Must rights impose enforceable positive duties?

Journal of Social Philosophy

Volumn 35, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 264-276

  Cohen, Andrew I ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42149191073     PISSN: 00472786     EISSN: 14679833     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.2004.00231.x     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. For the distinction between basic and derivative rights, see Roderick T. Long, "Abortion, Abandonment, and Positive Rights", Social Philosophy and Policy 10(1993):166-91, esp. 171-76.
2. See, for instance, Michael Levin, "Negative Liberty", in Human Rights, ed. Ellen Paul, Jeffrey Paul, and Fred Miller (New York: Blackwell, 1989), 90-91;
3. Douglas Den Uyl and Tibor Machan, "Gewirth and the Supportive State", in Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays, ed. Edward Regis, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 167-79;
4. Tara Smith, Moral Rights and Political Freedom (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 194-206;
5. Michael Levin, "Conditional Rights", Philosophical Studies 55(1989):211-13;
6. Ayn Rand, "Man's Rights", in The Virtue of Selfishness, ed. Ayn Rand (New York: Signet, 1964), 92-100;
7. David Kelley, A Life of One's Own (Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute, 1998);
8. Jan Narveson, The Libertarian Idea (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), chap. 5;
9. and Daniel Shapiro, "Conflicts and Rights", Philosophical Studies 55(1989):263-78.
10. See, for example, Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, chap. 4;
11. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), e.g., 160-62.
12. See also Loren Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), chap. 5, where Lomasky gives a carefully conditioned defense of the primacy of "liberty" over "welfare" rights, partly by appealing to the costs of correlative duties.
13. See, for example, Narveson, The Libertarian Idea, part 2; and Tibor Machan, Individuals and Their Rights (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 127.
14. See, for example, J. C. Lester, Escape from Leviathan (New York: St. Martin's, 2000);
15. Kelley, A Life of One's Own;
16. Smith, Moral Rights and Political Freedom, part 2.
17. See, for example, Tibor R. Machan, Generosity: Virtue in Civil Society (Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute, 1998);
18. Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, Liberty and Nature (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1991), chap. 3
19. and "Rights as Meta-Normative Principles", in Liberty for the 21st Century, ed. Tibor R. Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 59-75;
20. Douglas J. Den Uyl, "The Right to Welfare and the Virtue of Charity", in Liberty for the 21st Century, ed. Tibor R. Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 305-34;
21. Daniel Shapiro, "Egalitarianism and Welfare-State Redistribution", Social Philosophy and Policy 19(2002):1-35.
22. Though no advocate of positive rights, Andrew Melnyk provides a compelling critique of formal objections to positive rights. See "Is There a Formal Argument against Positive Rights?" Philosophical Studies 55(1989):205-9.
23. On related themes, see Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 2.
24. On the issue of the costs of correlative duties, see, for instance, Richard L. Lippke, "The Elusive Distinction between Negative and Positive Rights", Southern Journal of Philosophy 33(1995):335-46;
25. Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U. S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996);
26. and Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Costs of Rights (New York: Norton, 1999), 14-58.
27. As to which rights would be justified by contractualist procedures, see, for instance, Lippke; James Sterba, "A Libertarian Justification for a Welfare State", Social Theory and Practice 11(1985):285-306;
28. and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1971).
29. Many social philosophers have defended positive rights as amplifying overall human freedom. See, for instance, Rawls; Shue, part 1; and T. L. Zutlevics, "Libertarianism and Personal Autonomy", Southern Journal of Philosophy 39(2001):461-71. Among writers arguing that respecting some positive rights enhances opportunities for virtue, see, for instance, Zutlevics and Shue.
30. Shue, Basic Rights.
31. Holmes and Sunstein, The Costs of Rights.
32. I borrow the phrase "normative advantage" from L. W. Sumner, "Rights", in The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh La Follette (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), 290.
33. For a related discussion of rights as norms, see James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), chap. 5.
34. (H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64 [1955]: 175-91, at 175.)
35. Originally appearing in Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction (October 1961): 5-10;
36. also in Vonnegut's Welcome to the Monkey House (New York: Delacorte, 1968).
37. See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991);
38. Bruce L. Benson, To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
39. Medieval Iceland is also an interesting example of how private parties can establish voluntary institutions to secure order and relative prosperity. See, for instance, Jesse L. Byock, Medieval Iceland: Society, Sagas, and Power (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988);
40. William I. Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
41. The state can claim such authority. Whether it rightly has it is another question altogether. See, for instance, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
42. See also Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).