Board independence, firm performance and ownership concentration: Evidence from Chile

Journal of Business Research

Volumn 61, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 615-622

  Lefort, Fernando ^a   Urzúa, Francisco ^b  

^a PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DE CHILE   (Chile)

^b Bicentennial Science and Technology Program   (Chile)

Author keywords

Boards; Chile; Corporate governance; Emerging economies; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

EID: 41849116679     PISSN: 01482963     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2007.06.036     Document Type: Article

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