Status of forces and status of mission agreements under the ESDP: The EU's evolving practice

European Journal of International Law

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 67-100

  Sari, Aurel ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 42549125249     PISSN: 09385428     EISSN: 14643596     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/chn003     Document Type: Review

References (333)

1. The ESDP was launched by the European Council in June 1999 in order to provide the EU with the operational capabilities, made available to the EU by its Member States on a voluntary basis, and the institutional basis necessary for conducting autonomous crisis management operations in third countries. The ESDP's underlying purpose is to enable the EU to respond more effectively to international crises. For an overview of the ESDP see Wessel, 'The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Break-through in the Treaty of Nice', 8 J Conflict & Security L (2003) 265
2. T.C. Salmon and A.J.K. Shepherd, Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making? (2003)
3. N. Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy: The first five years (1999-2004) (2004)
4. Keane, 'European Security and Defence Policy: From Cologne to Sarajevo', 19 Global Society (2005) 89
5. S. Graf von Kielmansegg, Die Verteidingungspolitik der Europäischen Union: Line Rechtliche Analyse (2005)
6. M. Trybus and N. White (eds), European Security Law (2007). Significant changes to the EU's foreign and security policy system were envisaged by the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 29 Oct. 2004 [2004] OJ C 310/1.
7. See Naert, 'European Security and Defence Policy in the EU Constitutional Treaty', 10 J Conflict & Security L (2005) 187
8. M. Trybus, European Union Law and Defence Integration (2005), at 293-394.
9. The Constitutional Treaty was officially abandoned by the European Council in June 2007 in favour of opening negotiations on a less ambitious Reform Treaty (see Council doc CIG 1/07, Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 23 July 2007).
10. The draft Reform Treaty was signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the EU on 13 Dec. 2007 in Lisbon (see Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 Dec. 2007 [2007] OJ C306/1). The Treaty of Lisbon retains most of the innovations introduced by the failed Constitutional Treaty in the field of foreign and security policy. For an analysis of the relevant provisions by Steve Peers see www.statewatch.org/news/2007/aug/eu-reform-treaty-texts-analyses.htm.
11. Art. 2 TEU.
12. See also Naert, 'ESDP in Practice: Increasingly Varied and Ambitious EU Security and Defence Operations', in Trybus and White (eds), supra note 1, at 61
13. Tsagourias, 'EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues', in ibid., at 102
14. Thym, 'Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union', 66 ZaöRV (2006) 863.
15. Bowett, 'Military Forces Abroad', 3 Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1997) 388
16. Erickson, 'Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign Prerogative', 37 Air Force L Rev (1994) 137.
17. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject see D. Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (2001).
18. R.J. Stanger, Criminal Jurisdiction over Visiting Armed Forces (1965), at 111-156.
19. See Young (now Denza), 'The Development of the Law of Diplomatic Relations', 40 BYIL (1964) 141.
20. Cf. M.J. Kelly, Restoring and Maintaining Order in Cornplex Peace Operations: The Search for a Legal Framework (1999).
21. Prugh, 'The Soviet Status of Forces Agreement: Legal Limitations or Political Devices?' 20 Military L Rev (1963) 1
22. Hwang, 'Where Does Inequality Come From - An Analysis of the Korea-United States Status of Forces Agreement', 18 Am U Int'l L Rev (2002-2003) 1103.
23. Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 19 June 1951, 199 UNTS 67. See S. Lazareff, Status of Military Forces Under Current International Law (1971).
24. Agreement between the Member States of the European Union concerning the status of military and civilian staff seconded to the institutions of the European Union, of the headquarters and forces which may be made available to the European Union in the context of the preparation and execution of the tasks referred to in Art. 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union, including exercises, and of the military and civilian staff of the Member States put at the disposal of the European Union to act in this context (EU SOFA), 17 Nov. 2003 [2003] OJ C321/6.
25. For a detailed commentary on the EU SOFA see Sari, 'The EU Status of Forces Agreement: Continuity and Change in the Law of Visiting Forces', forthcoming in Revue de Droit militaire et de Droit de la Guerre in 2008.
26. E.g. UN Egypt (UNEF), 8 Feb. 1957, 260 UNTS 61
27. Israel Egypt (MFO), 3 Aug. 1981, 1335 UNTS 327
28. Italy-Albania (Operation Alba), 21 Apr. 1997, Gazzetta Ufficiale, 9 Mar. 1999, at 4.
29. See D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice (1964)
30. R.C.R. Siekmann, National Contingents in United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces (1991)
31. H. McCoubrey and N.D. White, The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations Military Operations (1996)
32. Bothe and Dörschel, 'The UN Peacekeeping Experience', in Fleck supra note 4, at 487.
33. On ESDP operations generally see Lindstrom, 'On the ground: ESDP operations', in Gnesotto, supra note 1, at 111
34. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 'ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges', 10 European Foreign Affairs Rev (2005) 215
35. A. Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way (2006).
36. E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (2002), at 129-133.
37. Pagani, 'A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union', 9 EJIL (1998) 737
38. Grassi, L'introduzione delle operazioni di peace-keeping nel Trattato di Amsterdam: Profile giuridici ed implicazioni politiche', 53 Comunità Internazionale (1998) 295
39. von Kielmansegg, 'The meaning of Petersberg: Some considerations on the legal scope of ESDP operations', 44 CMLRev (2007) 629. Art. III-309(1) of the Constitutional Treaty, and most recently Art. 28 of the draft Reform Treaty, supplements the list of Petersberg tasks with new missions, including joint disarmament operations and military advice and assistance tasks.
40. See Naert, supra note 1, at 196.
41. Council Joint Actions 2003/92/CFSP of 27 Jan. 2003 [2003] OJ L34/26 ( Concordia); 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 [2003] OJ L143/50 ( Artemis); 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 [2004] OJ L252/10 (Althea; 2006/319/CFSP of 27 Apr. 2006 [2006] OJ L116/98 (EUFOR RD Congo; 2007/677/CFSP of 15 Oct. 2007 [2007] OJ L279/21 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA.
42. App. 3 to Presidency Report on the ESDP (Feira), 15 June 2000.
43. Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP of 11 Mar. 2002 [2002] OJ L70/1.
44. Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 Sept. 2003 [2003] OJ L249/66.
45. Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 9 Dec. 2004 [2004] OJ L367/30.
46. Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 Nov. 2005 [2005] OJ L300/65.
47. Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 Nov. 2005 [2005] OJ L307/61.
48. Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 [2007] OJ L139/33.
49. Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP of 12 June 2007 [2007] OJ L151/46.
50. Council Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 [2004] OJ L228/21.
51. Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP of 7 Mar. 2005 [2005] OJ L62/37.
52. Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 Sept. 2005 [2005] OJ L234/13.
53. Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 [2005] OJ L112/20.
54. Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 Dec. 2005 [2005] OJ L327/28.
55. Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005 [2005] OJ L188/46.
56. Council Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP of 22 Dec. 2000 [2000] OJ L328/53.
57. Commission doc C(2005)4231/1, European Community Border Assistance Mission, 25 Oct. 2005.
58. Council Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP of 10 Apr. 2006 [2006] OJ L112/19.
59. Regarding cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field of the ESDP see App. to Annex VII to Presidency Report on the ESDP (Nice), 13 Dec. 2000, at 58
60. 'EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP', 42 ILM (2003) 242
61. Reichard, 'Some Legal Issues Concerning the EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreement', 73 Nordic J Int'l L (2004) 37
62. M. Reichard, The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective (2006).
63. Scannell, 'Financing ESDP Military Operations', 9 European Foreign Affairs Rev (2004) 529.
64. SC Res. 1484 of 30 May 2003, 1575 of 22 Nov. 2004, 1671 of 25 Apr. 2006, and 1778 of 25 Sept. 2007, respectively.
65. Generally see Denza, supra note 14, at 173-178
66. Marquardt, "The Conclusion of International Agreements under Article 24 of the Treaty on European Union', in V. Kronenberger (ed.), The European Union and the International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (2001), at 333
67. D.R. Verwey, The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of Treaties (2004), at 59-83
68. P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (2005), at 154-160.
69. EU Bill, 4 Oct. 2002 [2002] OJ L293/2.
70. EU FYROM, 21 Mar. 2003 [2003] OJ L82/46; EU FYROM, 11 Dec. 2003 [2004] OJ L16/66.
71. EU-Georgia, 3 Dec. 2004 [2004] OJ L389/42.
72. EU DRC, 1 Sept. 2005 [2005] OJ L256/58.
73. EU Indonesia, 9 Sept. 2005 [2005] OJ L288/60; extended by EU Indonesia, 28 Feb. 2006 [2006] OJ L71/55 and EU Indonesia, 15 Sept. 2006 [2006] OJ L273/9.
74. EU-Gabon, 16 June 2006 [2006] OJ L187/43. The conclusion of a SOFA with Gabon was necessary because the 'over-the-horizon' back-up forces of EUFOR RD Congo were stationed in that country. Pending the conclusion of these agreements, EUPOL RD Congo is subject to the same arrangements as EUFOR RD Congo (see infra note 52 and the accompanying text), while the privileges and immunities of EUPOL AFGHANISTAN are addressed in general terms in the (unpublished) letter by the Afghan authorities inviting the mission into the country: information received from the General Secretariat of the Council.
75. See rec (11) of Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP, supra note 28, and Art. 11(1) of Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP, supra note 22.
76. While these arrangements appear to be non-binding instruments, the commitments undertaken by the third parties concerned in these instruments, whereby they agreed to grant certain privileges and immunities to the relevant EU missions and their personnel, were clearly intended to produce legal effects. Cf. Schachter, 'The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements', 71 AJIL (1977) 296, at 301
77. Aust, 'The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments', 35 ICLQ (1986) 787.
78. For a discussion of the EU's practice of concluding informal arrangements see Sari, 'The Conclusion of International Agreements in the Context of the ESDP', forthcoming in 57 ICLQ (2008).
79. Annex I to Council doc. 10773/03, 26 June 2003; Council doc. 12225/03, Note Verbal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uganda, 4 Sept. 2004.
80. 35 ILM (1996) 75.
81. This arrangement has been confirmed by SC Res. 1575 of 22 Nov. 2004, 1639 of 21 Nov. 2005 and 1722 of 21 Nov. 2006.
82. Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) on the Establishment and Management of the Ceasefire Commission in the Darfur Area of the Sudan (CFC), 4 June 2004 (on file with the author). See recs (14) and (15) of Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, supra note 30.
83. 25 Oct. 1965, 1000 UNTS 393.
84. UN DRC, 4 May 2000 (on file with the author).
85. UNMIK/REG/2000/47, 18 Aug. 2000, available at www.unmikonline.org/.
86. Executive Decision 2006/18 on Privileges and Immunities of the European Union Planning Team for Kosovo and its Personnel, 21 June 2006 (on file with the author); exchange of letters between the High Representative and the Head of UNMIK (on file with the author).
87. Art. 13 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP, supra note 16. Military and civilian personnel made available by states for participating in international peace support operations are covered by the principle of state immunity under customary international law ( see infra note 105), yet the exact scope of this immunity is uncertain. One would assume, therefore, that negotiating SOFAs or SOMAs, or at least informal arrangements, is always 'required', inasmuch as the timely conclusion of such agreements or arrangements is critical for clarifying the legal position of foreign personnel and protecting the legal interests of all parties involved, including private individuals who might suffer damage or injury as a result of the operation. The confusion surrounding the applicability of the UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property (GA Res. A/RES/59/ 38) to military operations has arguably fuelled this uncertainty further: See Dickinson, 'Status of Forces Under the UN Convention on State Immunity', 55 ICLQ (2006) 427.
88. Council doc. 11621/05, 'Public access to documents - Confirmatory application No 33/c/03/05' (submitted by the author), 5 Sept. 2005, at 4. In addition, it should be noted that the position of national contingents in the territory of the host state may also be subject to bilateral or multilateral agreements, including SOFAs, concluded between the host state and the states contributing personnel and assets to an ESDP operation.
89. Supra note 4. The only exception in this regard is the EUPM SOMA, which closely follows the status agreements concluded for the ECMM/ EUMM, and is less detailed than subsequent ESDP status agreements.
90. Council doc. 12132/02, Framework for drafting a document on the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to be used in the event of EU led Police operation, 3 Oct. 2002, at 3-4.
91. Memorandum of Understanding on the Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia, 13 July 1991 (on file with the author). Identical arrangements were made in subsequent instruments relating to the ECMM as well, e.g. Memorandum of Understanding between the EU Member States and Croatia of 21 Dec. 1998 (on file with the author). Diplomatic status was also conferred on the EU Administration of the town of Mostar in BiH: Art. 19 Memorandum of Understanding on the European Union Administration of Mostar, 5 July 1994 (on file with the author). See Lopandic, 'Les Mémorandums d'Entente: Des Instruments Juridique Spécifiques de la Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité de l'Union Européenne - Le Cas de l'ex-Yugoslavie', 392 Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne (1995) 557
92. Pagani, 'L'Administration de Mostar par L'Union Européenne', 42 AFDI (1996) 234.
93. 18 Apr. 1961, 500 UNTS 95.
94. See E. Denza, Diplomatic Law: Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (2nd edn, 1998).
95. EU-FRY, 25 Apr. 2001 [2001] OJ L125/2; EU-FYROM, 31 Aug. 2001 [2001] OJ L241/2; EU-Albania, 28 Mar. 2003 [2003] OJ L93/50.
96. On attachés see The Amazon [1940] P 40 (CA)
97. Caravel Office Building Co v. Peruvian Air Attaché (1975) 347 A 2d 280 (DC)
98. Duff v. The Queen (1979) 39 FLR 315 (Fed Ct Aust), at 352-356.
99. For other attached personnel see US Indonesia, 15 Aug. 1950, UST 1619; Art. V of US Honduras, 20 May 1954, 222 UNTS 87; US Jamaica, 6 June 1963, UST 821; US Kuwait, 15 Apr. 1975, TIAS 8066.
100. Art. 5 of France-Cameroon, 13 Nov. 1960, 741 UNTS 206; US-Congo, 19 July 1964, TIAS 5530.
101. Art.13 of US-Liberia, 11 Jan. 1951, 122 UNTS 125. For an early example see UK-Egypt, 21 Oct. 1937, 184 LNTS 285.
102. Brazil Paraguay, 24 July 1995, 1953 UNTS 124; France Tajikistan, 7 Dec. 2001 [2003] Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF) 12474; Australia-Kyrgyz Republic, 14 Feb. 2002 [2002] ATS 14; France-Guyana, 1 July 2004 [2004] JORF 16337. Some agreements expressly prohibit the conferment of diplomatic status on foreign military personnel: Art. 9(6) of Germany-Tanzania, 22 Jan. 2002, [2002] II BGBI 622; s. VI(6.1) of US UK, 13 Feb. 2006, KAV 7537.
103. US-Grenada, 11 Oct. 1993, KAV 3693; US-Suriname, 17 Jan. 1996, KAV 4513; US-Nicaragua, 25 Nov. 1998, KAV 5581; US Paraguay, 30 Mar. 2001, KAV 6971; US-Afghanistan, 28 May 2003, KAV 6192; US-Rwanda, 11 July 2005, KAV 7344; Art. IX of US BiH, 22 Nov. 2005, KAV 7496.
104. Para. 25 of Israel Egypt (MFO), 3 Aug. 1981, 1335 UNTS 327; Art. VI(23) of UN-Mozambique (UNOMOZ), 14 May 1993, 1722 UNTS 39; Art. VI(24) of UN FYROM (UNPROFOR), 14 June 1994, 1788 UNTS 257; Art. VI(26) of UN Ethiopia (UNMEE), 23 Mar. 2001, 2141 UNTS 24.
105. Art. 1, Additional Protocol UN Angola (UNTAG), 9 June 1989, 1537 UNTS 13; UK-Lebanon (MFO), 31 Jan. 1983, 1316 UNTS 197.
106. UN Lebanon (UNOGIL), 13 June 1958, 303 UNTS 271.
107. UN-Iran (UNIIMOG), 28 Mar. 1989, 1512 UNTS 47; UN-Kuwait (UNIKOM), 20 May 1992, 1675 UNTS 163; UN Uganda (UNOMUR), 16 Aug. 1993, 1730 UNTS 103. On UN military observer missions see J. Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (2nd edn, 2000), at 33-57.
108. Numerous multilateral and bilateral status agreements simply refer to the relevant provisions of the NATO SOFA instead of reproducing them, e.g. Partnership for Peace SOFA, 19 June 1995, TIAS 12666; Memorandum of Understanding between Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden concerning a Multinational Battle Group to be made available to the EU, 17 May 2005 (on file with the author); US-France, 22 July 2004, KAV 6591. This technique is also frequently used in technical agreements.
109. Unlike diplomatic agents, foreign military personnel are usually liable to arrest and brief periods of detention by the local authorities, their private residence is not inviolable, nor do members of their household benefit from most of the privileges and immunities they themselves enjoy.
110. Cf. L.S. Frey and M.L. Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity (1998), at 575-576.
111. It is noteworthy in this context that Israel has granted full diplomatic status only to the Head of Mission of EU BAM Rafah, while other personnel of the mission benefit from the privileges and immunities afforded to administrative and technical staff under the VCDR. See Letter from the Vice Prime Minister of Israel addressed to the High Representative for the CFSP, 23 Nov. 2005 (on file with the author).
112. Council doc 12132/02, supra note 58, at 2.
113. See also Council doc. 9490/06, Policy of the EU on the security of personnel deployed outside the EU in an operational capacity under Title V of the TEU, 29 May 2006, at 9.
114. Council doc 12132/02, supra note 58, at 2.
115. For the classic statement of the functional nature of the immunities of visiting forces see The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812) 11 US 116.
116. Council doc 15711/02, Generic Status of Force Agreement for Police Missions, 17 Dec. 2002.
117. For a status agreement granting certain categories of military personnel the immunities attaching to technical and administrative staff under the VCDR without the corresponding privileges see Art. IV of Brazil Paraguay, 24 July 1995, 1953 UNTS 124.
118. 13 Feb. 1946, 1 UNTS 15.
119. Council doc 15711/02, supra note 77, at 2-3.
120. Council doc 11206/03, Lessons from the planning of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), 14 July 2003, at 8.
121. Council doc 9313/03, Model agreement on the status ofan EU-led Police mission, 14 May 2003. For the first version of this text see Council doc 14612/102, 27 Nov. 2002.
122. Art. IV, Council doc 14612/3/02 REV3, 24 Apr. 2003. Cf. Perritt, 'Policing International Peace and Security: International Police Forces', 17 Wisconsin Int'l LJ (1999) 281, at 310-323.
123. These privileges and immunities include immunity from personal arrest or detention, immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written anclacts done by experts in the course of the performance of their mission, and inviolability for all papers and documents.
124. See Siekmann, supra note 12, at 120-152
125. Bothe and Dörschel, supra note 12, at 496-497
126. Annex to UN doc A/59/710, A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations, 24 Mar. 2005, at 32.
127. Art. VI(26), UN doc A/45/594, Model status-of-forces agreement for peacekeeping operations: Report of the Secretary-General, 9 Oct. 1990 (hereinafter 'UN Model SOFA').
128. These provisions have occasionally been applied on a bilateral basis as well: Art. 1 (f) of France-Burundi, 7 Oct. 1969 [1970] JORF 3784.
129. Art. VI(46)(b), UN Model SOFA.
130. See Art. 37 VCDR.
131. Council doc 14612/3/02 REV3, 24 Apr. 2003, at 7.
132. Ibid.
133. Cf. Manners, 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?', 40 J Common Market Studies (2002) 235.
134. Certain international agreements to which a host state is a party, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, may impose on it an obligation to exercise its jurisdiction under certain circumstances. See van Elst, 'Implementing Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions', 13 Leiden J Int'l L (2000) 815.
135. To paraphrase the Permanent Court of International justice (PCIJ), the host state's undertaking in a status agreement to refrain from exercising its jurisdictional competences constitutes an exercise, not an abandonment, of its sovereignty: The SS Wimbledon (1923), PCIJ Series A, No 1, at 25. Cf. Klabbers, 'Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux', 3 Austrian Rev Int'l & European L 1998) 345. In fact, both the PCIJ and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have found the delegation of broad jurisdictional powers by one state to another compatible with the continued existence of sovereignty:
136. see Lighthouses in Crete and Samos (France v. Greece) (1937), PCIJ Series A/B, No 71, at 103
137. Rights of the Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. USA) [1952] ICJ Rep 176, at 188.
138. The notion that 'unequal treaties' are void has never become accepted in international law: I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (2nd edn, 2006), at 591
139. A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), at 257.
140. See also Lester, 'Bizerta and the Unequal Treaty Theory', 11 ICLQ (1962) 847
141. Caflisch, 'Unequal Treaties', 35 German Ybk Int'l L (1993) 52
142. Craven, 'What Happened to Unequal Treaties? The Continuities of Informal Empire', 74 Nordic J Int'l L (2005) 335.
143. At any rate, it cannot be convincingly argued that an international agreement defining the legal position of military and civilian personnel present in the territory of the host state as a result of an invitation to aid and assist the local authorities lacks an element of quid pro quo, as required by some authors, such as Detter, 'The Problem of Unequal Treaties', 15 ICLQ (1966) 1069, at 1088.
144. H. Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2002), at 19-20.
145. E.g. Art. II, NATO SOFA Art. IV(6), UN Model SOFA. It has been suggested that provisions to this effect reflect customary international law: Van Panhuys, 'Some Recent Developments of International Law in Respect ofthe Conflicts of Jurisdiction Resulting from the Presence of Foreign Armed Forces in the Territory of a State', 2 Netherlands Int'l L Rev (1955) 253, at 256.
146. See infra sect. 4. D on claims.
147. Seyersted, 'Jurisdiction over Organs and Officials of States, the Holy See and Intergovernmental Organisations', 14 ICLQ (1965) 31 and 493, at 33-43.
148. E.g.Art. 11 of Israel-Egypt (MFO), supra note 12
149. Art. VII(1)(a), NATO SOFA. See infra note 171, and the accompanying text.
150. Cf. Human Rights Committee Communication 1374/2005 (Spain), 11 Aug. 2006 (dismissing as inadmissible a complaint against the Spanish Police Unit in Kosovo on the basis that its authors failed to seek redress from the Spanish authorities).
151. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), 4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS 222. Cf. Waite and Kennedy v. Germany 30 EHRR (2000) 261, at para. 67.
152. All EU Member States are parties to the ECHR, and as such are obliged under Art. 1 to 'secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms' set out in the ECHR. In principle, this obligation may arise in the context of a crisis management operation in the following circumstances: Where the Member States exercise effective control over an area outside their national territory (Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 EHRR (1995) 99, at para. 62
153. Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 EHRR (2002) 30, at paras 75-80
154. Issa v. Turkey, 41 EHRR (2005) 27, at paras 68-71), to the extent that their personnel or other officials exercise authority over individuals in the host state (Cyprus v. Turkey [1975] 2 DR 125, at 136
155. Öcalan v. Turkey, 37 EHRR (2003) 10, at para. 93), or in cases where the acts of their national authorities produce effects outside their national territory (Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spaini], 14EHRR(1992) 745, at para. 91). There is some uncertainty in the English courts whether or not the first scenario arises only where the host state is itself a party to the ECHR: Al Skeini [2004]EWHC 2911 (Admim, [2005] 2 WLR1401, at paras249, 274-278
156. Al Skeini [2005]EWCA Civ 1609,[2007]QB 140, at paras 79-80 and 96
157. and Al-Skeini[2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 WLR 33
158. but see Wilde, 'The "Legal Space" or "Espace Juridique" of the European Convention on Human Rights: Is It Relevant to Extraterritorial State Action?' [2005] European Human Rights L Rev 115.
159. Whatever the correct position is, for the foreseeable future few, if any, ESDP operations will find themselves in effective control of foreign territory. On the applicability of the ECHR in the context of peace support operations see also Sari, 'Jurisdiction and International Responsibility in Peace Support Operations: The Behrami and Saramati Cases', forthcoming in 8 Human Rights L Rev (2008).
160. Waite and Kennedy, supra note 102, at para. 59.
161. Ibid., at para. 63
162. McElhinney v. Ireland, 34 EHRR (2002) 13, at para. 35. On the applicability of the principle of state immunity to foreign personnel see Shooting Range Extension Case, 86 ILR (1984) 533 (Verwaltungsgerichtshof Kassel), at 534
163. Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F 3d 148 (DC Cir. 1994), at 153.
164. Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 34 EHRR (2002) 12, at para. 36.
165. More stringent conditions might apply if the EU were to administer territory in the absence of effective local government: See Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No 1 on the Compatibility with Recognized International Standards of UNMIK Reg 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo (18 Aug. 2000), 26 Apr. 2001, esp. at paras 21-28.
166. See Brand, 'Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of UNMIK Legislation', 70 Nordic J Int'l L (2001) 461
167. Cerone, 'Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo', 12 EJIL (2001) 469
168. Verdirame, 'UN Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Post-Conflict Situations', in N.D. White and D. Klaasen (eds), The UN, Human Rights and Post-conflict Situations (2005), at 81, 92-95.
169. It is not clear why some of the Member States have opposed this practice. They may have called for more limited privileges and immunities in order to prevent a possible deterioration in relations between the EU and the host country's population. For an account of such a situation see Norman, 'The Rape Controversy: Is a Revision of the Status of Forces Agreement with Japan Necessary', 6 Indiana Int'l & Comp L Rev (1995-1996) 717.
170. Council doc 10651/04, Draft Council Status of Mission Agreement on EUJUST Themis, 18 June 2004, at I. Iowe this point to Naert, supra note 3, at 82.
171. Council doc 8720/05, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the European Union-led forces between the European Union and a Host State, 18 May 2005; Council doc 10564/05, Draft Model Agreement on the status of the European Union Civilian Crisis Management Mission in a Host State (SOMA), 27 June 2005.
172. Council doc 11206/03, supra note 81, at 8-9.
173. Ibid.
174. Council doc 11154/1/03 REV1, Lessons learned from the first EU military operation (Concordia), 15 Sept. 2003, at 7.
175. Council doc 6040/04, Draft Agreement between the EU and some third states establishing a framework for the participation of some third states in the EU crisis management operations (framework participation agreement) - Report, 6 Feb. 2004.
176. 2562nd Council meeting (General Affairs), 23 Feb. 2004, at p. v. The third countries concerned were Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine.
177. EU Romania, 22 Nov. 2004 [2005] OJ L67/14; EU Norway, 3 Dec. 2004 [2005] OJ L67/8; EU Iceland, 21 Feb. 2005 [2005] OJ L67/2; EU Bulgaria, 24 Jan. 2005 [2005] OJ L46/50; EU Ukraine, 13 June 2005 [2005] OJ L182/29; EU Canada, 24 Nov. 2005 [2005] OJ L315/21; EU Turkey, 29 June 2006 [2006] OJ L189/17.
178. Council doc 12047/04, Draft model agreement between the EU and a third state on the participation of a third state in an EU military crisis management operation, 3 Sept. 2004; Council doc 12050/04, Draft model agreement between the EU and a third state on the participation of a third state in an EU civilian crisis management operation, Sept. 2004. Both documents are classified.
179. See Letter from Rt Hon Denis MacShane MP, in House of Lords European Union Select Committee, Correspondence with Ministers (Forty-fifth Report), HL 243 (Session 2005-2006), at 240.
180. 2659th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 23 May 2005, at 10.
181. 2674th Council Meeting (General Affairs and External Relations), 18 July 2005, at 21.
182. In fact, the Council never formally approved the latter document.
183. This is a notable development, given that Art. 24(1) TEU directs the Commission, rather than the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP, to assist the Presidency as appropriate.
184. Council doc 11697/05, Confirmatory application made by Mr Aurel Sari (35/ c/04/05), 16 Sept. 2005, at 4-5.
185. Supra note 86. Cf. UN doc. A/44/301, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 9 June 19 8 9, at para. 25.
186. Council doc 11697/05, supra note 123.
187. See EC Reg 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] OJ L145/43.
188. Supra notes 42 and 43.
189. For instance, there is no need to make arrangements for military policing in the course of civilian missions.
190. E.g. the definition of 'facilities' under Art. 1(3)(f) of the EU Model SOMA expressly includes buildings, whereas the corresponding definition under Art. 1(3)(h) of the EU Model SOFA does not. Similarly, Art. 4(7) ofthe EU Model SOMA grants EU Mission' personnel 'free and unrestricted movement' in the territory of the host state, whereas the corresponding provision, Art. 4(5) of the EU Model SOFA, grants 'EUFOR' personnel 'freedom of movement and freedom to travel' within the territory of the host state.
191. E.g. Council Dec 2002/845/CFSP of 30 Sept. 2002 (EUPM) [2002] OJ L293/1.
192. Other preambular paras concerning the mission's duration and mandate, the EU's broader policy goals, or the objectives of the status agreement may be added, where appropriate.
193. The para. concerned first appeared in the sixth revised version of the draft EU SOFA in Dec. 2002: See Council doc SN 4438/6/01 REV6, 20 Dec. 2002.
194. The clause is extremely broad, given that it covers any international agreement or instrument establishing an international court or tribunal, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea establishing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or GA Res 351 A (IV) creating the UN Administrative Tribunal. It is unlikely that a conflict will ever arise in practice between the majority of these instruments and the EU Model SOFA and SOMA.
195. The model agreements cannot affect the obligations arising under SC Res 827 and 955 creating the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; see Lockerbie Case (Libya v. UK), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures [1992] ICJ Rep 3, at para. 39.
196. It would be arbitrary to dismiss this as a drafting error and instead interpret 'Parties' to refer to any EU Member States and third states contributing personnel to an operation, rather than the 'European Union'. Incidentally, the EU has assumed certain obligations in relation to the ICC under the Agreement between the ICC and the EU on cooperation and assistance, 10 Apr. 2006 [2006] OJ L115/50, though it has not thereby become bound by the Rome Statute.
197. The EU is not a party to the UN Charter and, unlike the European
198. Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649, at paras 181-208
199. Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council [2006] ECR II-2139, at para. 116.
200. See also Declaration on Arts JI4 and K10 of the TEU, Final Act, ToA [1997] OJ C340/1, at 131.
201. See Fleck, 'Are Foreign Military Personnel Exempt from International Criminal Jurisdiction under Status of Forces Agreements?', 1 J Int'l Criminal Justice (2003) 651.
202. A fine example of this is the inclusion of the clause in the Proxima SOMA despite the fact that neither of the two 'Parties' to the agreement, that is the EU and FYROM, was a signatory to the Rome Statute.
203. Council Conclusions on the ICC, 2450th Council meeting (External Relations), 30 Sept. 2002, at 10
204. Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the ICC [2003] OJ L150/67. The EU thereby seems to have closed the door on possible US contributions to ESDP operations that are subject to status agreements based on the EU Model SOFA and SOMA, given the US Government's opposition to the ICC.
205. See Schabas, 'United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All About the Security Council', 15 EJIL (2004) 701
206. Eubany, 'Justice for Some? US Efforts under Article 98 to Escape the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court', 27 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev (2003) 103.
207. Art. 1(1) and (2), EU Model SOFA; Art. 1(1) and (2), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 1(1) and (2), Concordia SOFA.
208. Art. 1(3), EU Model SOFA; Art. 1(3), EU Model SOMA. Provisions of this nature are found in many status agreements, e.g. Art. I, NATO SOFA; paras 1-5 of UN-Egypt (UNEF), 8 Feb. 1957, 260 UNTS 61; Art. I, UN-Haiti (UNMIH), 15 Mar. 1995, 1861 UNTS 268.
209. Art. 1(3)(a), EU Model SOFA.
210. Art. 1(3)(a), EU Model SOMA. The term 'EU Mission' is used in the EU Model SOMA merely as a place-holder, and will be replaced by the official code name of the mission in question.
211. Art. 1(3)(f), EU Model SOFA; Art. 1(3)(c), EU Model SOMA.
212. Art. 2, EU Model SOFA; Art. 2, EU Model SOMA.
213. See supra note 97.
214. Some agreements also impose a duty to respect local customs and traditions: E.g. Art. 4 of Canada Bahrain, 16 Jan. 1991, 1852 UNTS 389.
215. Lazareff, supra note 9, at 100-101
216. J. Woodliffe, The Peacetime Use of foreign Military Installations under International Law (1992), at 172
217. Batstone, 'Respect for the Law of the Receiving State', in Fleck, supra note 4, 61.
218. No corresponding provision was included in the EUPM SOFA. It is unlikely that this omission was intentional.
219. Art. 9, Concordia SOFA; Art. 2(1), Proxima SOFA. The duty laid down in Art. 9 of the Concordia SOFA to respect local and international norms regarding, amongst other things, the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of 'cultural heritages and values' seems to be without precedent in international practice in this area.
220. One difficulty concerns the question whether the duty to 'respect' local law involves a duty to obey local laws and regulations or merely a duty to take these into consideration. For the former view see Heitmann, 'Die Benutzung von Liegenschaften durch ausländische Streitkräfte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland' [1989] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 432, at 434-435
221. for the latter view see Welton, 'The NATO Stationing Agreements in the Federal Republic of Germany: Old Law and New Politics', 122 Military L Rev (1988) 77, at 95-96
222. Phelps, 'Environmental Law for Overseas Installations', 40 Air Force L Rev (1996) 49, at 58.
223. This lack of precision is partly the product of discrepancies between the English and French language versions of the text, both of which are equally authentic. See Schwenk, 'Jurisdiction of the Receiving State over Forces of the Sending State under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement', 6 Int'l Lawyer (1972) 525, at 529-530.
224. Schubert, 'Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection (EP) Overseas as Exemplified by German EP Legislation', 16 Air Force L Rev (1974) 1, at 8.
225. Art. IV(6), UN Model SOFA.
226. Art. 3(3), EU Model SOFA; Art. 3(3), EU Model SOMA.
227. Art. 4, EU Model SOFA; Art. 4, EU Model SOMA.
228. The need to exempt EU personnel from visa regulations in express terms was one of the lessons identified from the conduct of EUPM. See Council doc 11206/03, supra note 81, at 8.
229. Such exemptions may be found in most status agreements: See Art. III, NATO SOFA; Art. VI(33), UN Model SOFA.
230. See also Wright v. Cantrell (1943) 12 Annual Digest 133 (Sup Ct NSW), at 140.
231. Cf. Art. IV(13), UN Model SOFA.
232. Art. 14, EU Model SOFA; Art. 15, EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. IV(13), UN Model SOFA.
233. Art. 12, EU Model SOFA; Art. 14, EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. VI(50), UN Model SOFA.
234. Art. 10, EU Model SOFA; Art. 12, EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. V(16), UN Model SOFA.
235. This particular provision has been omitted from the EU-Gabon SOFA.
236. Art. 11, EU Model SOMA.
237. Art. 5(1), (4), and (5), EU Model SOFA; Art. 5(1), (4), and (5), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Arts. 22(1), 24, and 27(2) VCDR.
238. Art. 5(2), EU Model SOFA; Art. 5(2), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 22(3) VCDR.
239. Art. 5(3), EU Model SOFA; Art. 5(3), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 11(2) UN Privileges and Immunities Convention.
240. Art. 5(6), EU Model SOFA; Art. 5(6), EU Model SOMA. This provision joins together paras (5) and (6) of Art. 4 of the Concordia SOFA. Cf. Art. 23(1) VCDR.
241. Art. 5(6), EU Model SOFA; Art. 5(6), EU Model SOMA. Emphasis added.
242. Possible candidates include the force commander or head of mission, the Council, the Secretary-General of the Council, the Political and Security Committee, or the representatives of the contributing states acting jointly.
243. Art. 9, EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. IV(1), Memorandum of Understanding on Monitoring Activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1 Oct. 1991 (on file with the author).
244. Art. 13, EU Model SOFA.
245. Art. 6(3), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(3), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 31(3) VCDR.
246. Art. 8, EU Model SOFA; Art. 8, EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. VII(1)(a), NATO SOFA.
247. Art. 6(4), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(4), EU Model SOMA. Cf Art. VI(46), UN Model SOFA and Art. 37(2) VCDR.
248. Ibid.
249. Art. 6(1) and (5), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(1) and (5), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Arts. 29 and 31(2) VCDR.
250. Art. 6(6), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(6), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 31(2) VCDR and Art. VI(49)(b), UN Model SOFA.
251. Art. 6(8), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(8), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 33(1) VCDR.
252. Art. 6(9), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(9), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. VI(29)(b), UN Model SOFA.
253. Art. 6(2) and (10), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(2) and (11), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Arts. 30(2) and 36(2) VCDR.
254. Art. 6(10), EU Model SOFA; Art. 6(11), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. 36(1) VCDR.
255. Art. 6(10), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. VII(6) of EU-FRY (EUMAI), supra note 61; Art. 5(5) and (6), Proxima SOFA.
256. Emmanuel v. US, 253 F 3d 755 (1st Cir. 2001)
257. Bici v. Ministry of Defence [2004] EWHC 786 (QB), The Times, 11 June 2004.
258. Nissan v. Attorney-General [1968] 1 QB 28
259. M v. United Nations and Belgium, 45 ILR (1966) 446 (Trib Civ Brussels) and 69 ILR (1969) 139 (CA Brussels)
260. Askir v Boutros-Ghali, 933 F Supp 368 (SDNY 1996).
261. Generally see S.R. Lüder, Völkerrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit bei Teilnahme an 'Peace-keeping'-Missionen der Vereinten Nationen (2004)
262. M. Zwanenburg, Accountability of Peace Support Operations (2005). Cf. Art. VI of UN-Italy, 23 Nov. 1994, 1979 UNTS 351.
263. E.g. para. 38 of UN-Cyprus (UNFICYP), 31 Mar. 1964, 492 UNTS 57; Art. VII(57) of UN-South Africa (UNTAG), 10 Mar. 1989, 1526 UNTS 3; Art. VII(51), UN Model SOFA; Art. VII(50) of UN-Rwanda (UNAMIR), 5 Nov. 1993, 1748 UNTS 16.
264. UN doc A/51/389, Report of the Secretary-General, 20 Sept. 1996, at paras 20-33
265. UN doc A/51/903, Report of the Secretary-General, 21 May 1997, at paras 7-11
266. K. Schmalenbach, Die Haftung Internationaler Organisationen im Rahmen von friedenssichernden Maßnahmen und Territorialverwaltungen (2004), at 166-512.
267. Arts. VII(53) and VIII(54), UN CAR (MINURCA), 8 May 1998, 2015 UNTS 734 Arts. VII(54) and VIII(55), UN Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 4 Aug. 2000, 2118 UNTS 190; Arts. VII(54) and VIII(55), UN-Ethiopia (UNMEE), 23 Mar. 2001, 2141 UNTS 24.
268. Schmalenbach, supra note 185, at 535-564
269. Guillaume, 'La Réparation des Dommages Causés par les Contingents Français en ex-Yougoslavie et en Albanie', 43 AFDI (1997) 151
270. Prescott, 'Operational Claims in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia', Army Lawyer (1998: June) 1
271. I. Guillaume, 'Le cadre juridique de l'action de la KFOR an Kosovo', in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (2002), at 243, 256-258.
272. Art. XI(2), ECMMMoU, supra note 59; Art. 20, Mostar MoU, supra note 59. For a bilateral example of this nature see Art. VII, US-Bill, supra note 66.
273. Art. 13, Concordia SOFA.
274. Art. 16, Concordia SOFA. See Council doc 7307/03, Processing dossiers of the Joint Claims Commission, 7 Apr. 2003.
275. Art. 14, Proxima SOMA; Art. 13, EUJUST Themis SOMA; Art. 14, EUPOL Kinshasa SOMA.
276. Art. 15(1), EU Model SOFA; Art. 16(1), EU Model SOMA.
277. Supra note 191. Incidentally, this highlights a certain ambiguity in the UN's practice relating to operational necessity. Local claims review boards established by UN peace support operations have for decades consistently excluded the UN's liability for damage to or loss of private property caused by UN peace support operations in the course of operational necessities. See Schmalenbach, supra note 185, at 487-496.
278. Since Art. VII(51) of the UN Model SOFA does not mention this exception to the Organization's liability, the UN Secretary-General has recommended that the principle should be formally incorporated into that provision. See UN doc A/51/389, supra note 185, at paras 13-15.
279. This view has been endorsed by the General Assembly in GA Res 52/247 of 17 July 1998. However, despite the limited scope of the Secretary-General's recommendation, recent instruments concluded or adopted by the UN have extended the principle of operational necessity to cover not only damage to property, but also personal injury, illness, or death arising from or directly attributed to the UN. See Art. VII(54), UN-Ethiopia (UNMEE), 23 Mar. 2001, 2141 UNTS 24
280. s. 7, UNMIK Reg 2000/47, supra note 53.
281. Art. 15(2), EU Model SOFA; Art. 16(2), EU Model SOMA.
282. Art. 15(3), EU Model SOFA; Art. 16(3), EU Model SOMA.
283. Art. 15(4) and (5), EU Model SOFA; Art. 16(4) and (5), EU Model SOMA.
284. Art. 15(6), EU Model SOFA; Art. 16(6), EU Model SOMA.
285. Cf. Council doc 11154/1/03 REV1, supra note 113, at 4.
286. In fact, the Council does not hold copies of the various technical arrangements concluded by EU crisis management operations in this area: see Council doc 5030/07, Confirmatory application made by Mr Aurel Sari (01/c/01/07), 27 Feb. 2007, at 10.
287. See also Zwanenburg, supra note 183, at 287-314.
288. Art. 17(1), EU Model SOFA; Art. 18(2), EU Model SOMA.
289. Art. 18, EU Model SOFA; Art. 19, EU Model SOMA. For instance, such a technical arrangement has been concluded between the EU and FYROM defining the practical modalities of the Proxima protection element (on file with the author).
290. Art. 19(1), EU Model SOFA; Art. 20(1), EU Model SOMA. Cf. Art. X(59), UN Model SOFA; Art. 18(1), Proxim SOFA.
291. Art. 19(2), EU Model SOFA; Art. 20(2), EU Model SOMA.
292. E.g. SC Res 1590, 24 Mar. 2005. This practice followed a recommendation to this effect by GA Res A/RES/52/12B, 19 Dec. 1997, at para. 7.
293. Of course, where final status agreements have been negotiated and concluded on the basis of the EU Model SOFA or SOMA, but have not yet entered into force, these final agreements, rather than the EU Model SOFA or SOMA, should be applied provisionally. E.g. the AMM SOMA has been applied provisionally pending its entry into force. Similarly, the Ugandan authorities have applied the terms of the agreement between Uganda and France to other contributing states on a provisional basis before its application was formally extended to these states: See Council doc 12225/03, supra note 47, at 5.
294. See also supra note 44.
295. The fact that speed is of the essence is highlighted by the Council's decision to adopt the text of the EU Gabon SOFA first in one language only. See Council doc 10307/06, Operation EUFOR RD Congo, 8 June 2006.
296. By comparison, it should be remembered that it took the UN over three decades following the launch of its first large-scale peace support operations to draw up the UN Model SOFA.
297. Art. 4(5), EU Model SOFA.
298. See also Art. 4(7), EU Model SOFA.
299. Art. 11, EU Model SOFA
300. Art. 13, EU Model SOMA.
301. Cf. Art. 4(1), EU Model SOFA and Art. 4(1), EU Model SOMA.
302. Art. 2(2), EU Model SOMA.
303. Cf. Art. V(22), UN Model SOFA.
304. Both model agreements state that nothing in their provisions 'is intended or may be construed to derogate from any rights that may attach to an EU Member State or to any other State contributing' to 'EU-FOR' or the 'EU Mission' under other agreements: See Art. 17(2), EU Model SOFA and Art. 18(2), EU Model SOMA.
305. This clause merely safeguards the rights of contributing states without deciding which of the applicable agreements shall take precedence in toto over the other, as does Art. 19(6) of the EU SOFA. Cf. Rapport Fait au Nom de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères sur le Projet de Loin no 1781 autorisant l'approbation de le SOFA UE (par M.B. Schreiner), 26 Nov. 2004, at 18-19.
306. With the notable exception of UNMIK Reg. 2000/47, supra note 53, that is. S. 2.4 of the Reg. confers immunity on KFOR personnel, other than locally recruited staff, 'from jurisdiction before courts in Kosovo in respect of any administrative, civil or criminal act committed by them in the territory of Kosovo'.
307. This has not gone without criticism: See supra note 107. It is worth noting that s. 2.4 does not confer immunity on KFOR personnel before the courts of the Republic of Serbia outside the territory of Kosovo.
308. Arts. 6(3) and 8, EU Model SOMA.
309. Cf. Art. VI(47), UN Model SOFA.
310. In addition to the literature cited supra note 107,
311. see Rawski, 'To Waive or not to Waive: Immunity and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping Operations', 18 Connecticut J Int'l L (2002-2003) 103; UN doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/42, Working paper on the accountability of international personnel taking part in peace support operations submitted by Françoise Hampson, 7 July 2005.
312. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the EU Model SOFA and SOMA are completely one-sided. They do impose various obligations on 'EUFOR' and the 'EU Mission', such as the duty to respect local law or the duty regularly to inform the host state of the number of 'EUFOR' or 'EU Mission' personnel stationed within its territory: See Art. 2(2), EU Model SOFA; Art. 2 (3), EU Model SOMA.
313. For an international relations perspective on this issue see Hettne and Söderbaum, 'Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism', 10 European Foreign Affairs Rev (2005) 535.
314. As in the case of ISAF, see Annex A to the Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, 4 Jan. 2002, 41 ILM (2002) 1032.
315. Editorial Comment, 'The European Union - A New International Actor', 38 CMLRev (2001) 825
316. Reichard (2004), supra note 34, at 52
317. Tsagourias, supra note 3
318. Naert, supra note 3
319. Eeckhout, supra note 37, at 159-160
320. Verwey, supra note 37, at 60-61
321. Thym, supra note 3. Cf. P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (2006), at 409.
322. The literature on the subject is vast. For a selection of views in addition to those already cited supra notes 37 and 221
323. see Pechstein, 'Rechtssubjektivität für die Europäische Union?', 31 Europarecht (1996) 137
324. Wessel, 'The International Legal Status of the European Union', 2 European Foreign Affairs Rev (1997) 109
325. Tizzano, 'La personnalité internationale de l'Union européenne' [1998] 4 Revue du Marché Unique Européen 11
326. Hafner,'The Amsterdam Treaty and the Treaty-Making Power of the European Union: Some Critical Comments', in G. Hafner et al. (eds), Liber Amicorum Professor Seidl-Hohenveldern (1998)
327. Dashwood, 'External Relations Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty', 35 CMLRev (1998) 1019
328. Neuwahl,'A Partner With a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam', 3 European Foreign Affairs Rev (1998) 177
329. de Zwaan, 'The Legal Personality of the European Communities and the European Union', 30 Netherlands Ybk Int'l L (1999) 75
330. Gautier, 'The Reparation for Injuries Case Revisited: The Personality of the European Union', 4 Max Planck UNYB (2000) 331
331. Leal-Arcas,'EU Legal Personality in Foreign Policy?', 24 Boston U Int'l LJ (2007) 165.
332. Tomuschat, 'The International Responsibility of the European Union', in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an Actor in International Relations (2002), at 181.
333. See the arrangements for the settlement of claims made in various Council Joint Actions establishing EU crisis management missions, as well as Council Dec. 2004/197/CFSP of 23 Feb. 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications [2004] OJ L63/68 (as amended by Council Decs 2004/925/EC of 22 Dec. 2004 [2004] OJ L395/68, and 2005/68/CFSP of 24 Jan. 2005 [2005] OJ L27/59).