Romulo betancourt: From a communist anti-imperialist to a social Democrat with US support

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 29, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 613-665

  Schwartzberg, Steven ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

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EID: 4244158206     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X9700480X     Document Type: Article

References (220)

1. This conclusion is in accord with a growing literature on the subject. 'Those who assume that the source of Latin America's political turmoil and democratic failures is primarily external - US intervention and manipulation; economic dependence - may be disappointed with the historical analyses in this volume', write Larry Diamond and Juan Linz of a recent collection of essays. Without exception, they note, each of the contributors attributed the course of political development and regime change in the countries they covered primarily to internal structures and actions. L. Diamond, J. L. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1989), p. 47. See also J. L. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore, 1978). The contrary position is based in part on a widespread although mistaken assumption that the Cold War did not begin significantly to influence either US policy toward Latin America, or Latin American politics, until 1947 or 1948. See L. Bethell and I. Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, 1992); and D. Rock, (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, 1994). I am grateful to Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, Robert J. Alexander, Gilbert Joseph, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas Wright for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.
2. This conclusion is in accord with a growing literature on the subject. 'Those who assume that the source of Latin America's political turmoil and democratic failures is primarily external - US intervention and manipulation; economic dependence - may be disappointed with the historical analyses in this volume', write Larry Diamond and Juan Linz of a recent collection of essays. Without exception, they note, each of the contributors attributed the course of political development and regime change in the countries they covered primarily to internal structures and actions. L. Diamond, J. L. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1989), p. 47. See also J. L. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore, 1978). The contrary position is based in part on a widespread although mistaken assumption that the Cold War did not begin significantly to influence either US policy toward Latin America, or Latin American politics, until 1947 or 1948. See L. Bethell and I. Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, 1992); and D. Rock, (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, 1994). I am grateful to Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, Robert J. Alexander, Gilbert Joseph, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas Wright for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.
3. This conclusion is in accord with a growing literature on the subject. 'Those who assume that the source of Latin America's political turmoil and democratic failures is primarily external - US intervention and manipulation; economic dependence - may be disappointed with the historical analyses in this volume', write Larry Diamond and Juan Linz of a recent collection of essays. Without exception, they note, each of the contributors attributed the course of political development and regime change in the countries they covered primarily to internal structures and actions. L. Diamond, J. L. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1989), p. 47. See also J. L. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore, 1978). The contrary position is based in part on a widespread although mistaken assumption that the Cold War did not begin significantly to influence either US policy toward Latin America, or Latin American politics, until 1947 or 1948. See L. Bethell and I. Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, 1992); and D. Rock, (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, 1994). I am grateful to Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, Robert J. Alexander, Gilbert Joseph, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas Wright for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.
4. This conclusion is in accord with a growing literature on the subject. 'Those who assume that the source of Latin America's political turmoil and democratic failures is primarily external - US intervention and manipulation; economic dependence - may be disappointed with the historical analyses in this volume', write Larry Diamond and Juan Linz of a recent collection of essays. Without exception, they note, each of the contributors attributed the course of political development and regime change in the countries they covered primarily to internal structures and actions. L. Diamond, J. L. Linz and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1989), p. 47. See also J. L. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore, 1978). The contrary position is based in part on a widespread although mistaken assumption that the Cold War did not begin significantly to influence either US policy toward Latin America, or Latin American politics, until 1947 or 1948. See L. Bethell and I. Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948 (Cambridge, 1992); and D. Rock, (ed.), Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley, 1994). I am grateful to Gaddis Smith, Diane Bell, Robert J. Alexander, Gilbert Joseph, Paul Kennedy, and Thomas Wright for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.
5. 'In this latter connection, we must not ignore what, as I have frequently reported, may prove in the post war era to be the most dangerous and insidious threat of all to the American mode of life and to democracy - Communism. And it is well to bear in mind that the laws of action and reaction cause the dictators to prepare the most fertile soil for that disruptive ideology.' Spruille Braden, 'Policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable governments.', 5 April 1945, p. 2, 711.00/4-545, Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, DC [Hereafter NA].
6. See Joseph Grew to certain diplomatic missions, 28 May 1945, 711.00/5-2845, NA, and Division of American Republic Analysis and Liason, ' Ambassador Braden's Proposed Policy Respecting Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments in the Other American Republics', Oct. 1945, in a file folder marked 'Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments', in Records of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1945-56, NA. Those favourable included ambassadors Claude Bowers (Chile), Hallett Johnson (Costa Rica), J. F. McGurk (Dominican Republic), William Dawson (Uruguay), Edwin Kyle (Guatemala), George Messersmith (Mexico), Orme Wilson (Haiti) and John Simmons (El Salvador). Those opposed included Ambassadors John C. White (Peru), Willard Beaulac (Paraguay), Walter Thurston (Bolivia) and John Erwin (Honduras). Among the critics, many wished to see the policy pursued multilaterally by the inter-American community as a whole rather than by the United States alone.
7. See S. Schwartzberg, 'The Civility of Yankee Imperialism: Democracy and American Policy in Latin America in the Truman Years', unpubl. PhD diss., Yale University, 1996.
8. Spruille Braden, 'Subject: Combating Communism', 12 May 1947, pp. 2-3, FW 810.00B/5-847, NA.
9. See C. D. Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figures of Costa Rica (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 163-226. Among other projects, the CIA supported a journal, Combate, whose managing editor was Luis Alberto Monge and whose editorial board consisted of Norman Thomas, José Figueres, Rómulo Betancourt and Victor Raúl Hava de la Torre. Whether all of these individuals knew of the ultimate source of the journal's funding is unclear. Figueres would later observe that he had approached the Agency, not the other way around, and would suggest that the outcry resulting from the disclosure of such activities in Ramparts magazine in 1967 was 'silly and adolescent'. Quoted in Ameringer, Don Pepe, p. 164.
10. See C. D. Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figures of Costa Rica (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 163-226. Among other projects, the CIA supported a journal, Combate, whose managing editor was Luis Alberto Monge and whose editorial board consisted of Norman Thomas, José Figueres, Rómulo Betancourt and Victor Raúl Hava de la Torre. Whether all of these individuals knew of the ultimate source of the journal's funding is unclear. Figueres would later observe that he had approached the Agency, not the other way around, and would suggest that the outcry resulting from the disclosure of such activities in Ramparts magazine in 1967 was 'silly and adolescent'. Quoted in Ameringer, Don Pepe, p. 164.
11. R. H. Hillenkoetter to Spruille Braden, 16 July 1947, folder: 'Resignation', Box 22, Spruille Braden Papers, Butler Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York, NY. At this time, Hillenkoetter was still head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) which would only become the CIA under section 102(f) of the National Security Act of 26 July 1947. See M. Warner (ed.), The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, 1994), p. 134 and passim.
12. Central Intelligence Agency, 'The Venezuelan Elections of 14 Dec. 1947', ORE 65, 5 Jan. 1948, pp. 3-4, 'CIA Reports ORE 1948, 58-65 ', Box 256, President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
13. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Version taquigráfica del discurso radiodifundido a toda la Nación por los microfonos de "La Voz del Táchira" en San Cristóbal', 14 Dec. 1945, in R. Betancourt, Trayectoria democratica de una revolución in two volumes (Caracas, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 20. By the end of 1947, a little more than 73,000 hectares had been distributed to some 6,000 peasants. During Betancourt's second term, a little more than a decade later, more than 1.5 million hectares would be distributed to more than 60,000 peasant families. R. J. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, 1982), pp. 271, 504. Technically, there was no latifundia in Japan. The land reform imposed by the US occupation transferred landownership from roughly 2,341,000 landlords to some 4,748,000 tenants. See Steven Schwartzberg, 'The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform', The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 185-216.
14. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Version taquigráfica del discurso radiodifundido a toda la Nación por los microfonos de "La Voz del Táchira" en San Cristóbal', 14 Dec. 1945, in R. Betancourt, Trayectoria democratica de una revolución in two volumes (Caracas, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 20. By the end of 1947, a little more than 73,000 hectares had been distributed to some 6,000 peasants. During Betancourt's second term, a little more than a decade later, more than 1.5 million hectares would be distributed to more than 60,000 peasant families. R. J. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, 1982), pp. 271, 504. Technically, there was no latifundia in Japan. The land reform imposed by the US occupation transferred landownership from roughly 2,341,000 landlords to some 4,748,000 tenants. See Steven Schwartzberg, 'The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform', The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 185-216.
15. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Version taquigráfica del discurso radiodifundido a toda la Nación por los microfonos de "La Voz del Táchira" en San Cristóbal', 14 Dec. 1945, in R. Betancourt, Trayectoria democratica de una revolución in two volumes (Caracas, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 20. By the end of 1947, a little more than 73,000 hectares had been distributed to some 6,000 peasants. During Betancourt's second term, a little more than a decade later, more than 1.5 million hectares would be distributed to more than 60,000 peasant families. R. J. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, 1982), pp. 271, 504. Technically, there was no latifundia in Japan. The land reform imposed by the US occupation transferred landownership from roughly 2,341,000 landlords to some 4,748,000 tenants. See Steven Schwartzberg, 'The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform', The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 185-216.
16. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Version taquigráfica del discurso radiodifundido a toda la Nación por los microfonos de "La Voz del Táchira" en San Cristóbal', 14 Dec. 1945, in R. Betancourt, Trayectoria democratica de una revolución in two volumes (Caracas, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 20. By the end of 1947, a little more than 73,000 hectares had been distributed to some 6,000 peasants. During Betancourt's second term, a little more than a decade later, more than 1.5 million hectares would be distributed to more than 60,000 peasant families. R. J. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, 1982), pp. 271, 504. Technically, there was no latifundia in Japan. The land reform imposed by the US occupation transferred landownership from roughly 2,341,000 landlords to some 4,748,000 tenants. See Steven Schwartzberg, 'The "Soft Peace Boys": Presurrender Planning and Japanese Land Reform', The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 185-216.
17. Quoted in Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 30 Jan. 1946, file: 13, Box 55, Donald M. Dozer Papers, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA. On the Uruguayan initiative and the responses it drew, see Unión Panamericana, Consulta del gobierno del Uruguay y contestaciones de los gobiernos (Washington, 1946).
18. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Versión taquigráfica del discurso pronunciado en Panamá', 28 July 1946, Trayecioria democrática de Una revolución. Vol. 2, p. 180.
19. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 8 Feb. 1946, 835.00/2-846, NA. In a cover letter for the copy which he sent to Braden, Dawson commented : ' I do think it is worthwhile for you to know what one of the brightest men around this section of Latin America thinks of the Argentine situation and its corollaries.' Allan Dawson to Spruille Braden, 9 Feb. 1946, 'Diplomatic Correspondence, 1946-47, A-D', Box 20, Braden Papers.
20. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 8 Feb. 1946, 835.00/2-846, NA. For the situation in Chile to which Betancourt refers, see Andrew Barnard, 'Chilean Communists, Radical Presidents and Chilean Relations with the United States, 1940-1947', Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1981), pp. 359-60.
21. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 8 Feb. 1946, 835.00/2-846, NA.
22. 15 Ibid. This was in many ways the same advice which Betancourt would give the somewhat similarly situated Kennedy administration fourteen years later. 'As for a hemisphere policy toward Castro', Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. recalled. ' Betancourt argued that if the OAS first took action against Trujillo it would be easier to unite the American republics against Castro.' A. Schlesinger, Jr., AThousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965), p. 185.
23. The following interpretation of Betancourt's views is indebted to: Arturo Sosa A., 'Estudio introductorio' in Rómulo Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela: compilation de la columna 'Economia y Finanzas' del diario 'Ahora,' 1937-1939 in three volumes (Caracas, 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 3-341; Aníbal Romero, Elizabeth Tinoco, and Maria Teresa Romero, 'Estudio preliminar' in Rómulo Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935 (Caracas, 1990), pp. 7-39; A. Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partida Comunista de Costa Rica, 1931-1935 (Caracas, 1985); and Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt.
24. The following interpretation of Betancourt's views is indebted to: Arturo Sosa A., 'Estudio introductorio' in Rómulo Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela: compilation de la columna 'Economia y Finanzas' del diario 'Ahora,' 1937-1939 in three volumes (Caracas, 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 3-341; Aníbal Romero, Elizabeth Tinoco, and Maria Teresa Romero, 'Estudio preliminar' in Rómulo Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935 (Caracas, 1990), pp. 7-39; A. Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partida Comunista de Costa Rica, 1931-1935 (Caracas, 1985); and Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt.
25. The following interpretation of Betancourt's views is indebted to: Arturo Sosa A., 'Estudio introductorio' in Rómulo Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela: compilation de la columna 'Economia y Finanzas' del diario 'Ahora,' 1937-1939 in three volumes (Caracas, 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 3-341; Aníbal Romero, Elizabeth Tinoco, and Maria Teresa Romero, 'Estudio preliminar' in Rómulo Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935 (Caracas, 1990), pp. 7-39; A. Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partida Comunista de Costa Rica, 1931-1935 (Caracas, 1985); and Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt.
26. The following interpretation of Betancourt's views is indebted to: Arturo Sosa A., 'Estudio introductorio' in Rómulo Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela: compilation de la columna 'Economia y Finanzas' del diario 'Ahora,' 1937-1939 in three volumes (Caracas, 1992), Vol. 1, pp. 3-341; Aníbal Romero, Elizabeth Tinoco, and Maria Teresa Romero, 'Estudio preliminar' in Rómulo Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935 (Caracas, 1990), pp. 7-39; A. Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partida Comunista de Costa Rica, 1931-1935 (Caracas, 1985); and Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt.
27. See Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 74-5, and Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partido Comunista de Costa Rica, pp. 11-15 and passim.
28. See Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 74-5, and Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt y el Partido Comunista de Costa Rica, pp. 11-15 and passim.
29. Trotsky's succinct defence of totalitarianism is unrivaled on the antidemocratic left : ' The foundations of the militarization of labor are those forms of State compulsion without which the replacement of capitalist economy by the Socialist will forever remain an empty sound. Why do we speak of militarization? Of course, this is only an analogy - but an analogy very rich in content. No social organization except the army has ever considered itself justified in subordinating citizens to itself in such a measure, and to control them by its will on all sides to such a degree, as the State of the proletarian dictatorship considers itself justified in doing, and does. Only the army - just because in its way it used to decide questions of the life or death of nations, States, and ruling classes - was endowed with powers of demanding from each and all complete submission to its problems, aims, regulations and orders.' L. Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky [1920] with a foreword by M. Shachtman (Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 141 . For Lenin's contempt for human life, see the documents in R. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive (New Haven, 1996). On Betancourt's view of Lenin and Trotsky as bringing Russia into the vanguard of the struggle for world socialism, see Rómulo Betancourt to Antonio García, 28 Nov. 1932, in Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935, p. 430.
30. Trotsky's succinct defence of totalitarianism is unrivaled on the antidemocratic left : ' The foundations of the militarization of labor are those forms of State compulsion without which the replacement of capitalist economy by the Socialist will forever remain an empty sound. Why do we speak of militarization? Of course, this is only an analogy - but an analogy very rich in content. No social organization except the army has ever considered itself justified in subordinating citizens to itself in such a measure, and to control them by its will on all sides to such a degree, as the State of the proletarian dictatorship considers itself justified in doing, and does. Only the army - just because in its way it used to decide questions of the life or death of nations, States, and ruling classes - was endowed with powers of demanding from each and all complete submission to its problems, aims, regulations and orders.' L. Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky [1920] with a foreword by M. Shachtman (Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 141 . For Lenin's contempt for human life, see the documents in R. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive (New Haven, 1996). On Betancourt's view of Lenin and Trotsky as bringing Russia into the vanguard of the struggle for world socialism, see Rómulo Betancourt to Antonio García, 28 Nov. 1932, in Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935, p. 430.
31. Trotsky's succinct defence of totalitarianism is unrivaled on the antidemocratic left : ' The foundations of the militarization of labor are those forms of State compulsion without which the replacement of capitalist economy by the Socialist will forever remain an empty sound. Why do we speak of militarization? Of course, this is only an analogy - but an analogy very rich in content. No social organization except the army has ever considered itself justified in subordinating citizens to itself in such a measure, and to control them by its will on all sides to such a degree, as the State of the proletarian dictatorship considers itself justified in doing, and does. Only the army - just because in its way it used to decide questions of the life or death of nations, States, and ruling classes - was endowed with powers of demanding from each and all complete submission to its problems, aims, regulations and orders.' L. Trotsky, Terrorism and Communism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky [1920] with a foreword by M. Shachtman (Ann Arbor, 1961), p. 141 . For Lenin's contempt for human life, see the documents in R. Pipes (ed.), The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive (New Haven, 1996). On Betancourt's view of Lenin and Trotsky as bringing Russia into the vanguard of the struggle for world socialism, see Rómulo Betancourt to Antonio García, 28 Nov. 1932, in Betancourt, Antología politica, 1928-1935, p. 430.
32. Rómulo Betancourt to Raúl Leoni, 12 Oct. 1935, ibid., pp. 511-12.
33. Rómulo Betancourt to Raúl Leoni, 12 Oct. 1935, ibid., pp. 512-13.
34. Although Betancourt described his position as caught between two fronts: the right and the ultra-left, Wall Street and Moscow, he found the latter much less threatening. He thought that the Bolshevik Revolution had entered a Thermidorian phase and that Stalin - having dedicated himself to the idiocy of 'building socialism in one country' - was a Bonaparte without Bonaparte's expansionary ambitions. See Rómulo Betancourt to German Herrera Umérez, 13 Aug. 1931, and Rómulo Betancourt to Antonio García, 28 Nov. 1932, in Betancourt, Antología política, 192-1935, pp. 308, 431.
35. On Haya and Apra, see Schwartzberg, , 'The Civility of Yankee Imperialism', pp. 178-95.
36. Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, speech of 11 Aug. 1931, quoted in Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, 'Treinta años de aprismo' [1955], in Victor Raul Haya de la Torre Obras completas in seven volumes (Lima, 1977), Vol. 6, pp. 424-5.
37. Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, speech of 20 Aug. 1931, text in Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, 'Politica aprista', Obras completas, Vol. 5, p. 48.
38. Quoted in M. Seoane, Las calumnias contra el aprismo (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1932), p. 34.
39. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 35-47.
40. Gómez, Rómula Betancourt, p. 30.
41. The aprista views in this paragraph are a summary of arguments contained in Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, ' El anti-imperialismo y el Apra' [written 1928, published 1936], Obras completas, Vol. 4, especially pp. 89, 120-124, 150, 157, 177ff, 185.
42. Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 30, 44.
43. Valmore Rodríguez would be the interior minister in the first AD government and Raúl Leoni would be the minister of labour. In the 1960s, Leoni would succeed Betancourt as president of the republic.
44. Rómulo Betancourt to Valmore Rodríguez, Ricardo Montilla and Raúl Leoni, 3 May 1932, in Betancourt, Antología político, pp. 354-5.
45. For an excellent discussion of the Costa Rican CP's heterodoxies, see Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 67-86. The best discussion of Betancourt's role in the party is Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt.
46. For an excellent discussion of the Costa Rican CP's heterodoxies, see Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 67-86. The best discussion of Betancourt's role in the party is Gómez, Rómulo Betancourt.
47. Rómulo Betancourt to Rodríguez, Ricardo Montilla and Raúl Leoni, 27 Jan. 1932, in Betancourt, Antología político, p. 335. Although some of the Scottsboro defendants had been sentenced to death at the time Betancourt was writing, they were ultimately released after the Supreme Court reversed their convictions on procedural grounds and one of the alleged rape victims recanted her testimony.
48. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Panorama de los movimientos estudiantiles de Latinoamerica y sus proyecciones', 15 and 22 March 1930 [in Repertoria Americano], ibid., p. 143.
49. Rómulo Betancourt, 'La verdad sobre la situación del Peru', 19 Nov. 1930 [in La Prensa of Bogotá] ibid., p. 221. Mariátegui was a founder of the Peruvian Communist Party.
50. Rómulo Betancourt to Magda Portal and Serafín del Mar, 23 May 1931, ibid., p. 267.
51. Rómulo Betancourt to German Herrera Umérez, 29 July 1931, ibid., p. 300.
52. Rómulo Betancourt to Valmore Rodriguez, Ricardo Montilla and Raúl Leoni, 3 May 1932, ibid., p. 361.
53. Rómulo Betancourt to Hermanitos (Raúl Leoni, Ricardo Montilla and Valmore Rodríguez), 19 May 1932, quoted in Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 72.
54. Rómulo Betancourt to Mariano Picón Salas, 12 Oct. 1932, in Betancourt, Antologia político, p. 426. Since the original Apra platform had only specified action against Yankee imperialism, a standard communist claim was that Apra was covertly allied with the British.
55. Rómulo Betancourt to Valmore Rodríguez, Ricardo Montilla and Raúl Leoni, 3 May 1932, ibid., p. 361 . The work which most bothered Betancourt seems to have been: Manuel Seoane, Las calumnias contra el aprismo (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1932). On the one side, as Seoane comments on page 34, were the Russian bolsheviks who favoured the immediate dictatorship of the proletariat and violent transformation. On the other, 'almost all of the European socialist parties, advocates of the democratic system and of evolutionary transformation'.
56. Rómulo Betancourt to Valmore Rodríguez, Ricardo Montilla and Raúl Leoni, 3 May 1932, ibid., p. 361 . The work which most bothered Betancourt seems to have been: Manuel Seoane, Las calumnias contra el aprismo (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1932). On the one side, as Seoane comments on page 34, were the Russian bolsheviks who favoured the immediate dictatorship of the proletariat and violent transformation. On the other, 'almost all of the European socialist parties, advocates of the democratic system and of evolutionary transformation'.
57. See Leszek Kolakowski, 'The Myth of Human Self-Identity: Unity of Civil and Political Society in Socialist Thought', in Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire (eds.), The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal (New York, 1974), especially pp. 24-5.
58. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Con quién estamos y contra quién estamos', May 1932 [in Venzuela Futura] in Betancourt, Anto logía política, pp. 378-400
59. . Alexander follows Betancourt's misleading recollection of this document as attacking both conservative and communist positions. While it did attack a ' New York ' communist position, it also put forward a Venezuelan one - Betancourt's. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 60.
60. Betancourt, 'Con quién estamos y contra quién estamos', pp. 379-81.
61. The US ambassador, Fred Morris Dearing, after meeting with Haya, wrote an enthusiastic report to the State Department: 'While talking to me, Haya de la Torre gave me the impression of relaxation, and while I was conscious of his intensity of purpose and have the evidence of the last few months to show that he is a man of ability and has the respect of his fellow-citizens, I am still uncertain as to whether I should say that he is a man of destiny or not. From what I know up to this point, however, I should think that if he should become president of Peru, we should have nothing to fear and on the contrary might expect an excellent and beneficient administration of strongly liberal tendencies in which justice in the main would be done, and a period of confidence and well being be initiated.' Ambassador Fred Morris Dearing to the Secretary of State, 7 Sept. 1931, 810.43 APRA/IOZ. Quoted in T. M. Davies, Jr., Indian Integration in Peru: A Half Century of Experience, 1900-1948 (Lincoln, 1974), pp. 110-11.
62. Betancourt, 'Con quién estamos y contra quién estamos ',p. 397. The use of 'Quakers' and 'Jews' as part of a derogatory stereotype was not common in Betancourt's writing. This is the only example with which I am familiar. It may have reflected nothing more than the kind of simplistic association of 'race' with economic backwardness or success which was common at the time. On the other hand, such formulations were not unheard of on the antidemocratic left and Marx had set a particularly nasty precedent in an early formulation of his desire for the unity of civil and political society: 'Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism; Judaism is the vulgar practical application of Christianity. But this practical application could only become universal after Christianity as the perfect religion had completed, in a theoretical manner, the self-alienation of man from himself and from nature. Only then could Judaism attain general domination and make externalized man and externalized nature into alienable, saleable objects, a prey to the slavery of egoistic need and the market... As soon as society manages to abolish the empirical essence of Judaism, the market and its presuppositions, the Jew becomes impossible, for his mind no longer has an object, because the subjective basis of Judaism, practical need, has become humanized, and because the conflict of man's individual, material existence with his species-existence has been superseded.
63. The social emancipation of the Jew implies the emancipation of society from Judaism.' Karl Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' [written in 1843] in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 61-2.
64. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Guerra civil en el Perú y posición del paitido aprista', 19 March 1935 [in Trabajo] in Betancourt, Antología político, pp. 470-1.
65. Betancourt, 'Con quién estamos y contra quién estamos', pp. 397-8.
66. Víctor Raúl Haya de Ia Torre, speech of 11 Aug. 1931. quoted in Haya, 'Treinta años de aprismo', Obras completas, Vol. 6, pp. 424-5.
67. Betancourt, 'Con quién estamos y contra quién estamos', p. 400.
68. For Betancourt's enthusiasm with the popular front, and the opening to Apra in particular, see Rómulo Betancourt to Raúl Leoni, 12 Oct. 1935, in Betancourt, Antología político, pp. 518-21. See also Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 64.
69. For Betancourt's enthusiasm with the popular front, and the opening to Apra in particular, see Rómulo Betancourt to Raúl Leoni, 12 Oct. 1935, in Betancourt, Antología político, pp. 518-21. See also Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 64.
70. In Venezuela: Politica y petróleo, as Arturo Sosa observes, Betancourt attempted to portray López Contreras' regime as little more than a prolongation of the Gómez dictatorship. A very different picture emerges from his contemporary newspaper columns. See Arturo Sosa, 'Estudio introductorio', in Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela, pp. 327-8.
71. In Venezuela: Politica y petróleo, as Arturo Sosa observes, Betancourt attempted to portray López Contreras' regime as little more than a prolongation of the Gómez dictatorship. A very different picture emerges from his contemporary newspaper columns. See Arturo Sosa, 'Estudio introductorio', in Betancourt, La segunda independencia de Venezuela, pp. 327-8.
72. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Venezuela: tierra de riqueza y pauperismo', 25 Feb. 1939, ibid., p. 88.
73. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 88- 114.
74. For a discussion of the break between Betancourt's group and the communists, and of the importance of his 'Economy and Finances' column, see Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 118-47.
75. Rómulo Betancourt, "Venezuela y el Japón, 21 March 1937, in Betancourt, La segunda independencia, Vol. 1, p. 359.
76. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Nuestro comercio exterior', 24 March 1937, ibid., pp. 361-2.
77. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Los tratados de reciprocidad', 27 March 1937, ibid., p. 364.
78. Rómulo Betancourt, ' La proposición venezolane en la conferencia de Panamá', 4 Oct. 1939, ibid., Vol. 3, p. 451.
79. Rómulo Betancourt, 'America Latina y la política emprestista de los Estados Unidos', 11 May 1939, ibid., p. 216.
80. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Con capitales nacionales debe fomentarse la industria bananera', 14 Oct. 1937, ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 622-3.
81. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Nuestra producción de petroleo crudo', 26 Sept. 1937, ibid., pp. 592-4.
82. Rómulo Betancourt, 'La empress "Gran Ferrocarril de Venezuela" y sus abusos intolerables', 3 March 1939, ibid., Vol. 3, p. 98.
83. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Hacia la explotación nacional de nuestro petróleo', 24 and 25 Jan. 1939, ibid., pp. 38-40.
84. Rómulo Betancourt, 'La expropriación petrolera mexicana y las perspectivas de un arreglo con las Compañías yanquis', 20 March 1939, ibid., pp. 124-6.
85. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Una frase de Roosevelt', 7 Jan. 1938, ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 10-12.
86. 66 Rómulo Betancourt, 'La nacionalización de los ferrocarriles franceses', 3 Sept. 1937, ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 555-6.
87. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Economía dirigida frente a economía, 5 Jan. 1938, ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 7-8.
88. Rómulo Betancourt, 'El "antisemitismo" fórmula del despojo económico', ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 59-61.
89. Rómulo Betancourt, 'La expropriación petrolera mexicana y las perspectivas de un arreglo con las Compañíes yanquis', 20 March 1939, ibid., p. 125.
90. Rómulo Betancourt, 'La "Standard Oil" en la picota de la opinión norteamericana', 16 Sept. 1939, ibid., pp. 450-1.
91. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Entente económica y defensiva interamericana con Estados Unidos', 31 Aug. 1939, ibid., pp. 411-13. Although the context provides no evidence, one may assume that the twenty-first nationality was Puerto Rican.
92. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, for example, insisted that the Second World War was the product of the global decay of the bourgeois system and that while those who had provoked it claimed it was a war between fascism and democracy, this was not the case: 'The repression against the labour movement, the abolition of labour laws, the deprivation of individual and collective liberties in England and France have already reached the situation of the German people under Hitler's regime. In these moments, there is no essential difference between a bourgeois-democratic regime converted into a dictatorship and a fascist regime : for the proletariat and the people, the one is the same as the other.' See Vicente Lombardo Toledano, ' Apagar el incendio de la guerra: Tarea del proletariado' [Nov. 1939];
93. and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 'Los trabajadores están en pie de lucha para defender a toda costa la independencia de America Latina' [Jan. 1940],
94. and especially Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 'Informe del comité national de la CTM, al XIII consejo nacional de la misma institución' [April 1940],
95. in V. Lombardo Toledano, Obras completas, 25 vols. (México, DF, 1991), Vol. 22, pp. 274ff.,
96. Vol. 23, pp. 89ff.,
97. and Vol. 24, pp. 13ff. Lombardo Toledano changed his tune rather dramatically once Nazi Germany had invaded the Soviet Union.
98. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 151-63, quotations 161-3.
99. Ibid., pp. 163-92.
100. Report #26, Consulate, Caracas, 19 Oct. 1943, quoted in Roland Hussey, 'Background Material on Acción Democrática in Connection with the Venezuelan Revolution", 24 Oct. 1945, Memos of the American Republics Division of Research and Liaison, Box 16, Records of the Office of American Republic Affairs, NA.
101. Confidential Biographic Data, Jan. 1944, quoted in Roland Hussey, 'Background Material', 24 Oct. 1945, Memos of the American Republics Division of Research and Liaison, Box 16, Records of the Office of American Republic Aflairs, NA.
102. S. G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976 (Austin, 1982), pp. 73-4.
103. Spruille Braden to Frank Corrigan, 13 Jan. 1939, 'Braden, Spruille', Box 1, Francis P. Corrigan Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY.
104. Frank Corrigan to Cordell Hull, 21 Jan. 1936, Foreign Relations of the United States [Hereafter FRUS], 1936, Vol. 5, pp. 126-7.
105. Sumner Welles to Laurence Duggan, 17 March 1936; Laurence Duggan to Sumner Welles, 25 March 1936; Sumner Welles to Laurence Duggan, 26 March 1936; FRUS, 1936, Vol. 5, pp. 127-31.
106. Laurence Duggan to Sumner Welles, 25 March 1936, FRUS, 1936, Vol. 5, p. 130.
107. 'I want you to know just how pleased and satisfied I was at your appointment to direct and formulate our Latin American policy. I can think of nothing that has ever made me happier. This is not only because you are patently the best fitted citizen for the long overdue job of revamping that policy and getting it back on the track but because your integrity, vigor and sound belief in democracy are so needed in the Washington councils.'Allan Dawson to Spruille Braden, 1 Sept. 1945,'Diplomatic Correspondence: 1946-7, A-D', Box 20, Braden Papers.
108. A. G. Keller, ' The Transplantation of Democracy ', The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (March 1945), pp. 165-76.
109. Keller, ibid., p. 175.
110. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 4 Sept. 1945, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
111. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 9 Oct. 1946, ibid.
112. While denying that there was any foundation to communist charges of US support for the coup, Corrigan did mention Dawson's loan in passing. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, 1 July 1946, 810.00B/7-146, NA.
113. Frank Corrigan to Joe Flack, 22 Oct. 1945, 'Flack, Joe', Box 2, Corrigan Papers. Flack was the head of the North and West Coast Division of the State Department at this time.
114. Frank Corrigan to Kevin Corrigan, 27 Oct. 1945, ' 1945 ', Box 12, Corrigan Papers.
115. Alexander, Rómulo Betaocourt, pp. 195-220.
116. Bainbridge Davis, Memorandum of Conversation between Spruille Braden and Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, 25 Oct. 1945, 831.01/10-2545, NA.
117. Spruille Braden, memorandum, ibid.
118. Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 102; Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 259.
119. Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 102; Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 259.
120. Frank Corrigan to Alan Dawson, 15 Feb. 1946, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
121. Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 102.
122. Stephen Rabe has suggested that the larger oil companies protested only mildly because they were prospering and recognised that the 1943 oil legislation was designed to divide profits equally between themselves and the Venezuelan government and that Decree 112 insured such a division for 1945. See Rabe, The Road to OPEC, pp. 102-3. In fact, as Bernard Mommer has shown, a 50:50 profit split was not adopted in 1943, but only an agreement which centered on royalties. The adecos did express the hope that this agreement, together with other taxes, would result in a 60:40 profit split between Venezuela and the oil companies. Venezuela had, however, no legal commitment from the companies to such an arrangement or even to a 50:50 split. There was merely an expectation on the part of the adecos that the 1943 agreement would, over the years, result in a 50:50 split. This had no practical implication for the division of any given year's profits. See B. Mommer, La cuestión petrolera (Caracas, 1988), especially pp. 84-96. I am particularly grateful to anonymous referees from the Journal of Latin American Studies for calling my attention to this fine work and for other helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this essay.
123. Stephen Rabe has suggested that the larger oil companies protested only mildly because they were prospering and recognised that the 1943 oil legislation was designed to divide profits equally between themselves and the Venezuelan government and that Decree 112 insured such a division for 1945. See Rabe, The Road to OPEC, pp. 102-3. In fact, as Bernard Mommer has shown, a 50:50 profit split was not adopted in 1943, but only an agreement which centered on royalties. The adecos did express the hope that this agreement, together with other taxes, would result in a 60:40 profit split between Venezuela and the oil companies. Venezuela had, however, no legal commitment from the companies to such an arrangement or even to a 50:50 split. There was merely an expectation on the part of the adecos that the 1943 agreement would, over the years, result in a 50:50 split. This had no practical implication for the division of any given year's profits. See B. Mommer, La cuestión petrolera (Caracas, 1988), especially pp. 84-96. I am particularly grateful to anonymous referees from the Journal of Latin American Studies for calling my attention to this fine work and for other helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this essay.
124. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 12 Jan. 1946, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
125. Corrigan to State Department, 9 Oct. 1939, 831.6363/1155, quoted in Rabe, The Rood to OPEC, p. 73.
126. Frank Corrigan, memorandum, 11 May 1943, 'State Department', Box 19, Corrigan Papers.
127. B. Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York, 1961), p. 276.
128. William F. Buckley to James Byrnes, 29 Oct. 1945, 831.01/10-2945, NA.
129. Allan Dawson to James Bytnes, 3 Jan. 1946, 831.00/1-346, NA.
130. Rómulo Betancourt, 'Mensaje de Año Nuevo dirigido por radio a la Nación', 1 Jan. 1946, in Betancourt, Trayectoria democrática de una revolución, Vol. 2, pp. 61-6.
131. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 3 Jan. 1946, 831.00/1-346, NA.
132. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 5 Feb. 1946, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
133. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 15 Jan. 1946, 831.00/1-1546, NA.
134. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 16 Jan. 1946; see also Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 19 Jan. 1946, both in 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers. The admission probably came from Carlos Morales, the Foreign Minister.
135. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 15 Feb. 1946, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
136. Quoted in Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 5 Feb. 1946, 831.00/2-546, NA.
137. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, 12 March 1946, 831.00/3-1246, MA
138. Frank Corrigan to Alan Dawson, 14 Feb. 1946, 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
139. Frank Corrigan to Alan Dawson, 15 Feb. 1946, ibid. In a letter in this file from 28 Jan. 1946, Dawson had suggested to Corrigan that members or the Junta went off on an anti-foreign capital bent when they wanted to impress the public, but that he and other members of the embassy had been working diligently ' to make them realize what harm lack of confidence up North might mean'.
140. Frank Corrigan to Arthur Proudfit, 1 May 1946, 'Proudfit, Arthur', Box 8, Corrigan Papers.
141. Bainbridge Davis, memorandum, 12 April 1946, 'Diplomatic Correspondence: 1946-7, A-D', Box 20, Braden Papers. Commenting on the War Department's leak in a marginal note, Braden wrote: 'This is getting to be the standard practice.'
142. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, 2 May 1946, 831.00/5-246, NA. See also the attached memorandum on 'The Venezuelan Supply Situation'.
143. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, ibid.
144. Frank Corrigan to Arthur Proudfit, 1 May 1946, 'Proudfit, Arthur', Box 8, Corrigan Papers.
145. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, 2 May 1946, 831.00/5-246, NA.
146. For background on these parties, see Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, pp. 229-34.
147. Ibid., p. 237.
148. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 6 Nov. 1946, 831.00/11-646, NA. Some of the complaints against AD's tactics were undoubtedly justified, but it seems impossible to get at the truth of some of the more important ones. Before a Copei mass meeting on 18 June 1946, for example, handbills were distributed in Caracas threatening that AD would disrupt the meeting. According to Robert Alexander, who was basing his account on an interview with Rafael Caldera, 'Neither Gonzalo Barrios as governor of the Federal District nor Mario Vargas as minister of the interior responded favorably to Copei requests for police protection for the meeting. The threatened attack did take place, and three people were killed during it'. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 250. On 20 Oct. 1946, in contrast, Copei held a large mass meeting in Caracas without the slightest untoward event. Gonzalo Barrios, Dawson reported to the State Department, 'informed me before the meeting that he was morally certain that there would be no incidents. He said he had suggested to the copei leaders that the meeting be held in the afternoon instead of at night in order to make protection easier, had made arrangements for half of the Caracas police force plus army detachments to be on hand and had called the principal Communist leaders (the Communists were blamed, probably with reason, for the June 18 fracas) into his office on Oct. 19 to tell them that he would hold them personally responsible and jail them if there were any disorder'. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 21 Oct. 1946, 831.00/10-2146, NA.
149. Frank Corrigan, 'Comments on Recent Revolution in Venezuela', 13 Dec. 1946, FW831.00/11-1346, NA.
150. Allan Dawson to Spruille Braden, 30 Oct. 1946, 'Diplomatic Correspondence: 1946-7, A-D', Box 20, Braden Papers.
151. Frank Corrigan to James Byrnes, 7 Nov. 1946, 831.00/11-746, NA.
152. Ibid. Both Dawson and Corrigan were favourably inclined toward Lopez Contreras for what they considered as his role in leading Venezuela away from the Gómez dictatorship. In early 1946, Corrigan had met with him and ascertained that he had completely separated himself from the Medina crowd and was willing to help Betancourt carry out a programme which he considered similar to his own. Corrigan suggested that Dawson pass this information along to Betancourt and received this reply: 'I finally had a chance to talk to Rómulo about General L. C. He has become more bitter against the old man with the passage of time and, from his remarks, it was clear that he would not consider letting him come back as long as he is in power. In an endeavor to find an excuse for continuing the present repressive police system and detentions without formal charges, he and Rodríguez and the Junta as a whole are getting themselves in deeper and deeper with verbal attacks on "reactionary forces" and "the deposed regimes" (always with an "s"). Having created this bugaboo, they cannot well go back on their line and they are a vindictive crowd. I think I wrote you some time ago that Valmore had told me with glee that the Sustanciadora had uncovered some hidden assets of L. C.' Frank Corrigan to Allan Dawson, 2 Jan. 1946; and Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 5 Feb. 1946, both in 'Dawson, Allan", Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
153. 'By taking away not only ill-gotten wealth from former office holders and their sycophants, but legitimately acquired property as well, such an amount of hatred has been engendered that some of those affected have been driven to plotting against the Government. And, to the number of people who still have appreciable influence despite the fact that much if not all of their wealth has been taken from them, there must be added a very large number of other people who were deprived of their liberty and even subjected to torture for reasons probably more closely related to political vindictiveness than to any sound evidence of connection with conspiracy'. Frank Corrigan to George Marshall, 22 Jan. 1947, 831.00/1-2247, NA.
154. Frank Corrigan, 'Comments on Recent Revolution in Venezuela', 13 Dec. 1946, FW83I.OO/11-I346, NA. By July 1947, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would uncover solid evidence that López Contreras was in fact conspiring with the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo to overthrow Betancourt. See Charles Hauch, 'Dominican Involvement in Revolutionary Plot Against Venezuela in 1947', 19 Aug. 1948, 831.00/8-1948, NA.
155. Frank Corrigan, 'Comments on Recent Revolution in Venezuela', 13 Dec. 1946, FW83I.OO/11-I346, NA. By July 1947, the Federal Bureau of Investigation would uncover solid evidence that López Contreras was in fact conspiring with the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo to overthrow Betancourt. See Charles Hauch, 'Dominican Involvement in Revolutionary Plot Against Venezuela in 1947', 19 Aug. 1948, 831.00/8-1948, NA.
156. Frank Corrigan to George Marshall, 17 March 1947, 831.00/3-1747, NA.
157. Frank Corrigan to George Marshall, 22 April 1947, 831.00/4-2247, NA.
158. William Baggs, 'Venezuelan Reds Losing Ground, U.S. Envoy Says', 1 May 1947, Miami Daily News, typed copy attached to William Baggs to Frank Corrigan, 5 May 1947, 'Baa-Baz', Box 1, Corrigan Papers.
159. William Krieg quoted in Richard N. Post, 'Notes on Recent Transportation Strike in Caracas, with Particular Reference to the Communist Situation', 28 Aug. 1947; and Richard Post, 'Strike of Communist-Led Caracas Transport Workers Ends in Virtual Government Victory', 10 Sept. 1947, both in 'Venezuela', Box 63, Records of the Office of American Republic Affairs, NA. Post was head of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs in the State Department. The victory
160. William Krieg quoted in Richard N. Post, 'Notes on Recent Transportation Strike in Caracas, with Particular Reference to the Communist Situation', 28 Aug. 1947; and Richard Post, 'Strike of Communist-Led Caracas Transport Workers Ends in Virtual Government Victory', 10 Sept. 1947, both in 'Venezuela', Box 63, Records of the Office of American Republic Affairs, NA. Post was head of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs in the State Department. The victory was 'virtual' and not 'complete' because the government settled with the communist unions once they gave up their demand for a wage increase.
161. Thomas Maleady to George Marshall, 1 Oct. 1947, 831.00/10-147, NA; Rabe, The Road to OPEC, p. 103. Maleady was chargé d'affaires ad interim in the embassy.
162. See Frank Corrigan to Jack Flatau, 21 April 1947, 'Fl-Fz', Box 2, Corrigan Papers.
163. Quoted in Cecil Lyon to Claude Bowers, 15 July 1948, 'March-July 1948', Box 7, Mss. II, Claude G. Bowers Papers, Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
164. Alexander, Rómulo Betancourt, p. 251.
165. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 26 Dec. 1947, 831.00/12-2647, NA.
166. Central Intelligence Agency, 'The Venezuelan Elections of 14 Dec. 1947', ORE 65, 5 Jan. 1948, pp. 5-4, 'CIA Reports ORE 1948, 58-65', Box 256, President's Secretary's File, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO.
167. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 18 Dec. 1947, 831.001 Betancourt, Romulo/12-1847, NA.
168. On 24 Nov. 1952, Alex Cohen, an attaché at the American embassy in Costa Rica, referred the State Department to 'irrefutable evidence that as late as Sept. 25, 1934 (that is only eighteen years ago) Betancourt publicly stated "I am and I will be a communist". He may quite well have changed since that time, but his [recent] statement that he has fought communism for twenty years is a deliberate misstatement of fact'. Cohen appears to have convinced himself that Betancourt could be a covert leader of a 'little cominform' for Latin America. Alex Cohen, memo of 24 Nov. 1952, 718.00/11-2452, NA.
169. Richard Post, 'Honest Rómulo of Venezuela', 26 Feb. 1948, FW831.00/2-2048, NA.
170. CIA, 'Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curaçao', ORE 31-48, 14 May 1948, pp. 2-3 ', CIA Reports ORE 1948, 30-39', Box 255, President's Secretary's File, Truman Library. In general, US embassy assessments shared this view of declining communist influence. A report of early Aug. 1948 did accept the thesis of a Chicago Tribune reporter that communist activities during the past month had become 'bolder' and that the Venezuelan government was not effectively curbing the movement. By late Sept., however, the embassy would be praising the forthright response of the government to a resolution from a group of communist oil workers and suggesting that the Voice of America contrast this resolution with one from the anticommunist oil workers federation which had expelled them. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 5 Aug. 1948, 831.00B/8-548, NA; and Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 30 Sept. 1948, 831.00B/9-3048, NA.
171. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 20 July 1948, 831.001 Gallegos, Romulo/7-2048, NA.
172. Richard Post, 'Possibility of Revolutionary Attempt in Venezuela', 1 July 1948, 831.00/7-148, NA.
173. 'The general feeling among the Army officers, according to José Giacopini, is that... Acción Democrática has absorbed many of the functions of the Government by placing civilian members of Acción Democrática in high positions which had formerly been under the control of the Army.' Controlled American Source, 'Revolutionary Movement Against the Venezuelan Government', 21 May 1948, p. 4, 831.00/6-448, NA. José Giacopini Zarraga had been secretary general of the junta and had been appointed a governor of the territory of the Amazon by Gallegos.
174. John Thompson, 'Reśumé of Recent Overthrow of Government in Venezuela', 30 Dec. 1948, p. 1, 831.00/12-3048, NA. Thompson was the third secretary of the US embassy at this time.
175. Richard Post, 'Renewed Activities of the Rightist "Opposition" in Venezuela', 4 June 1948, 831.00/6-448, NA.
176. 'Lt. Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez, Chief of Staff of the Venezuelan Army and one of the leaders of the young officers in the Venezuelan Army who brought about the Revolution of 18 Oct. 1945, is very ambitious. He is known to be in opposition to the United States, particularly with respect to its military polices regarding Latin America.' Controlled American Source, 'Revolutionary Movement Against the Venezuelan Government', 21 May 1948, p. 2, 831.00/6-448, NA. 'Llovera Páez is liaison officer with the recently named petroleum industry committee on Communist sabotage, on which Embassy Caracas has a representative. He has shown himself to be unfriendly to the United States.' Richard Post, 'Renewed Activities of the Rightist "Opposition" in Venezuela', 4 June 1948, ibid.
177. John Thompson,'Résumé of Recent Overthrow', 30 Dec. 1948, p. 5, 831.00/12-3048, NA.
178. Ibid., pp. 2-3, 831.00/12-3048, NA.
179. Ibid., pp. 2-4, 831.00/12-3048, NA.
180. ibid., pp. 5-7, 831.00/12-3048, NA.
181. Ibid., pp. 1, 7-8, 831.00/12-3048, NA.
182. John Thompson, 'Theory and Practices of Copei', 17 March 1949, especially pp. 3-4, 831.00/3-1749, NA; and John Thompson, 'Policies and Practices of URD', 31 March 1949, especially pp. 1, 3, 831.00/3-3149, NA.
183. John Thompson, 'Theory and Practices of Copei', 17 March 1949, especially pp. 3-4, 831.00/3-1749, NA; and John Thompson, 'Policies and Practices of URD', 31 March 1949, especially pp. 1, 3, 831.00/3-3149, NA.
184. In late March 1949, the new Venezuelan foreign minister told John Carrigan, the US chargé d'affaires ad interim, that to 'take action against Communist unions, simultaneously with that against the AD unions, was not opportune'. Carrigan, for his part, said nothing in defence of the AD unions and instead suggested the establishment of 'apolitical' labour federations. John Carrigan to Dean Acheson, 1 April 1949, 831.00/4-149, NA. By Aug. 1949, the military junta had exiled a few communists along with a large number of adecos. See William Krieg, 'Deportation of Communists from Venezuela', 29 Sept. 1949, 831.00/9-2949, NA.
185. Disappointment was evident even before the Venezuelan coup as can be seen in the following column by Eduardo Rodriguez Larreta: 'A characteristic sign of what we are talking about is the attitude adopted toward the Peruvian military coup; a coup conducted by force, and without extenuating circumstances, against the rule of law. Not even the traditional consultations among foreign ministries have been initiated to consider whether that government should be recognised. Today we learn that the United States has, on its own account, decided on recognition; an example which will surely be followed by others in the hemisphere. Just as we attribute part of the responsibility for retrograde developments to the weakness and disunity of the democratic forces, it doesn't hurt to add that the indifference which the United States is displaying toward the organisation and life of the countries of "the good neighbourhood", conspires terribly against the future of these republics. The simple moral support of that formidable nation constituted a great point of leverage for the democracies against totalitarian tendencies.' 'Latino-América crucificada', El País (Montevideo), 23 Nov. 1948.
186. Quoted in a press release issued by the State Department on 10 Dec. 1948, reproduced in a circular to US ambassadors in Latin America, 13 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1348, NA.
187. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 9 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-948, NA.
188. Leroy Mallory to George Marshall, 13 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1348, NA. C. Allan Stewart appears to have been the delegate dispatched.
189. Rómulo Gallegos to Harry Truman, 15 Dec. 1948, Confidential File, White House Central Files, Truman Library. See also Joseph Flack to Dean Acheson, 19 Jan. 1949, 831.00/1-1949, NA.
190. Leroy Mallory to George Marshall, 13 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1348, NA.
191. Walter Donnelly, memorandum of conversation with Robert Brinsmade, 7 Dec. 1948, attached to Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 10 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1048, NA.
192. Acting Secretary of State Lovett to the embassy in Caracas, 10 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-848, NA.
193. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 9 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-948, NA.
194. If anything Creole's Arthur Proudfit appears to have desired a continuation of the Gallegos administration. In May 1948, he told Richard Post of the State Department's division of north and west coast affairs that he had been worried about a possible rightist coup attempt in the months before Gallegos' inauguration and while he could not imagine such a coup succeeding, he thought that it might do great harm both materially and politically. Richard Post, 'Renewed Activities of the Rightist "Opposition" in Venezuela', 4 June 1948, 831.00/6-448, NA.
195. Leroy Mallory to George Marshall, 13 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1348, NA.
196. William Buckley to George Marshall, 9 Dec. 1948, FW731.02/12-548, NA.
197. After the event, Edward Adams acknowledged that he had 'thoughtlessly contributed to anti-United States propaganda' and that his presence among military officers at the start of the coup had been improper although it 'appeared at that time to be a logical way to obtain information'. He also admitted that during lunch at the tank battalion's officers club, 'A civilian at the table talked excitedly to me but his Spanish was entirely too rapid for me to comprehend; besides, I was trying to question the officers concerning their military plans.'Edward Adams, memoranda of 6 Dec. 1948 enclosed with Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 11 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-1148, NA. Adams does not seem to have recalled being warned twice beforehand by the ambassador to avoid contact with Venezuelan officers during the crisis. See Walter Donnelly to LeRoy Irwin, 22 March 1949, ibid. Irwin was head of army intelligence and in this letter Donnelly spelled out his reasons for wanting Adams' transferred. Donnelly did not question Adams' motives, but he did deplore his judgement.
198. Frank Corrigan, 'Inaccuracy of Reports from Military Attaché's Office', 20 Nov. 1945, and enclosures, 121.5431/11-2045, NA.
199. Allan Dawson to James Byrnes, 19 Jan. 1946, 831.00/1-1946, NA.
200. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 7 Feb. 1946, File: 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
201. 172 Dissent of the Intelligence Division of the Department of the Army, Enclosure 'A', attached to CIA, 'The Venezuelan Elections of 14 Dec. 1947', ORE 65, 5 Jan. 1948, pp. 3-4, 'CIA Reports ORE 1948, 58-65', Box 256, President's Secretary's File, Truman Library.
202. CIA, 'Vulnerability to Sabotage of Petroleum Installations in Venezuela, Aruba, and Curaçao', ORE 31-48, 14 May 1948, pp. 2-3', CIA Reports ORE 1948, 30-39', Box 255, President's Secretary's File, Truman Library.
203. Spruille Braden to Nelson Rockefeller, 22 Jan. 1945, 121.54/1-2245, NA.
204. See S. J. Chamberlin to Spruille Braden, 17 June 1946, and the enclosed directive of the same date by Deputy Chief of Staff Thomas Handy, FW121.54/6-1746, NA. Handy's directive reiterated civilian authority over the MAs, and MA reporting, but it dug in its heels over requiring the MAs to reveal the identity of all sources upon request. It told the MAs only that they 'may' reveal sources.
205. Allan Dawson to Frank Corrigan, 15 Jan. 1947, File: 'Dawson, Allan', Box 3, Corrigan Papers.
206. Allan Dawson to Ellis Briggs and John Dreier, 20 Feb. 1947, Memos Relating to General Latin American Affairs, Box 12, Records of the office of American Republic Affairs, NA.
207. Allan Dawson to Ellis Briggs and John Dreier, 20 March 1947, ibid. Box 13, Records of the Office of American Republic Affairs, NA.
208. Allan Dawson to Spruille Braden, Ellis Briggs and John Dreier, 2 April 1947, ibid.
209. Allan Dawson to Ellis Briggs and John Dreier, 20 Feb. 1947, ibid. Box 12, Records of the Office of American Republic Affairs, NA. At a second conference held the following year, Donald Dozer of the State Department's intelligence organisation found a number of the attachés to be reactionary in their outlook. At the same time, he saw 'an almost eager willingness on the part of most attachés to follow the behests of Washington in so far as those behests are known to them'. Donald Dozer, 'Report on the Second Latin American Intelligence Conference, 18 Feb. 1948, Box 48, File 4, Donald Marquand Dozer Papers, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
210. Bethany Aram, 'Exporting Rhetoric, Importing Oil: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1945-1948', World Affairs, Vol. 154, No. 3 (Winter 1992), p. 97.
211. 182 William Krieg, 'Conversation of Ambassador Donnelly with Rómulo Betancourt', 28 Dec. 1948, FW831.001 Betancourt, Romulo/12-1648, NA.
212. On Berle's speech and its impact, see Leslie Bethell, 'Brazil', in Bethell and Roxborough (eds.), Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948,pp. 52-5.
213. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 14 Sept. 1948, 831.00/9-1448, NA. For an early warning of Pérez Jiménez's potential support for an anti-Gallegos revolt, see Richard Post, 'Possibility of Revolutionary Attempt in Venezuela', 1 July 1948, 831.00/7-148, NA.
214. In March 1948, Pérez Jiménez was sent abroad on a tour of Latin American countries. Reports from various US embassies indicated that he was opposed to arms standardisation and also to sending Latin American troops outside the hemisphere. See Sheldon Mills, circular telegram, 2 Dec. 1948, 831.00/12-148, NA.
215. Walter Donnelly to George Marshall, 17 Nov. 1948, 831.00/1-1748, quoted in Bethany Aram, 'Exporting Rhetoric, Importing Oil: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1945 1948', World Affairs, Vol. 154, No. 3 (Winter 1992), p. 97.
216. Walter Donnelly to Dean Acheson, 25 May 1949, p. 2, 710.11/5-2549, NA.
217. In his classic account of the Good Neighbour Policy, Bryce Wood goes so far as to claim that 'The policy of nonintervention renounced one technique, the use of armed force, for the pursuit of any and all policy objectives.' His account does not sustain this assertion and, on the contrary, contains considerable evidence of the willingness of US officials to use force if a situation were to arise in which US national security was directly threatened. If certain European governments were to do in Mexico what they did in Spain, Roosevelt asked a press conference on 20 April 1938, 'Do you think that the United States could stand idly by and have this European menace right on our own borders?' His own answer left no room for doubt: 'Of course not. You could not stand for it.' Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 137, quotation 349.
218. The apparent success of the Good Neighbour Policy in the late 19305 and early 19405 in fact had a good deal less to do with the US commitment to non-intervention than these officials supposed. They consistently overestimated the importance of their own activities for the formation of Latin American attitudes toward the United States and consistently underestimated the influence of other factors such as the New Deal and the recovery of US capitalism, the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the common hemispheric response to that threat, the aspirations and solidarity of democratic and progressive movements in the region, and the opportunistic pro-Americanism of communist movements for several years before the Hitler-Stalin Pact and for several years after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. They also failed to distinguish between the impact on Latin American attitudes of such things as their refusal to intervene on behalf of US economic interests in Mexico in 1938 and their refusal to intervene against dictatorships such as those of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua or Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.
219. This formulation of the ideological conflict between nationalism and democracy is taken from E. Kedourie, Nationalism [1960] fourth edition (Oxford, 1993), pp. 128-9.
220. See Daniel H. Levine, 'Venezuela: The Nature, Sources, and Future Prospects of Democracy', in Diamond, Linz and Lipset (eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America, pp. 257-9.