Auctions for procuring options

Operations Research

Volumn 51, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 41-51

  Schummer, James ^a   Vohra, Rakesh V ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Games, bidding auctions: procuring from capacity constrained suppliers; Programming, linear: formulating procurement as longest path

Indexed keywords

AUCTION; BIDDING; DEMAND; SUPPLIERS;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CONSTRAINT THEORY; COSTS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 4243169274     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.51.1.41.12804     Document Type: Article

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