Agenda power, executive decree authority, and the mixed results of reform in the Brazilian congress

Legislative Studies Quarterly

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 5-33

  Pereira, Carlos ^a,c,d   Power, Timothy J ^b,e   Rennó, Lucio R ^c  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF BRASILIA   (Brazil)

^d FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS   (Brazil)

^e Brazilian Studies ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 42149105559     PISSN: 03629805     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3162/036298008783743309     Document Type: Article

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