What is sociological about economic sociology? Uncertainty and the embeddedness of economic action;Was ist soziologisch an der wirtschaftssoziologie? Ungewißheit und die einbettung wirtschaftlichen handelns

Zeitschrift fur Soziologie

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 125-146

  Beckert, Jens ^a  

^a FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4243100830     PISSN: 03401804     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. Akerlof, G., 1970: The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488-500.
2. Arrow, K./G. Debreu, 1954: Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy. Econometrica 22: 265-290.
3. Arrow, K., 1969: The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocation. S. 47-64 in: Joint Economic Committee: The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: the PPB System. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
4. Axelrod, R., 1984: The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic Books.
5. Backhouse, R., 1985: A History of Modern Economic Analysis, New York: Blackwell.
6. Boudon, R., 1986: The Logic of Relative Frustration. S. 171-196 in: J. Elster (Hg.): Rational Choice. New York: New York UP.
7. Bowles, S., 1985: The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models. American Economic Review 75: 16-36.
8. Burt, R., 1992: Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge Ma.: Harvard UP.
9. Camic, C., 1979: The Utilitarians Revisited. American Journal of Sociology 85: 516-550.
10. Camic, C., 1986: The Matter of Habit. American Journal of Sociology 91: 1039-1087.
11. Clarke, S., 1991: Marx, Marginalism and Modern Sociology. London: Macmillan.
12. Coddington, A., 1982: Deficient Foresight: A Troublesome Theme in Keynesian Economics. American Economic Review 72: 480-487.
13. David, P.A., 1986: Understanding the Economics of OWERTY: The Necessity of History. S. 30-49 in: W.N. Parker (Hg.): Economic History and the Modern Economist. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
14. DiMaggio, P./W. Powell, 1983: The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review 48: 147-160.
15. DiMaggio, P., 1988: Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory. S. 3-22 in: L. Zucker (Hg.): Institutional Patterns and Organizations. Cambridge Ma.: Ballinger.
16. Durkheim, É., 1992: Über soziale Arbeitsteilung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
17. Elster, J. (Hg.), 1986: Rational Choice. New York: New York UP.
18. Elster, J., 1990: When Rationality Fails. S. 19-51 in: K.S. Cook/M. Levi (Hg.): The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: Chicago UP.
19. Etzioni, A., 1988: The Moral Dimension, New York: Free Press.
20. Fox, A., 1974: Beyond Contract. London: Faber and Faber.
21. Frank, R., 1990: Rethinking Rational Choice. S. 53-87 in: R. Friedland/A.F. Robertson (Hg.): Beyond the Marketplace. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
22. Giddens, A., 1984: The Constitution of Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
23. Giddens, A., 1994: Risk, Trust, Reflexivity. S. 184-197 in: U. Beck /A. Giddens/S. Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Stanford Ca.: Stanford UP.
24. Gould, M., 1991: Parsons' Economic Sociology: A Failure of Will. Sociological Inquiry 61: 89-101.
25. Granovetter M./Swedberg R. (Hg.), 1992: The Sociology of Economic Life. Boulder et al.: Westview.
26. Granovetter, M., 1973: The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 78: 89-101.
27. Granovetter, M., 1985: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, American Journal of Sociology 91: 481-510.
28. Gul, F., 1991: On the Bayesian View in Game Theory and Economics. Research Paper #1991. Stanford University.
29. Hahn, F., 1980: General Equilibrium Theory. The Public Interest, Special Issue: 123-138.
30. Hammond, P., 1987: Uncertainty. S. 728-733 in: J. Eatwell et al. (Hg.): The New Palgrave. London: The Macmillan Press, Bd.3.
31. Harsanyi, J. C., 1978: Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 68: 223-228.
32. Harsanyi, J. C., 1986: Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior. S. 82-107 in: J. Elster (Hg.): Rational Choice. New York: New York UP.
33. Hayek, F. A., 1948: Individualism and Economic Order, Chicago: Chicago UP.
34. Heiner, R., 1983: The Origin of Predictable Behavior. The American Economic Review 73: 560-595.
35. Hirsch, F., 1975: Social Limits to Growth, Cambridge Ma.: Harvard UP.
36. Hirschman, A., 1977: The Passions and the Interests. Princeton N.J.: Princeton UP.
37. Hirshleifer, J./J. G. Riley, 1992: The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
38. Hodgson, G., 1985: The Rationalist Conception of Action, Journal of Economic Issues 19: 825-851.
39. Hodgson, G., 1988: Economics and Institutions. Cambridge: Ashgate Publishing.
40. Hollis, M./W. Vossenkuhl (Hg.), 1992: Moralische Entscheidung und rationale Wahl. München: R. Oldenbourg.
41. Kahneman, D./J. L. Knetsch/R. Thaler, 1986: Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market. American Economics Review 76: 728-741.
42. Kahnemann, D./P. Slovic/A. Tversky (Hg.), 1982: Judgement under Uncertainty. Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge Ma.: Cambridge UP.
43. Keynes, J. M., 1921/1973: Treatise on Probability, London: AMS Press.
44. Keynes, J. M., 1936/1966: Allgemeine Theorie der Beschäftigung, des Zinses und des Geldes. Berlin: Dunker & Humblot.
45. Keynes, J. M., 1937/1973: The General Theory of Employment. S. 109-123 in: The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, Bd. 14, London: Cambridge UP.
46. Knight, F. H., 1921: Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Boston and New York: Kelley.
47. Kotowitz, Y., 1987: Moral Hazard. S. 549-551 in: J. Eatwell et al. (Hg.): The New Palgrave. London: The Macmillan Press, Bd. 3
48. Kreps, D. M./P. Milgrom/J. Roberts/R. Wilson, 1982: Rational Coorporation in the Finitely Repeated Prisonner's Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27: 245-252.
49. Kreps, D. M., 1990: Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford: Oxford UP.
50. Kuttner, R., 1985: The Poverty of Economics. The Atlantic Monthly, Feb.: 74-84
51. Latsis, S., 1972: Situational Determinism in Economics. British Journal of Philosophy of Science 23: 207-245.
52. Lawson, T. 1985: Uncertainty and Economic Analysis. The Economic Journal 95: 909-927.
53. Leifer, E. M./H. C. White, 1986: A Structural Approach to Markets. S. 85-108 in: M. Mizruchi/M. Schwartz (Hg.): Intercorporate Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
54. Lindblom, C., 1959: The Science of 'Muddling Through'. Public Administration Review 2: 79-88
55. Loasby, B. 1976: Choice, Complexity and Ignorance: An Enquiry into Economic Theory and Practice of Decision Making. Cambridge: Books on Demand.
56. Luhmann, N., 1968: Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität. Über die Funktion von Zwecken in sozialen Systemen. Tübingen: Mohr.
57. Luhmann, N., 1988: Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
58. Machina, M., 1990: Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved. S. 90-131 in: K. S. Cook/M. Levi (Hg.): The Limits to Rationality. Chicago: Chicago UP.
59. Mansbridge, J. (Hg.), 1991: Beyond Self-interest. Chicago: Chicago UP.
60. March, J./J. Olson, 1979: Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. Bergen et al.: Oxford UP.
61. March, J., 1986: Behavior and the Concept of Preference. S. 60-81 in: J. Elster (Hg.): Rational Choice. New York: New York UP.
62. Menger, C., 1871: Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre. Wien: Braumüller.
63. Meyer, M./L. G. Zucker, 1988: Permanently Failing Organizations. Huntington Park: Sage.
64. Murphy, J. W., 1992: Reason, Bounded Rationality, and the Lebenswelt. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 51: 293-304.
65. North, D., 1990: Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic Performance. S. 383-401 in: K. S. Cook and M. Levi (Hg.): The Limits of Rationality. Chicago: Chicago UP.
66. Oberschall, A./E. M. Leifer, 1986: Efficiency and Social Institutions: Uses and Misuses of Economic Reasoning in Sociology. American Review of Sociology 12: 233-253.
67. Olson, M., 1965: The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge Ma.: Harvard UP.
68. Palfrey, T. R./S. Srivastava, 1989: Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem. Journal of Political Economy 97: 668-691.
69. Pareto, V., 1955: Allgemeine Soziologie. Tübingen: Mohr.
70. Parsons, T. (1949): The Structure of Social Action, New York: Free Press.
71. Parsons, T./E. Shils (Hg.), 1951: Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge Ma.: Books on Demand.
72. Peseran, M. H., 1987: The Limits of Rational Expectations. Oxford: Blackwell.
73. Polanyi, Karl, 1944: The Great Transformation, Beacon Hill and Boston: Beacon Press.
74. Popkin, S., 1986: The Political Economy of Peasant Society. S. 197-247 in: J. Elster, 1986: Rational Choice. New York: New York UP.
75. Postlewaite, A., 1987: Asymmetric Information. S. 133-135 in: J. Eatwell et al. (Hg.): The New Palgrave. London Macmillan, Bd.1.
76. Reuter, N., 1994: Der Institutionalismus. Marburg: Metropolis
77. Riker, W./P.C. Ordeshook, 1973: An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
78. Rosen, S., 1985: Implicit Contracts: a Survey. Journal of Economic Literature 23: 1144-1175.
79. Samuelson, P., 1947: Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge Ma.: Harvard UP.
80. Schiller, R., 1987: Expectations. S. 224-229 in: J. Eatwell et al. (Hg.): The New Palgrave. London: Macmillan, Bd.2.
81. Sen, A., 1977: Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6: 317-344.
82. Shackle, G.L.S., 1978: Imagination, Formalism, and Choice. S. 19-31 in: M. J. Rizzo (Hg.): Time, Uncertainty, and Disequilibrium, Lexington, Ma.
83. Simon, H., 1945: Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmillan.
84. Simon, H., 1992: Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution. Brookfield: Asgate Publishing.
85. Stigler, G. 1961: The Economics of Information, The Journal of Political Economy 69: 213-225.
86. Swedberg, R. (Hg.), 1993: Explorations in Economic Sociology. New York: Russel Sage.
87. Wagner, P., 1990: Science of Society Lost: On the Failure to Establish Sociology in Europe During the 'Classical' Period. S. 219-245 in: P. Wagner/B. Wittrock/R. Whitley (Hg.): Discourses on Society, Bd. 15.
88. Weber, M., 1985: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen: Mohr.
89. Weintraub, E. R., 1974: General Equilibrium Theory. London: Macmillan.
90. White, H. C., 1981: Where do Markets Come From? American Journal of Sociology 87: 517-547.
91. Williamson, O., 1975: Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press.
92. Williamson, O., 1985: The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
93. Williamson, O., 1993: Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization. Journal of Law & Economics 36: 453-486.
94. Zelizer, V., 1979: Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th century America. American Journal of Sociology 84: 591-610.
95. Zukin, S./P. DiMaggio (Hg.), 1990: Structures of Capital. The Social Organization of the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.