Republican cosmopolitanism

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 336-352

  Bohman, James ^a  

^a SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4243137165     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9760.2004.00203.x     Document Type: Review

References (52)

1. On the various positions and differences among domains in the controversies over globalization, see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
2. See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 98-101, for an argument of this sort that emphasizes the scope of interconnections and its consequences for the realization of autonomy as the key problem for democratic governments.
3. Kant, "On the Common Saying: This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice," Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 90. Kant argues that it is both a practical and a moral necessity to enter into a civil society subject to coercive public law due to the "universal violence and distress" of the state of nature that applies in context of forming a state or a "lawful federation according to a cosmopolitan constitution." While he later weakens this form to "a confederation without the sovereign power of a civil constitution," the achievement of peace is still a moral ideal of pure practical reason, an expression of the highest good and thus a moral duty. See The Metaphysics of Morals in Kant's Political Writings, pp. 165ff.
4. Kant, "On the Common Saying: This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice," Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 90. Kant argues that it is both a practical and a moral necessity to enter into a civil society subject to coercive public law due to the "universal violence and distress" of the state of nature that applies in context of forming a state or a "lawful federation according to a cosmopolitan constitution." While he later weakens this form to "a confederation without the sovereign power of a civil constitution," the achievement of peace is still a moral ideal of pure practical reason, an expression of the highest good and thus a moral duty. See The Metaphysics of Morals in Kant's Political Writings, pp. 165ff.
5. Kant, "Perpetual peace," Political Writings, p. 106.
6. Chris Brown, "International political theory and the idea of world community," International Relations Theory Today, ed. K. Booth and S. Smith (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), p. 93. Charles Beitz at one time suggested such a direct inference from empirical interdependence through trade, but later retracted such a view. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 5ff. For a criticism of this inference, see Brian Barry, "Humanity and justice in global perspective," Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 232ff.
7. Chris Brown, "International political theory and the idea of world community," International Relations Theory Today, ed. K. Booth and S. Smith (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), p. 93. Charles Beitz at one time suggested such a direct inference from empirical interdependence through trade, but later retracted such a view. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 5ff. For a criticism of this inference, see Brian Barry, "Humanity and justice in global perspective," Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 232ff.
8. Chris Brown, "International political theory and the idea of world community," International Relations Theory Today, ed. K. Booth and S. Smith (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995), p. 93. Charles Beitz at one time suggested such a direct inference from empirical interdependence through trade, but later retracted such a view. See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 5ff. For a criticism of this inference, see Brian Barry, "Humanity and justice in global perspective," Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics and the Law, ed. J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 232ff.
9. Kant, Political Writings, pp. 133, 135.
10. Iris Young, Democracy and Inclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 223-4. For a similar account that the scope of obligations derives from sharing a "world," see Judith Lichtenberg, "National boundaries and moral boundaries," Boundaries, ed. P. Brown and H. Shue (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 79-100.
11. Iris Young, Democracy and Inclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 223-4. For a similar account that the scope of obligations derives from sharing a "world," see Judith Lichtenberg, "National boundaries and moral boundaries," Boundaries, ed. P. Brown and H. Shue (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 79-100.
12. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 27.
13. Ibid., p. 213. For various dimensions of this issue, see Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds, Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
14. Ibid., p. 213. For various dimensions of this issue, see Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, eds, Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
15. Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 119.
16. See Allen Buchanan, "Rawls's law of peoples," Ethics 110 (2000), 705.
17. On the "circumstances of politics" see Albert Weale, Democracy (London: St. Martins, 1999), pp. 8-13; also Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 114-17.
18. On the "circumstances of politics" see Albert Weale, Democracy (London: St. Martins, 1999), pp. 8-13; also Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 114-17.
19. On the conception of freedom as non-domination as "robust non-interference," see Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For the problem of freedom and social dependence, see Fredrick Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
20. On the conception of freedom as non-domination as "robust non-interference," see Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). For the problem of freedom and social dependence, see Fredrick Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), ch. 2.
21. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, p. 145.
22. Among other political cosmopolitans, Held and Habermas both have argued for such a fundamentally Kantian, legal interpretation of cosmopolitan democracy.
23. Pettit bases this claim that non-domination is a primary good on its status with reference to planning. "For most all the things a person is likely to want, the pursuit of those things is going to be facilitated by their ability to make plans," which is undermined by the uncertainty produced by the arbitrary interference of domination. See Pettit, Republicanism, p. 91.
24. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2nd edn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). For Shue, economic rights such as the right to subsistence are included among the basic rights; my argument sees them as derivative of basic membership rights in the human political community. In this respect, I agree with Walzer that rights of membership are basic; or, as he put it, "the first social good" to be distributed, since it is the basis for the recognition of further entitlements. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 50. Like other civic republican arguments, this claim about membership rights can be put to cosmopolitan purposes when linked to nondomination as a primary good.
25. See Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2nd edn (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). For Shue, economic rights such as the right to subsistence are included among the basic rights; my argument sees them as derivative of basic membership rights in the human political community. In this respect, I agree with Walzer that rights of membership are basic; or, as he put it, "the first social good" to be distributed, since it is the basis for the recognition of further entitlements. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 50. Like other civic republican arguments, this claim about membership rights can be put to cosmopolitan purposes when linked to nondomination as a primary good.
26. Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 52ff. Michael Alien first pointed out to me that this argument does not sufficiently distinguish classical tyranny and modern domination.
27. See Pettit, Republicanism, p. 183.
28. On "the right to have rights," see Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), p. 298, On the socially destructive consequences of globalization, see Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997).
29. On "the right to have rights," see Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1967), p. 298, On the socially destructive consequences of globalization, see Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997).
30. Rawls, Theory of Justice Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 236.
31. See Fernando Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder: Westview, 1998), 16ff.
32. See Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 17ff.
33. For example, Jaspers distinguishes between humaneness (Menschlichkeit) from humanity (Menschheit). See Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers Correspondence (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1993), p. 413. In republican fashion Arendt argues that Nuremberg marks the beginning of political claims made for humanity.
34. See for example, Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 268; or Mary Ann Glendon, The World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 9.
35. See for example, Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 268; or Mary Ann Glendon, The World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), p. 9.
36. For this formulation, see David Luban, "Crimes against humanity: what's in a name?" Crimes Against Humanity, ed. Charles Jones (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, forthcoming).
37. For a justification of punishment for international crimes along these lines, see James Bohman, "Punishment as a political obligation: crimes against humanity and the international political community," University of Buffalo Criminal Law Review 5, #2 (2002), 101-39.
38. Gary Miller, Managerial Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 16.
39. Saskia Sassen, Losing Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 10. On this issue of the "reversal of agency" in international institutions, see James Bohman, "Cosmopolitan republicanism," Monist 84, #1 (2001), 3-22.
40. Saskia Sassen, Losing Control (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 10. On this issue of the "reversal of agency" in international institutions, see James Bohman, "Cosmopolitan republicanism," Monist 84, #1 (2001), 3-22.
41. Fritz Scharf, Governing in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), ch. 4.
42. On the idea of a democratic and multiperspectival form of inquiry in international institutions, see James Bohman, "How to make a social science practical: critical theory, pragmatism and multiperspectival theory," Millennium 21, #3 (2003), 499-524.
43. See Ngaire Woods, "Order, globalization and inequality in world politics," The Global Transformations Reader, p. 393.
44. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative democracy," Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratisation, ed. Guillermo O'Donnell (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1999), pp. 175-94.
45. Gerald Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity (London: Routledge: 1999), p. 186.
46. For two contrasting views, compare Christian Joerges and Michelle Everson, "challenging the bureaucratic challenge" with Erik Eriksen, "Deliberative supranationalism," both in Democracy in the European Union: Integration Through Deliberation, eds Erik Eriksen and John E. Fossum (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 164-99 and 42-64, respectively.
47. Christian Jorges and J. Neyer, "From intergovernmental bargaining to deliberative political processes: the constitutionalisation of comitology," European Law Journal, 3 (1997), 274-300.
48. There are many different ways to organize deliberation in transnational institutions, but ones that secure freedom from domination are directly deliberative rather than representative ones. Representative democracy does not solve the problems of scale sufficiently to avoid domination. For an account of such a form of deliberation, see Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Sovereignty and solidarity: EU and US," Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments, eds J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
49. Kant, "Theory and practice," Kant's Political Writings, pp. 90ff.
50. See Anthony Padgen, Lords of all the World (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 188.
51. For arguments for the advantages of large numbers, see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, ch. 3.
52. Neil MacCormick, "Democracy, subsidiarity and citizenship," Law and Philosophy (1997), 345. Contrary to the spirit of MacCormick's claim, however, a democracy that is "adequate" to transnational institutions need not thereby be more minimal than democracy in the national state, but rather robust in ways appropriate to its level and scale.