Modelling bureaucracy: The case of the Australian federal budget sector 1982-1992

Public Administration

Volumn 74, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 477-507

  Dollery, Brian ^a   Hamburger, Peter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW ENGLAND   (Australia)

^b Australian Treasury   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4243078664     PISSN: 00333298     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1996.tb00881.x     Document Type: Article

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