Mexico's shock plan: The dialectics of macro- and microregionalization

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 437-467

  Saxe Fernández, John ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4243924243     PISSN: 08914486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02098686     Document Type: Review

References (107)

1. For a general assessment on this, see John Saxe-Fernández, "After the Cold War: New Strategies in Latin American-United States Relations," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter 1994, pp. 225-253.
2. See Pablo González Casanova, Globalidad, Neoliberalismo y Democracia, México, Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades, (CIICH), UNAM, 1995;
3. and Arthur MacEwan, Globalization and Stagnation, C.I.I.C.H, UNAM, 1995. Regarding the jurisdictional aspects of Article 15 of the bailout package, Acuerdo Marco entre Estados Unidos de América y México para la Establización de la Economía Méxicana, under the heading of "Applicable Legislation and Surrender of Jurisditionality" ("Legislación Aplicable y Sometimiento de Jurisdiccionalidad"), it is stated that the bailout package will be interpreted "according to and under the laws of the State of New York, in as much as it is not inconsistent with the federal laws of the United States. By this act, and irrevocably, México, the Bank of México and Pemex and all its enterprises are subjected for all the purposes of this Agreement and in relation to the same, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of the United States of America located in the District of Manhattan in New York City." The "agreement" technically and formally violates basic tenets and articles of the Mexican Constitution.
4. I am referring here to Robert Cox, "Global Perestroika," in Ralph Milliband and Leo Panitch, editors, New World Order?, Socialist Register, 1992, London, Merlin Press, 1992, pp. 26-43. Cox seems to assume the existence of a global economic structure that "somehow" works on the international system of power relations and that from this action, there emerges a "new political structure" in which the old Wesfalian notion of a system of sovereign states is no longer capable of giving an adequate account of world politics. The problem with some of his central assumptions is the vague characterization of these "forces," which apparently are irreversible. Cox does not present the specific nature of the type of "power relations" that are present nor the context of world politics; thus his analysis seems to rule out any possibility for "praxis," since he fails to locate where such praxis takes place. However, his analysis of the relationships and contradictions between macroregionalization and microregionalization present in current "neoliberal globalization," which he calls "Global Perestroika," are quite pertinent and constitute a proposal that deserves further research and analysis.
5. Gustavo Sauri, "Caerá 7% el PIB en 1995; Ciemex-Wefa," El Financiero, November 11, 1995, p. 8. As of November 19, 1995, it was estimated that Mexico's GDP had fallen 9.6 percent during the third quarter of 1995. James Nash, head of the Latin American division of the Nomura Research Institute, estimates there will be no positive growth until the second or third quarter of 1996.
6. Craig Torres and Paul B. Carro, "El PIB Mexicano se Descalabra y los Inversionistas Tiemblan," The Wall Street Journal, reprinted in Reforma, November 20, 1995, p. 36A.
7. González Casanova, Globalidad, pp. 17-18.
8. Excelsior, June 2, 1994, p. 10A.
9. See John Saxe-Fernández, "The Chiapas Insurrection: Consequences for México and the United States," International Journal of Politics, Culture and Sockty, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter, 1994, pp. 325-342.
10. Excelsior, June 7, 1994, pp. 7A and 8A.
11. Sauri, "Caerá", p. 8.
12. An analysis of current IMF-induced dismantling of labor rights was presented recently by Professor Fernando Talavera Aldana, from the Economics School, UNAM. See Edgar Amigón, "Induce el FMI a Iimitar Derechos Laborales," El Financiero September 5,1995, p. 25.
13. Luis Acevedo Pesquera, "Los Sindicatos Desamparan al Sector Laboral," El Financiero, April 3, 1995, p. 36.
14. Elvia Gutiérrez, "Rebasa La Economía Subterránea al Sector Formal: Más Desempleo," El Financiero, April 19, 1995, p. 1.
15. Ibid. By September, 1995, the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, which groups Mexico's leading Forbes billionaires, recognized that thousands of factories were closing and tens of thousands of small and middle-sized enterprises were on the verge of bankruptcy. "No Hay Repunte del Empleo, Mérico, Inmerso en la Parte más Aguda de la Crisis," El Financiero, September 13, 1995, p. 20.
16. Arturo Huerta, "Ideas Acerca de una Crisis Anunciada," Excelsior, "Sección Ideas Tercera Parte de la Sección A," January 17, 1995, p. 1. Some of the consequences of the economic policy mentioned by Huerta: imports in 1987 were officially estimated at $12 billion and by 1992 jumped to $48 billion. By 1993 they were estimated at $50 billion. (One must recall that Mexico's GDP was estimated at around $270 billion.) In 1987 there was a trade surplus of $700 million, but by 1993 the trade deficit was $19 billion, and $24 billion by 1994. A new trade surplus is expected as a consequence of the massive devaluations that we have experienced since mid-December 1994 to date (mid-November 1995). As economist Thea Lee points out, "In the first three months of 1995, the much-touted U.S. trade surplus with Mexico has already turned into a deficit averaging well over $1 billion per month, which is likely to lead to a $10 to $15 billion deficit for the year. Using the same formula NAFTA supporters used to calculate potential job gains from U.S.-Mexico trade, this deficit would entail the loss of around 300,000 U.S. jobs. Meanwhile, the gap between Mexican and U.S. wages has risen sharply, rewarding companies that move or have moved production to Mexico and encouraging immigration, both legal and illegal,"
17. "Assessing NAFTA's Impact: Employment, Trade and Social Issues," mimeo, Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1995, p. 2.
18. Leticia Rodríquez López, "Inminente Suspensión de Pagos y Quiebras Masivas: CCE," El Financiero, November 22, 1995, p. 22.;
19. "Caida de 20.6 en las Ventas," El Financiero, ibid.
20. As estimated by economist Ruiz Durán. See Arturo Gómez Salgado, "Dos Millones de Méxicanos al Desempleo durante el Año, El Financiero, April 3, 1995, p. 45.
21. Arturo Gómez Salgado, "El Financiero, Ibid.
22. Doha Estévez, "Drástica Caída de 6% en la Producción Industrial," El Financiero, September 6, 1995, p. 21.
23. 'Angustia y Agotamiento: La Planta Industrial a 30% de su Capacidad" El Financiero, October 18, 1995, p. 20. Mexico's industrial recovery is being blocked by the IMF-WB-Treasury tight financial and monetary restrictions on nonfinancial investments.
24. See Isabel Becerril, "Cierre de Empresas, Inflación y Desempleo en los Próximos Meses," El Financiero, May 3, 1995, p. 24;
25. Elvia Gutiérrez, "Continúa Bloqueado el Proceso de Industrialización," El Financiero, May 12, 1995, p. 3A;
26. "Ningún Apoyo Concreto del Gobierno: Fomento Industrial a la Deriva, IP," El Financiero, September 5,1995, p. 20;
27. Elvia Gutierrérz, "Padece la Industria Manufacturera el Efecto Inercial de la Crisis de Producción. Durante Junio Cayó 10.9 Por Ciento Anual el Índies de Volúmen Físico de la Producción en Manufacturas," El Financiero, September 8, 1995, p. 3A;
28. and "Desaparecerán las Empresas si no se Suelta el Circulante," El Financiero, October 18,1995, p. 21.
29. Roberto González Amador, "Cuadro Pesimista a Corto Plazo: Ortiz," La Jornada, April 4, 1995, p. 44.
30. "Especuladores Arruinaron a México: El Nobel Tobin," La Jornada, May 30, 1995, pp. 1 and 44.
31. Dolia Estévez, "Rechaza el FMI Cualquier Candado al Capital Volátil," El Financiero, September 13, 1995, p. 5.
32. Mr. Zedillo has followed this IMF policy. When the president of Chile suggested early in September that Mexico should impose restrictions on speculative investments, Mr. Zedillo replied that "México no impondrá 'Candados' a la Inversión Extranjera," El Financiero, September 12, 1995, p. 4.
33. Of particular relevance on this issue, see James Petras and Morris Morley, Empire or Republic? American Global Power and Domestic Decay, New York, Routledge, 1995, pp. 25-62.
34. See Sarah Anderson et al., NAFTA's First Year: Lessons for the Hemisphere, Chicago, Institute for Policy Studies, Center for Urban Economic Development, University of Illinois, 1994, as a good example of an empirically well-founded diagnosis on NAFTA, contrasting with a growing mass of technical studies that have been rendered obsolete by the 1994-1995 events-
35. such as Raúl Hinojosa Ojeda y Robert McCleery, "La Interdependencia Estados Unidos-México, Pactos Sociales y Alternatives de Política, un Enfoque de Equilibrio General Computable," Estudios Económicos, No. 10, México, 1990,
36. and Horacio Sobarzo, A General Equilibrium Analysis of the Gains from Trade for the Mexican Economy of North American Free Trade Agreement, Mexico Centro de Estudios Económicos, el Colegio de México, 1991.
37. On virtually every prediction on NAFTAs short-term impact, Mexican NAFTA supporters were wrong. A similar pattern can be found in U.S. and Canadian research on NAFTA. For a clear and valuable analysis, see Jaff Faux, The Failed Case for NAFTA: The Ten Most Common Claims for the North American Free Trade Agreement and Why They Don't Make Sense, Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 1993.
38. For an analysis of the effects on the United States, see Jeff Faux and Thea Lee, The Effect of George Bush's NAFTA on American Workers: Ladder Up or Ladder Down? Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, 1992;
39. and Petras and Morley, Empire.
40. Thea Lee, "Assessing NAFTAs Impact: Employment, Trade, and Social Issues," mimeo, Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, June 7, 1995, p.
41. NAFTA apologists claimed that this type of macroregionalization would generate enough employment in Mexico to reduce illegal immigration to the United States. But official data show that in the first semester of 1994 the number of Mexican workers registered by the Social Security Institute had increased by only 0.7 percent. Only 87,000 new jobs were generated in that year. There is great uncertainty in respect to many of the Mexican official statistics, their methodology, and their basic assumptions (e.g., a person over 12 years working one hour a week is defined as "employed"), and estimates of unemployment range from an official Mexican figure of 3 to 5 percent to 25 percent estimated by OECD for mid-1994. Thus, before the December, 1994, crisis, the unemployment problem in Mexico was extremely serious.
42. Quoted in Anderson et al., NAFTA's First Year, p. 6.
43. Leticia Rodríguez López, "Riesgo del Plan de Estabilización por Variables sin Control," El Financiero, July 27, 1995, p. 20;
44. Claudia Olguín, "Multinacionales Aprovechan los Precios de la Crisis: Ganga de Empressas Mexicanas," El Financiero, October 7, 1995, p. 6;
45. and "Empressas de EU Invertirán el 60%: Extranjeros Buscan Accionar el Interuptor del Sector Energético," El Financiero, July 4, 1995, p. 12.
46. Rosalbina Garavito, Excelsior, March 2, 1995, p. 7A.
47. As we are reminded by Arthur Vidich in "Teoría Social y Económica en Nuestros Días," Problemas del Desarrollo, Vol. 26, No. 103, October-November, 1995, Institute for Economic Research, UNAM.
48. In Time, reprinted by Excelsior, March 2, 1995, p. 7F.
49. Time, Ibid.
50. Arturo Ortiz Wadgymar, Político Económica de México 1982-1985, México, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1994.
51. Arturo Ortiz Wadgymar, Político Económica de México 1982-1985, Ibid.
52. Carlos Vilas, "La Crisis Mexicana," Realidad Económica, No. 129, Buenos Aires, January, 1995. This is a short and precise account of the crisis.
53. Carlos Vilas, Realidad Económica, Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Alicia Salgado, "Deuda Pública, Barril sin Fondo, Es de 127 Mil Mdnp," El Financiero, September 25, 1995, p. 7.
56. See footnote 2.
57. The text in Spanish reads, "México deberá compietar todos los arreglos necesarios para la transferencia por parte de Pemex a una cuenta especial, del importe que haya recibido por sus Exportaciones de Petróleo crudo y Derivados...sin que alguna entidad de Pemex tenga derecho alguno sobre los fondos. Dichos fondos serán transferidos vía Fedwire al Federal Reserve Bank of New York. México y Pemex se sujetan irrevocablemente, para todos los propósitos de, o en conexión con este Acuerdo, a la juridicción exclusiva de la Corte del Distrito de los Estados Unidos, ubicada en el Distrito de Manhattan en la ciudad de Nueva York..." "...en vista del hecho de que los Acuerdos Financieros constituyen actividades comerciales y de conformidad con las prácticas normales, el Gobierno, el Banco de México y cada una de las Entidades de Pemex, renuncian a la inmunidad en cuanto a i) embargo precautorio, ii) ejecución, o iii) embargo previo a la sentencia." See note 2.
58. John Saxe-Fernández, "After the Cold War: New Strategies in Latin American-United States Relations," International Journal of Politics, Cultural and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, Winter, 1994, p. 231.
59. On this issue, see John Saxe-Fernández, "Aspectos Político-Militares Inmersos en la Integración de América del Norte," in Benito Rey Romay, editor, La Integración Commercial de México a Estados Unidos y Canadá, México, Siglo XXI editores, 1992, especially the "Poscriptum."
60. Fortune, July 26, 1993, p. 123.
61. See John Saxe-Fernández, NAFTA: Los Cruces de la Geoeconomía y de la Geopolítica, Mexico, C.I.I.C.H., UNAM, 1994.
62. Pablo González Casanova, Globalidad, p. 23.
63. Donald E. Shulz, Mexico in Crisis Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1995, p. 6.
64. Petras and Morley, Empire, pp. 126-127.
65. Petras and Morley, Empire, Ibid, p. 52-53.
66. Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. xiii. This is by far the best researched and analyzed study available for this period. The historical record developed in the four volumes of the Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations provides a significant and indeed indispensable background for dealing and grasping "post-Cold War" trends. Of particular interest is the information and rich bibliographic suggestions provided by LaFeber regarding the Mexican experience with the United States. In the section entiled "Saturating Mexico with Americanism," he reminds us that "in 1860, trade with Mexico amounted to $7 million. By 1890 it had quadrupled and in 1900 it reached $64 million....Investments in Mexico grew even more remarkably. In the early 1870's the Mexicans, still angry over being relieved of one-third of their country by the United States in 1848, and having just expelled the French invaders of the 1860s, opposed having U.S. investors building their railroads or buying their lands. By 1910, as the Mexican Revolution was about to erupt, U.S. citizens owned 43 percent of the country's property, and more than did Mexicans. The relationship between the flood of post-1880 investment and the outbreak of revolution was direct." (p. 68) "Between 1903 and 1910 [US] investments skyrocketed to three times those of 1876 to 1900...The massive foreign investments transformed Mexico. As haciendas evolved to export sugar and hemp, landless peasants proliferated and the production of staple foods dropped Mexico grew more corn and beans for domestic consumption in 1867 than in 1910." (p. 221) A description and background for Cox's " macroregionalization" is provided by a key U.S. banker quoted by LaFeber who told the German ambassador in 1904 that "in the United States there is a pervasive feeling that Mexico is no longer anything but a dependency of the American economy, in the same way that the entire area from the Mexican border to the Panama Canal (all Central America) is seen as part of North America." (p. 211)
67. See Arturo Guillén Romo, "Bloques Regionales y Globalización de la Economía Mundial," Revista Economía, Teoría y Práctica No. 3, México, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 1995, pp. 7-24.
68. Cox, "Global Perestroika."
69. Cox, "Global Perestroika." Ibid, p. 34.
70. Cox, "Global Perestroika." Ibid, p. 35.
71. John Saxe-Fernández, "La Doctrina de las Areas Económicas Amplias: Su Relevancia para México," in Javier Delgado y Diana Villarreal, editores, Cambios Territoriales en México, México, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Xochimilco, 1991, pp. 23-41.
72. The best studies and maps available in México have been compiled and published by the Institute de Geografía, UNAM, in its Atlas Nacional de México, 1990 under the consultanship of Josefina Morales, María Teresa Sánchez-Salazar, and Luis Fuentes-Aguilar. According to this source, von Humbolt's socio-economic regionalization of Mexico was based on the division of Provinces and intendencies in use in 1804, and on natural aspects such as temperate zone, and torrid zone. A UNAM regionalizaton study to learn about the condition of ejidos was carried out by N. Bassols, V. Lombardo Toledano, and Antonio Caso in 1930. The General Statistics office published a "Zoning for Statistical Purposes," 1930-1960, and between 1933 and 1937, "studies were carried out to divide the country into economic 'zones' and 'regions.'" The Ministry of National Economy produced in 1959 a study on "Natural Economic Regions and Economic Concentration Zones," in which a delimitation of "natural regions" was made where the behavior of the population and the main economic activities were studied. The first regional division maps by states and municipalities were published in 1961, and by 1965 large regions were outlined. See Angel Bassols Batalla, Zonificación para Fines de Planeación Socio-económica (Regiones Reales), S.P. México 1965 and Instituto de Geografía, Atlas, VI.14.1, 1990.
73. Manuel Gutiérrez Vidal, "América del Norte: Las Regiones de México ante el TLC," Revista de Comercio Exterior, Vol. 44, No. 11, November, 1994, pp. 1008-1014.
74. Manuel Gutiérrez Vidal, Revista de Comercio Exterior, Ibid, p. 1008.
75. The information used by Gutiérrez Vidal clearly indicates that the Northern region has the highest levels of migration. As he points out, "Baja California and Baja California Sur have a positive net migration of 40 and 23 respectively, and Nuevo León of 16.2; then the State of México and Morelos 34 and 18.2, respectively, which compensate for negative rates for Hidalgo and the Federal District and Quintana Roo. However, states like Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi have negative rates of migration (-33.8 in the first case, and -17.8 in the second). The rate for Oaxaca is -17.6 and for Guerrero, -15.2.
76. Ibid p. 1009.
77. Coahuila has a literacy fo 94.5 percent; Nuevo León 95.4 percent; Baja California; 95.3 percent; and Baja California Sur; 94.6 percent. And in the Central part, the Federal District has a literacy rate of 96 percent, the highest in the country.
78. Guerrero has a literacy rate of 73.2 percent, Oaxaca of 72.5 percent, and Chiapas of 70 percent.
79. Information from the Censo General de Población y Vivienda for 1990 indicates that the three subregions composing Northern Mexico have the following "economic participation" (which means the proportion of the economically active population in relation to the total working population): Northwest, 45.9 percent; North, 43.7 percent; Northeast, 45.2 percent. The proportions of the population engaged either as employer, employee, or workers are 62.5 percent, 67.1 percent, and 74.6 percent, respectively. The figures for the subregions of Central Mexico are, for economic participation: Central-North 40.5 percent; West, 42.2 percent; and Central, 44.0 percent The proportion of the population engaged in capitalist relations as described above: 55.9 percent; 56.2 percent; and 67.8 percent, respectively. The figures for the subregions of Central-South Mexico are, for economic participation: Gulf, 41.7 percent; South Pacific 40.1 percent; and Penninsular, 44.0 percent. (The national average is, therefore, 43.0 percent). The proportions of the population engaged in capitalist relatoins as described above: 47.1 percent; 31.8 percent; and 58.3 percent, respectively. The national average is 59.7 percent. Information compiled by Gutiérrez Vidal, Atlas, p. 1010.
80. Data from the Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1990 gives the following account of the subregions that I have grouped in three main regions: Northern Mexico: percentage of the population engaged in primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, Northwest: primary, 24.5 percent, secondary, 24.9 percent, and tertiary, 50.6 percent; North: 18.3 percent, 35.8 percent, and 45.9 percent; and Northeast: 10.6 percent, 37.6 percent, and 51.8 percent; Central: North-central: 26.5 percent, 32.6 percent, and 40.9 percent; West: 24.1 percent, 28.9 percent, and 46.9 percent; and Central: 12.9 percent, 31.6 percent, and 55.6 percent. Central-South: Gulf: 40.0 percent (primary), 21.8 percent (secondary), and 38.2 percent (tertiary); South-pacific: 52.2 percent, 15 percent, and 32.8 percent; and Penninsular 27.8 percent, 22.2 percent, and 50.0 percent.
81. Gutiérrez Vidal, Atlas, p. 1014.
82. On the specific ways Mexican railroad development historically organized the territory, see Ana García, Los Ferrocarriles y la Organización del Espacio Económico en México, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Geográficas, UNAM, 1984.
83. Mario Herrera Ramos, "La Integración como Objectivo de los Planes de Desarrollo de la Frontera Norte," in Gustavo Garza, editor, Una Década de Planeación Urbana-Regional en Mexico, 1978-1987, México, El Colegio de México, 1988, pp. 426-427.
84. Jesús Aranda, "Pedirán que se Considere a Chiapas Zona Fronteriza," La Jornada, April 7, 1995, p. 9.
85. Jesús Aranda, La Jornada, Ibid.
86. This model has long-term geostrategic implications, and its historic antecedents are of enormous importance, as we can see from studying the various phases of macroregionalization in the United States itself-for example, the phase from 1832 to 1865, or, more importantly, the one from 1865 to the end of the nineteenth century.
87. Ana García de Fuentes and Josefina Morales, "El Desarrollo Regional frente a la Modernización," in Angel Bassols Batalla, editor, El Desarrollo Regional en México: Teoría y Práctica, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM, 1992, p. 16.
88. Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America, New York, Avon Books, 1981, p. 211.
89. Joel Garreau, The Nine Nations of North America, Ibid.
90. Jerry Adler and Tim Padgett, "Mexamerica: Selena Country," Newsweek, October 23, 1995, pp. 10-11.
91. Garreau, Nine Nations.
92. Quoted by Garreau, Nine Nations.
93. Adler and Padgett, "Mexamerica."
94. Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in México: 1916-1932, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1972, p. 139.
95. Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in México: 1916-1932, Ibid. p. 194. The recommendation was made by Judge F. J. Klearful, former counsel for the Fall Committee. "He believed that such an arrangement could be made with dissident Mexicans. 'I get your thought,' said Secretary Hughes. 'I am glad to have met you: good bye.'"
96. See Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 85-86.
97. Smith, United States, p. 94.
98. Smith, United States, Ibid.
99. For an account of this incident, see John Saxe-Fernández, "Lázaro Cárdenas: Presidente de Presidentes," in C. Cárdenas Batel, editor, Se Llamaba Lázaro Cárdenas, México, Editorial Grijalbo, 1995, p. 570.
100. Ignacio Rodríguez Reyna, "El Enemigo También Está Adentro," El Financiero, September 25, 1995, p. 42;
101. Ignacio Rodríguez Reyna, "La Derrota de la Vieja Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional," El Financiero, September 26, 1995, p. 28;
102. Javier Ibarrola, "Seguridad National: Esqueleto de la Crisis Politíca y Económica," El Financiero, January 15, 1995, p. 30;
103. "La Frontera, Campo de Entrenamiento para las Fuerzas Armadas de EU," El Financiero, July 3, 1995, p. 76;
104. Doha Estévez, "Incrementó el FBI su Presencia en México," El Financiero, November 6, 1995;
105. Dolia Estévez, "Alerta Roja en la Frontera Norte," El Financiero, November 12, 1995, p. 19.
106. Estévez, "Alerta Roja."
107. Quoted by Fausto Fernández Ponte, "Asimetrías," El Financiero, March 13, 1995, p. 73.