Emerging patterns in Liberia's post-conflict politics: Observations from the 2005 elections

African Affairs

Volumn 107, Issue 427, 2008, Pages 177-199

  Sawyer, Amos ^a,b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Governance Reform Commission of Liberia   (Liberia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM; ELECTION; POLITICAL CHANGE; POLITICAL CONFLICT; TWENTY FIRST CENTURY;

AFRICA; LIBERIA; SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; WEST AFRICA;

EID: 42049095714     PISSN: 00019909     EISSN: 14682621     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adm090     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. David Harris, 'Liberia 2005: An unusual African post-conflict election', Journal of Modern African Studies 44, 3 (2006), pp. 375-95.
2. The alleged Charles Julu coup plot has been widely reported in Liberian news organs; see The Perspective,
3. The Analyst, 23 July 2007, www.analystliberia.com
4. Daily Observer, 27 September 2007, .
5. See Tom W. Shick, Behold the Promised Land: A history of Afro-American settlers in Liberia (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1980).
6. See Amos Sawyer, 'Liberating Liberia: Understanding the nature and needs of governance', Harvard International Review 27, 3 (2005), pp. 18-22.
7. After several early visits to Liberia during the campaign, the author returned during the run-off to work for the Sirleaf campaign. Although the author supported the Sirleaf campaign during the run-off, he maintained an ongoing dialogue with senior officials of the Weah campaign. While this dialogue may have had an impact on his views, it did not cloud his judgement.
8. See Staffan Lindberg, Democracy and Elections in Africa (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 2006).
9. Michael Cowen and Liisa Laakso (eds), Multi-party Elections in Africa (James Currey, Oxford, NY, 2002).
10. Timothy D. Sisk and Andrew Reynolds (eds), Elections and Conflict Management in Africa (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1998).
11. The author noted this perspective from some Nigerian journalists and leaders of NGOs when he served as an elections observer during the 2007 presidential elections.
12. This view is noted by the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES). See 'A Nigerian perspective on the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections results from pre-and post-election surveys', (August 2007).
13. Terrence Lyons, Voting for Peace: Postconflict elections in Liberia (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1999).
14. See article 33 of 'Comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconstruction and Development (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and political parties' (Accra, 18 August 2003).
15. By the end of March 2007, the chairman of the NTGL and several senior members of that government had been indicted for stealing from the public coffers.
16. Yusuf Bangura, 'Strategic policy failure and governance in Sierra Leone', Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 4 (2000), pp. 551-77.
17. This was not the case in Burundi, where the situation has been different. Power-sharing arrangements were preceded and subsequently nurtured by enormous efforts at confidence building and leadership training conducted by an extraordinary mediator. See Howard Wolpe and Steve McDonald, "Burundi's transition: Training leaders for peace", Journal of Democracy 17, 1 (2006), pp. 132-8.
18. Estimates of voter turnout during the first round were about 74 percent. Turnout in the second round was about 60 percent.
19. Another independent presidential candidate who was not certificated took his claims against the elections commission to the Supreme Court and won - but later, upon the intervention of the International Contact Group, agreed not to contest the elections.
20. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1968). It should also be noted that many of these parties contested the 2005 elections in coalition with other parties and do not appear on the list of parties in Table 1. For example, LPP and UPP formed the Alliance for Peace and Democracy, while LAP and LUP were part of the Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL).
21. Among the credible sources who have chronicled the political struggles of the 1970s and early and mid-1980s are Liebenow and Dunn and Tarr. See J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: The quest for democracy (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1987),
22. D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, Liberia: A national policy in transition (The Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ, and London, 1988).
23. See also Amos Sawyer, Effective Immediately-Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986: A personal perspective (Liberia Working Group, Bremen, 1987);
24. Amos Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward democratic governance in Liberia (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2005).
25. Didwho Twe was the only Liberian of indigenous background who was able to get his name on the presidential ballot during a century of TWP rule. He was forced to flee the country. Others, who spoke openly about their ambitions, like Henry Boima Fahnbulleh, were similarly pursued or imprisoned.
26. US$1million of Farhat's holdings was declared to be contingent upon court rulings.
27. Jackson Doe, the presidential candidate of the Liberia Action Party, had been a public school teacher and later, a member of the Legislature; Edward Kesselley of the Unity Party became a minister of the government and Gabriel Kpolleh was another public school teacher - all had been in the public service for at least two decades, and all were individuals of modest holdings.
28. Since the coup of 1980, the Liberian diaspora, especially the diasporic group in the United States, has played an increasingly influential role in Liberian politics. The remittances sent home by this group have also made a substantial contribution to the livelihoods of large numbers of local people. Despite its impact, the role of the diaspora in the political economy of post-conflict Liberia has yet to be fully investigated.
29. Even after her election, Sirleaf continued to articulate this self-identity, doing so notably in her inaugural address and in her address to a joint session of the United States Congress in March 2006.
30. Sande is the 'secret society' for females as poro is for males.
31. Interestingly, in the presidential contest, the Mandingo vote was split among three presidential candidates, two of whom (Alhaji Kromah and Sekou Conneh) were Mandingo. The influential Mandingo caucus did not support either candidate but instead threw its support behind Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.
32. These include Richard Divine, the petroleum company's comptroller who won a senate seat in Bomi; Fred Cherue, the chairman of its board, in River Gee; Mobutu Nyepan, its deputy managing director, in Sinoe; and Edwin Snowe, its managing director, who won a House of Representatives seat in Montserrado and went on to win the position of speaker of the House of Representatives. (He was later removed from the speakership.) Isaac Nyenabo, comptroller at the Ministry of Finance and a member of LURD, won a senate seat in Grand Gedeh and went on to win the senate's in-house election for president protempore.
33. Despite having spent enormous sums of money to win votes within his own neighborhood on Ashmun Street (Snapper Hill), Sherman was out-polled by Sirleaf 9 to 1 in the 4 polling places at Cathedral Catholic School, located near his residence.
34. My colleague Jacqui Bauer of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis of Indiana University is currently engaged in research that is likely to throw light on this question.