Flickering admissibility: Neuroimaging evidence in the U.S. courts

Behavioral Sciences and the Law

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 29-49

  Moriarty, Jane Campbell ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AKRON   (United States)

^b Department of Law ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BRAIN SCINTISCANNING; COMPUTER ASSISTED TOMOGRAPHY; COURT; FORENSIC MEDICINE; FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; HUMAN; LEGAL EVIDENCE; MENTAL DISEASE; NEUROIMAGING; NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; POSITRON EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY; REVIEW; SINGLE PHOTON EMISSION COMPUTER TOMOGRAPHY;

BRAIN; BRAIN DISEASES; ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY; EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE; EXPERT TESTIMONY; FORENSIC PATHOLOGY; FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY; HUMANS; JUDICIAL ROLE; MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; POSITRON-EMISSION TOMOGRAPHY; SUPREME COURT DECISIONS; TOMOGRAPHY, EMISSION-COMPUTED, SINGLE-PHOTON; TOMOGRAPHY, X-RAY COMPUTED; UNITED STATES;

EID: 42249104737     PISSN: 07353936     EISSN: 10990798     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/bsl.795     Document Type: Review

References (150)

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2. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE, 17 (2006).
3. See cases discussed infra.
4. See, e.g., United Laundries Co. v. Bradford, 105 A. 303 (Md. 1918) (a physician testified in a personal injury case that an x-ray revealed the plaintiff's skull fracture).
5. Francine Cournos and Deborah L. Bavaniss, Clinical Evaluation and Treatment Planning: A Multimodal Approach, in PSYCHIATRY 478 (Allan Tasman, Jerald Kay, & Jeffrey A. Lieberman, eds., 2d ed. 2003).
6. Id. at 490.
7. Id. at 490.
8. Id. at 491.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Stephen B. Billick and Stephen P. Sullivan, Neuroimaging in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 46 (Richard Posner, ed., 2d ed. 2003).
12. Id.
13. Cournos and Bavaniss, supra note 5, at 491.
14. Id. at 491-492.
15. Joseph C. Wu & Daniel Amen, The Use of Functional Brain Imaging Technology in Assessment of Head Trauma, 2 ANN. 2003 ATLA-CLE 1637 (2003) (citing studies).
16. Billick and Sullivan, supra note 11, at 46.
17. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, some of the shortcomings of neuroimaging studies and addressing the distinction between the imaging and the assessment of criminal liability).
18. Jana L. Bufkin and Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and Violent Behavior, Vol. 6, No. 2 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 176, 176 (2005).
19. Moreno, supra note 2, at 98.
20. Billick and Sullivan, supra note 11, at 465.
21. Moreno, supra note 2, at 98-99.
22. Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 844, 844 (2005).
23. Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (1997).
24. Tovino, supra note 22, at 844.
25. See cases discussed infra.
26. Moreno, supra note 2, at 103; Daniel Langleben, Frank M. Dattilio, & Thomas G. Guthei, True Lies: Delusions and Lie-Detection Technology, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 351 (2006).
27. Langleben et al., True Lies, supra note 26, at 359.
28. Id. at 360. Accord, D. D. Langleben, L. Schroeder, J. A. Maldjian, R. C. Gur, S. McDonald, J. D. Ragland, C. P. O'Brien, & A. R. Childress, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727 (2002) (results indicated that fMRI can detect neural correlates of cognitive differences between truth and deception).
29. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception, supra note 28, at 731.
30. See studies described by Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 306-10 (2006) (reviewing four studies on fMRI and deception);
31. Henry T. Greely and Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377, 395-402 (2007) (discussing 12 studies).
32. Langleben, True Lies, supra note 26, at 360.
33. Johnathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A "No-Brainer" or a Human Rights Hazard? 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 483, 489 (2007). Accord, Pardo, supra note 30, at 319 (2006) (noting various concerns, including that researchers admit that fMRI deception studies are just beginning and that the studies to date involve small sample size and relatively low stakes); Greely and Illes, supra note 30, at 402 (stating it is as yet only a "promising technology," and discussing the shortcomings of the studies).
34. Pardo, supra note 30, at 319; Greeley and Hies, supra note 30, at 402-05; Langleben, True Lies, supra note 26, at 360-61.
35. Greely and Illes, supra note 30, at 402 (emphasis in original).
36. Moreno, supra note 2, at 103.
37. See http://www.noliemri.com/products/overview.htm, claiming greater than 90% accuracy, and http://www.cephoscorp.com/, claiming that fMRI is currently 90% accurate in clinical trials.
38. Marks, supra note 32, at 490, and at n.51, citing both correspondence and the Department of Defense Directive No. 5210.48. See also Margaret Talbot, Duped, THE NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 52, writing that the founder of No Lie MRI, Joel Huizenga, claims that the U.S. government is interested in the type of technology No Lie MRI offers. Moreover, at least one of Langleben's studies was funded in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the central research and development organizations in the Department of Defense. Marks, supra note 32, at 489-90. See also www.darpa.mil (explaining the relationship between DARPA and the Department of Defense).
39. The phrase is inapt because fingerprint comparison, like DNA profiling comparison, is a method by which forensic examiners seek to link an item of evidence found at a crime scene to its source. See Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws and Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 ABA JUDGES' J. 16, 17 (2005). Brain fingerprinting makes no such claim.
40. See http://www.mindcontrolforums.com/bf-research.htm; Lawrence A. Farwell and Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J.FORENSIC SCIENCE 1 (2001).
41. Farwell & Smith, supra note 30.
42. Farwell's discoveries have been presented in both television and print media. See Sara Solovitch, MIND READER, 2004-DEC LEGAL AFF. 66.
43. Id. at 67, noting that "many scientists accuse Farwell of making misleading and exaggerated claims."
44. Moreno, supra note 2, at 104.
45. Greely and Iles, supra note 30, at 388.
46. Solovitch, supra note 41, at 70.
47. See cases discussed infra.
48. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 329-35;
49. Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007 (discussing both applications).
50. Andre A. Moenssens, Brain Fingerprinting - Can It Be Used to Detect the Innocence of Persons Charged with A Crime?, 70 UMKC. L. REV. 891 (2002);
51. Sean Kevin Thompson, Note, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence Interrogation, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1601 (2005);
52. Jennifer Kulynych, Brain, Mind and Criminal Behavior: Neuroimages as Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 235 (1996);
53. Greely and Iles, supra note 30; Marks, supra note 32; Morse, supra note 17; Pardo, supra note 30; and Talbot, supra note 37 (discussing lie detection in general and considering both fMRI and brain fingerprinting).
54. For example, a number of states have enacted statutes stating that DNA evidence is reliable and admissible. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.5 (West 2002), which provides in pertinent part that "[i]n any criminal proceeding, DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing shall be deemed to be a reliable scientific technique and the evidence of a DNA profile comparison may be admitted to prove or disprove the identity of any person." For additional state statutes, see JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, § 11:58 (1995) (2006 Supp.) [hereinafter MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
55. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
56. Id. at 588.
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
58. See the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendment to FRE 702, discussing the change in the rule meant to reflect Supreme Court decisions.
59. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the "Task At Hand": Non-Science Forensic Science After Kamho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773 (2000), quoting Kumho Tire at 153-54.
60. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
61. David L. Faigman, Check Your Crystal Ball at the Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 (1994).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236-1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing criticism of Frye); and Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (discussing, inter alia, criticism of Frye).
63. See MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 48, Appendix 1A, providing a state-by-state analysis of admissibility standards.
64. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
65. Id. at 588.
66. Id. at 592-94.
67. Id. at 595.
68. Id.
69. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
70. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
71. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141.
72. Id. at 152.
73. For a state-by-state discussion of admissibility standards, see MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 48, Appendix 1A.
74. See, e.g., Grady v. Frito Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003) (stating that Frye is a better way to insure that only reliable evidence is admitted).
75. See, e.g., Comm. v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12 (Mass 2005) (noting that Massachusetts still retains Frye in addition to adopting Daubert's reliability standard).
76. People v. Protsman, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 819 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2001) (unpublished).
77. Id. at 822.
78. Id. at 823.
79. The United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit likewise held that using PET scan evidence to diagnose chronic PCP abuse was not generally accepted in the medical field and the court was correct to disregard such evidence pursuant to Daubert. See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000).
80. Brown v. Allerton Associates, 831 N.Y.S.2d 351 (2006).
81. Id. at *2. New York has enacted a statute to allow neuroimaging procedures - including CT and PET scans, as well as MRI - to be admitted, since these procedures were generally accepted in the medical field (C.P.L.R. §4532-a). The statute was amended to delete the types of neuroimaging allowed, in recognition that the science changes rapidly. Brown, 831 N.Y.S. 2d 451, *1.
82. Id. at *2.
83. United States v. Gigante, 982 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
84. Id. at 147.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 148. The court remained unpersuaded by the neuroimaging evidence at the time of sentencing, when defendant again raised competency issues. See United States v. Gigante, 996 F.Supp.194 (E.D.N.Y.1998).
87. Hose v. Chicago Northwestern Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1995).
88. Penney v. Praxair, Inc., 116 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 1997).
89. Id. at 333-34.
90. Id. at 334, n.5.
91. In re Care and Protection of Sharlene, 840 N.E.2d 918 (Mass. 2006).
92. State v. Kuehn, 728 N.W.2d 589 (Neb. 2007).
93. Sanchez v. State, 142 P.3d 1134 (Wyo. 2006).
94. In re Estate of Meyer, 747 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind.App. 2001), transfer to Supreme Court denied, 761 N.E2d 425 (Ind. 2001).
95. Lanter v. Kentucky State Police, 171 S.W.3d 45 (Ky. 2005).
96. Blodgett-McDeavitt v. University of Nebraska, 2004 WL 2792453 (Neb.App. 2004) (unreported) (review overruled, January 20, 2005).
97. Green v. K-Mart Corp., 849 So.2d 814 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2004), aff'd on causation and rev'd on other issues, 874 So.2d 838 (La. 2003).
98. 849 So.2d at 826-27.
99. Id. at 828.
100. 874 So.2d at 842.
101. See, e.g., Falksen v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 2004 WL 785056 (Fed.Cl. 2004); Gardner-Cook v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 59 Fed.Cl. 38 (2003).
102. See Kulynych, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior, supra note 47 at 235.
103. See The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. §17 (1986), which states that to establish insanity a defendant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that he "as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts."
104. See state-by-state analysis, MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 48, at §3:22.
105. See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 115, 133-34 (2007) (discussing the shortcomings of neuroimaging, the criticisms over neuroimaging interpretation, the disagreements among scientist about the proper use of neuroimages in the courtroom, and concluding that "most neuroscientists and legal scholars are skeptical that brain imaging techniques can diagnose mental conditions in individual offenders"). For additional discussion about the proper role of neuroimaging in the courtroom, see Kulynych, Brain, Mind and Criminal Behavior, supra note 47, at 244.
106. Kulynych, Brain, Mind, and Criminal Behavior, supra note 47, at 240.
107. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
108. United States v. Mezvinksky, 206 F. Supp.2d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2002). For a period of three years, while traveling in Africa, the defendant apparently ingested mefloquine, sold under the trade-name Lariam, as a preventative against malaria.
109. The Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), 18 U.S.C. §17, enacted after John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the attempted assassination of President Reagan, limited substantially the insanity defense in federal criminal cases. See Kulynych, Brain, Mind and Criminal Behavior, supra note 47 at 235-236. In United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 890 (3d Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that IDRA did not permit a defendant to introduce mental health evidence to support a defense of diminished responsibility or capacity, but could be introduced to negate specific intent or mens rea. Thus, the use of mental health evidence by the defense is narrowly cabined by cases and statute.
110. 206 F.Supp. 2d at 674.
111. Id. at 675.
112. People v. Goldstein, 786 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y.A.D.1 Dept. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005).
113. Id. at 432.
114. People v. Williams, 2004 WL 740049 (Cal.App.4th Dist. 2004) (unreported).
115. State v. Marshall, 27 P.3d 192 (Wash. 2001).
116. In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the standard of competency to waive one's rights (such as the right to trial) was the same as the standard of competency to be tried. That standard is "whether the defendant has 'sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'" Id. at 396 (citing Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402 (1960)).
117. See Johnston v. State, 841 So.2d 349, 353-54 (Fla. 2002); Smithers v. State, 826 So.2d 916 (Fla. 2002); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1997) (admitting PET scan and EEG evidence in the penalty phase).
118. State v. Reid, 213 S.W. 3d 792 (Tenn. 2006).
119. Hoskins v. State, 735 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam).
120. Id. (Wells, J. dissenting).
121. Entenainment Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F.Supp. 2d 1051, (N.D. Ill. 2005), aff'd, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
122. The court does not provide a name or citation for any of the peer-reviewed studies it discusses.
123. 404 F.Supp.2d at 1065.
124. Id. at 1066-67.
125. Id. at 1067. Other cases have struck down similar statutes, only briefly mentioning the fMRI studies. See Entertainment Software Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F.3d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entertainment Software Ass'n. v. Hatch, 443 F.Supp. 2d 1065 (D.Minn. 2006). In Hatch, the opinion cites two articles in which Kronenberger was the lead author: William G. Kronenberger et al., Media Violence Exposure in Aggressive and Control Adolescents: Differences in Self-and Parent-Reported Exposure to Violence on Television and in Video Games, 31 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 201 (2005);
126. and William G. Kronenberger et al., Media Violence Exposure and Executive Functioning in Aggressive and Control Adolescents, 61 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 725 (2005). 404 F.Supp. 2d at 1070, n.2.
127. See U.S. v. Scheffer 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (upholding Military Rule of Evidence 707, which categorically excluded all polygraph evidence in military tribunals, noting "there is simply no consensus that polygraph is reliable."). Id. at 309. Aside from the reliability issue, the policy concerns about admitting evidence of peoples' thought are distressing to many. As Professor Greely states, "Mind reading seems like the ultimate invasion of privacy." Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 253 (Judy Illes ed., 2006).
128. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa, 2003).
129. Id. at 524.
130. Id. at 516 n.6.
131. Slaughter v. State, 105 P.3d 832, 835-36 (Okla.Cr.App. 2005).
132. Id. at 835.
133. See Johnson v. State, 730 N.W. 2d 209 (Ct.App. Iowa 2007); Lebron v. Sanders, 2007 WL 1225548 (S.D.N.Y.).
134. See, e.g., State v. Perez, 745 So. 2d 166 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1999), writ denied, 768 So.2d 32 (La. 2003).
135. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN 89 (2005).
136. Alexander McCall Smith, Human Action, Neuroscience, and The Law in THE NEW BRAIN SCIENCES: PERILS AND PROSPECTS 116 (Dai Reese and Steven Rose eds., 2004).
137. Morse, supra note 17, at 404.
138. See generally JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY ED., MENTAL ILLNESS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, vols. 1 & 2 (2001).
139. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 384 (1994).
140. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 32, discussing that "colorful images" or "3D representations that appear like holograms" can "create overconfidence in the technology and the interpretation of its output." Id. at 486.
141. See Cournos and Bavaniss, supra note 5, at 491.
142. See generally Daniel Krane & William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence §§11:14-11:23, at 11-22 through 11-37, in PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (Jane Campbell Moriarty ed., 1996, 2005 Supp.).
143. Scott T. Grafton, Walter P. Sinnott-Armstrong, Suzanne I. Gazzaniga, & Michael S. Gazzaniga, Brain Scans Go Legal, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, 30, 33 (Dec. 2006/Jan. 2007).
144. See Fed. R. Evid. 102.
145. See http://innocenceproject.org/understand/eyewitness- misidentification.php, noting that eyewitness identification played a part in 75% of wrongful convictions.
146. As the Supreme Court has held, a jury must have the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to mitigation in a capital case. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2523 (2006).
147. Legal insanity in the federal courts (and in many states) is quite limited, requiring the defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he "as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1986).
148. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
149. See David McCord, Switching Juries in Mid-Stream: The Perplexities of Penalty-Phase Only Retrials, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, n.1 (2004) (discussing the high rate of reversals of death sentences).
150. Greely, supra note 120, at 253.