The division of moral labour. Egalitarian liberalism as moral pluralism: I - Samuel Scheffler

Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes

Volumn 79, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 229-253

  Scheffler, Samuel ^a   Munoz Dardé, Véronique ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 42449128356     PISSN: 03097013     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00134.x     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974), 204-213
2. Elsewhere I have argued for this claim as it applies to each of the first three limiting norms mentioned above. On the idea that we have a greater responsibility for what we do than for what we allow, see 'Doing and Allowing', Ethics, v. 114, n. 2 (January 2004), 215-239
3. On our special responsibilities toward those with whom we have close personal ties, see 'Relationships and Responsibilities', Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 26, n. 3 (Summer 1997), 189-209
4. (reprinted in Boundaries and Allegiances [Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001], 97-110)
5. On the legitimacy of pursuing one's own aims even if that means forgoing opportunities to do good, see 'Projects, Relationships, and Reasons', in R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, and M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), 247-69
6. and also The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev. ed. 1994)
7. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), Chapter 7 (especially Sections 2 and 3). Cited hereafter as PL, with page references given parenthetically in the text
8. My summary of Rawls's views in the next several pages draws on my more extensive discussion in 'Is the Basic Structure Basic?' (forthcoming in C. Sypnowich, ed., The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour of G. A. Cohen [Oxford: Oxford University Press])
9. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971), pp. 54-55, and rev. ed. (Harvard University Press 1999), p. 47
10. G. A. Cohen, 'Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 26, n. 1 (Winter 1997), 3-30, at p. 16
11. Liam Murphy, 'Institutions and the Demands of Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 27, n. 4 (Fall 1998), 251-291, at p. 258. Cited hereafter as IDJ, with page references given parenthetically
12. Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), p. 3. Cited hereafter as EP, with page references given parenthetically
13. 'Rawls and Utilitarianism', in S. Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 426-59
14. reprinted in Boundaries and Allegiances, 149-72
15. See also the Introduction to Boundaries and Allegiances
16. I have discussed holism about distributive justice in the following writings, in addition to those cited in note 12 above: 'Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory', California Law Review, v. 88, n. 3 (May 2000), 965-90
17. 'Distributive Justice and Economic Desert', in S. Olsaretti, ed., Desert and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003), 69-91
18. 'Replies to Ashford, Miller, and Rosen', Philosophical Books, v. 44, n. 2 (April 2003), 125-34
19. See, in addition to the article by Cohen cited above, the following of his writings: 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community', in Grethe B. Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, v. 13 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 1992), 263-329
20. 'The Pareto Argument for Inequality', Social Philosophy and Policy, v. 12, n. 1 (Winter 1995), 160-85
21. If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000)
22. For helpful discussion of this point, see Joshua Cohen, 'Taking People as They Are?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, v. 30, n. 4 (Fall 2001), 363-86