomas's conceptions of the subject of logic, R. W. Schmidt, The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966 it is not only privations that were regarded as such by St. Thomas. Indeed, according to him, the proper subject matter of logic consists of beings of reason of a different sort: relations of reason. For a thoroughgoing discussion
107. For a discussion of various sorts of entia rationis and their systematic role in medieval semantics, G. Klima, The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Medieval Philosophy: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction, Synthese 96:1 (1993): 25-59. role in medieval semantics, see G. Klima, The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Medieval Philosophy: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction," Synthese 96:1 (1993): 25-59
108. 2', claiming the existence of sight in the ens rationis sense. Cf. with this the analysis of 'A blindness is a being' in n. 65 above
109. In meta. lb. 7, lc. 1, n. 1256
110. Cf. De Principiis Naturae c. 1
111. 1'))(SUP('blindness') (t)). (The phrase 'with-respect-to' need not be analyzed because it functions as a single modifier. Indeed, in Latin the one-word phrase respectu, as in homo est respectu caecitatis, or secundum, as in homo est secundum caecitatem, would do the same job.)
112. 2') (SUP ('sight') (t)) (t)¬in;A(t). In brief, whenever there is no sight, there is no being of a sight either, but this does not mean that then there also has to be the being of the nonbeing of sight conceived by an intellect
113. Thus, the actuality of a being of reason is conditioned both on the side of reality and on the side of the activity of the intellect. So if either of these two fails to obtain, a being of reason will not be in actuality, just as it was technically detailed in n. 72. of reality and on the side of the activity of the intellect. So if either of these two fails to obtain, a being of reason will not be in actuality, just as it was technically detailed in n. 72
114. Of course, insofar as we construe 'chimera' as referring to a possible imaginary animal, and not an implicitly contradictory term, in the way fourteenth-century logicians used this term. For more on this issue E. J. Ashworth, Existential Assumptions in Late Medieval Logic, American Philosophical Quarterly 10 1973, 141-47. Klima, Old Directions in Free Logic imaginary animal, and not an implicitly contradictory term, in the way fourteenth-century logicians used this term. For more on this issue see E. J. Ashworth, "Existential Assumptions in Late Medieval Logic," American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 141-47. Cf. Klima, "Old Directions in Free Logic."
115. ". . . ens potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo ut est maxime commune omni intelligibili. Et sic est adaequatum obiectum intellectus. Et sic non sequitur: Hoc est ens, ergo hoc est. Secundo modo accipitur pro ente, cui non est esse prohibitum, et sic omne possibile est ens. Et sic etiam non sequitur: Hoc est ens, ergo hoc est. Tertio modo accipitur pro ente actualiter existente, et sic est participium descendens ab hoc verbo 'est, Ens primo modo dictum dicitur ens in intellectu, quia est obiectum intellectus; et ita est in intellectu obiective. Ens secundo modo dictum dicitur ens in suis causis vel ens quod est in sua causa. Sed ens tertio modo dictum dicitur esse ens in se. W. Burleigh, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, ed. P. Boehner St. Bonaventure, N.Y, Franciscan Institute, 1955, pp. 58-59 transcendens et commune omni intelligibili. Et sic est adaequatum obiectum intellectus. Et sic non sequitur: Hoc est ens, ergo hoc est. Secundo modo accipitur pro ente, cui non est esse prohibitum, et sic omne possibile est ens. Et sic etiam non sequitur: Hoc est ens, ergo hoc est. Tertio modo accipitur pro ente actualiter existente, et sic est participium descendens ab hoc verbo 'est'. Ens primo modo dictum dicitur ens in intellectu, quia est obiectum intellectus; et ita est in intellectu obiective. Ens secundo modo dictum dicitur ens in suis causis vel ens quod est in sua causa. Sed ens tertio modo dictum dicitur esse ens in se." W. Burleigh, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, ed. P. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 58-59
116. See nn. 65 and 69 above
117. Cf. n. 71. Note that when I am talking about 'the predication of being' certain 'sense of being', I mean the act of predicating either the absolute predicate 'is' or the predicate 'being' or 'is a being' or the complex 'is P' or 'is with respect to P' in the sense of 'is' or 'being' required by the context for the truth of the predication. in a certain 'sense of being', I mean the act of predicating either the absolute predicate 'is' or the predicate 'being' or 'is a being' or the complex 'is P' or 'is with respect to P' in the sense of 'is' or 'being' required by the context for the truth of the predication
118. In such a "chain" of equivalences, the logically squeamish look for parentheses (as in 'p iff (q iff p), but in vain. Such chains of equivalences are intended only to abbreviate a series of proper equivalences. Thus, i) iff (ii) iff (iii, abbreviates, i) iff (ii) and (ii) iff iii, that is, this is just a brief expression of the idea that each member of the chain is equivalent to any other member. Of course the same applies to such chains of any number of members would certainly look for parentheses (as in 'p iff (q iff p)'), but in vain. Such "chains" of equivalences are intended only to abbreviate a series of proper equivalences. Thus, '(i) iff (ii) iff (iii)' abbreviates '(i) iff (ii) and (ii) iff (iii)'; that is, this is just a brief expression of the idea that each member of the chain is equivalent to any other member. Of course the same applies to such "chains" of any number of members
119. 2'). Cf. nn. 65 and 69
120. 2') (SGT('blind')). Cf. n. 71
121. Cf. n. 72
122. 2' indicates a broader, less stringent usage of 'white', say, in which the white pages of the phone book can be called 'white' (as opposed to the yellow pages), despite the black letters that cover a part of their surface. Of course, in a complete semantics the hyphenated qualifications could (and should) be analyzed further, but that is irrelevant here
123. Indeed, most things we normally call white, even if they are white all over their whole surface, could not be called absolutely and totally white in the strictest sense; namely, in the sense in which the definition of whiteness would be satisfied absolutely and 100 percent by the property of the thing called white. On the basis of contemporary physical optics we could reasonably define that property, whiteness, as the reflective capacity of a surface measurable by what is called albedo (Latin for whiteness) in modern science, that is, the percentage of the reflected light relative to the incident light which is, by the way, just one of the nicest illustrations, pace Molière, of modern science's unabashed usage of scholastic barbarisms when they come in handy, But then we can also quite reasonably say that only that thing can be called absolutely white that has 100 percent albedo. So any object with a lesser albedo is only white to a cert over their whole surface, could not be called absolutely and totally white in the strictest sense; namely, in the sense in which the definition of whiteness would be satisfied absolutely and 100 percent by the property of the thing called white. On the basis of contemporary physical optics we could reasonably define that property, whiteness, as the reflective capacity of a surface measurable by what is called albedo (Latin for whiteness) in modern science, that is, the percentage of the reflected light relative to the incident light (which is, by the way, just one of the nicest illustrations, pace Molière, of modern science's unabashed usage of "scholastic barbarisms" when they come in handy). But then we can also quite reasonably say that only that thing can be called absolutely white that has 100 percent albedo. So any object with a lesser albedo is only white to a certain degree but not strictly and absolutely white, without any qualification, even if we normally would not add any qualification in ordinary usage. This example also shows very nicely that it is precisely this phenomenon, namely, the omission of several sorts of implied qualifications, that accounts for much of the vagueness or fuzziness of everyday usage, represented in contemporary "fuzzy logics" by assigning fuzzy or diminished truth values to predications, that is, truth values between (and including) 0 and 1, instead of the classical 0 and 1. However, in treating this fuzziness, instead of assigning fuzzy, qualified truth to unqualified, absolute predicates, medieval Aristotelian logicians assigned absolute, unqualified truth to either explicitly or implicitly qualified, fuzzy predicates. But vagueness is an issue beyond the scope of this paper
124. See n. 14
125. "Non enim ens dicitur proprie et per se, nisi de substantia, cuius subsistere. Accidentia enim non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed inquantum eis subest aliquid, ut postea dicetur (In De hebd lc. 2). est subsistere. Accidentia enim non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed inquantum eis subest aliquid, ut postea dicetur" (In De hebd lc. 2)
126. Cf. In meta. lb. 4, lc.l, n. 15
127. See QDL 9, q. 2, a. 2, in corp., quoted above
128. Cf. In meta. lb. 7, lc. 1, n. 1256, quoted above
129. 1SN d. 33, q. 1, a. 2, in corp. Cf. In meta. lb.7, lc. 1, nn. 1252-1256
130. For St. Thomas's principled insistence on keeping the two apart, see both numerous discussions of what he took to be Plato's fundamental error concerning universals and of how the modi significandi of the names we attribute to God do not correspond to some matching modi essendi in Him. his numerous discussions of what he took to be Plato's fundamental error concerning universals and of how the modi significandi of the names we attribute to God do not correspond to some matching modi essendi in Him
131. 3SN ds. 11, q. 1, a. 4
132. ST1 q. 13, a. 1, ad 2-um
133. Cf. STl q. 32, a. 2
134. QDP q. 8, a. 3
135. Cf. 1SNd. 22, q. 1, a. 2
136. Cf. ScG lb. 1, c. 30
137. lSN d. 22, q. 1, a. 2
138. De ente c. 5. See also n. 41
139. For D. P. Henry's own Principle of Logical Aloofness, see That Most Question - (Quaestio Subtilissima): The Metaphysical Bearing of Medieval and Contemporary Linguistic Disciplines (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). (See entry aloofness in the index.) Again, we should note here that the question of whether there are such subsistent forms or not is a metaphysical question, not determined by these semantic considerations. All these semantic considerations determine is what it means to claim that there are such subsistent forms. But, of course, it is only on the basis of the proper understanding of this claim that one can set about determining its truth. Subtle Question - (Quaestio Subtilissima): The Metaphysical Bearing of Medieval and Contemporary Linguistic Disciplines (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). (See entry "aloofness" in the index.) Again, we should note here that the question of whether there are such subsistent forms or not is a metaphysical question, not determined by these semantic considerations. All these semantic considerations determine is what it means to claim that there are such subsistent forms. But, of course, it is only on the basis of the proper understanding of this claim that one can set about determining its truth
140. [1]')(u) (t) = 0. For the general definition of what it is for a predicate P to be substantial to an individual substance u, see n. 98 below
141. Cf. QDA q. 14. Indeed, this is precisely the point that Siger of Brabant, unable to separate modi essendi from modi significandi in the way Thomas did, found unacceptable in Thomas's conception of the intellective soul: Praeterea, alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi seu formae per se subsistentis. Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secundum quam est aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis est secundum quam habet esse compositum, et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum unde ratio essendi formae materialis est quod sit unita alii. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel formae liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separate, non unum ens cum alio, Et sunt istae rationes essendi, qua aliquid habet esse unite ad materiam et qua aliquid habet rationem subsistentis per se et separate, oppositae adeo ut eidem inesse non possunt. Unde anima intellectiva non potest habere rationem per se subsistentis et, cum hoc, unum fac unable to separate modi essendi from modi significandi in the way Thomas did, found unacceptable in Thomas's conception of the intellective soul: Praeterea, alia est ratio essendi formae materialis et compositi seu formae per se subsistentis. Ratio enim essendi formae materialis est secundum quam est aliquid aliud, ut ratio compositionis est secundum quam habet esse compositum, et ratio figurae secundum quam habet esse figuratum unde ratio essendi formae materialis est quod sit unita alii. Ratio autem essendi compositi vel formae liberatae a materia est quod sit ens per se et separate, non unum ens cum alio.... Et sunt istae rationes essendi, qua aliquid habet esse unite ad materiam et qua aliquid habet rationem subsistentis per se et separate, oppositae adeo ut eidem inesse non possunt. Unde anima intellectiva non potest habere rationem per se subsistentis et, cum hoc, unum facere cum materia et corpore in essendo. Siger of Brabant, De anima intellectiva, in B. Bazán, Siger de Brabant (Paris: Louvain, 1972), pp. 79-80. Cf. also St. Thomas's De unitate intellects, nn. 37-38
142. In De hebd 1c. 2, n. 34
143. 1') (u) (t); otherwise P is accidental to u. Cf. n. 95
144. 1 with-respect-to [P]') (u) (t)
145. 1') (u) (t)
146. ST1 q. 13, a. 11
147. In De hebd lc. 2, n. 33. ScG lb. 1, c. 42, n. 10
148. ScG lb. 3, c. 97, n. 3
149. For this point see J. F. Wippel, Thomas Aquinas and Participation," of America Press in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. J. F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1987)
150. Whether this is indeed so is a metaphysical question, again left undetermined by our formal, semantic considerations, but for the sake of the example it is a quite plausible assumption in any case undetermined by our formal, semantic considerations, but for the sake of the example it is a quite plausible assumption in any case
151. Cf., for example, ST1 q. 18, a. 3
152. ScG lb. 1, cc. 97-98
153. Note that in this argument, we already assumed with Aquinas that life is a kind of being of a higher degree than lifeless existence. This argument shows only, that the fact that lifeless entities can have certain capacities that living beings do not have does not contradict this assumption. Of course, it is a further issue whether and why we are justified in this assumption. For this Aquinas's texts referred to in n. 106. a kind of being of a higher degree than lifeless existence. This argument shows only, that the fact that lifeless entities can have certain capacities that living beings do not have does not contradict this assumption. Of course, it is a further issue whether and why we are justified in this assumption. For this see Aquinas's texts referred to in n. 106
154. Consider the following, more drastic example. God cannot scratch His nose. This is not an incapacity, absolutely speaking, for this is an incapacity only insofar as a higher capacity excludes the presence of the limiting opposite capacity. My capacity to scratch my nose is a capacity that direcuy involves the limitation on the form of being I have, namely, the limitation that it is a sort of bodily existence, restricted to a portion a rather small portion at that, of space and time. So I can have this particular, limited capacity only and precisely on account of the obviously restricted mode of being I have. Thus, despite possible appearances to the contrary, this capacity is obviously an indication of a lower degree of being, whence the lack of this capacity in, or rather its sheer inapplicability to, Divine Being is just a further indication of the absolute perfection of that Being. Thomas on why we cannot truly and properly predicate of God terms that signify perfections but a nose. This is not an incapacity, absolutely speaking, for this is an incapacity only insofar as a higher capacity excludes the presence of the limiting opposite capacity. My capacity to scratch my nose is a capacity that direcuy involves the limitation on the form of being I have, namely, the limitation that it is a sort of bodily existence, restricted to a portion (a rather small portion at that!) of space and time. So I can have this particular, limited capacity only and precisely on account of the obviously restricted mode of being I have. Thus, despite possible appearances to the contrary, this capacity is obviously an indication of a lower degree of being, whence the lack of this capacity in, or rather its sheer inapplicability to, Divine Being is just a further indication of the absolute perfection of that Being. See Thomas on why we cannot truly and properly predicate of God terms that signify perfections but also necessarily involve limitations of being. Cf. ST1 q. 13, a. 3
155. 1SN d. 22, q. 1, a. 2