Unraveling yields inefficient matchings: Evidence from post-season college football bowls

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 38, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 967-982

  Fréchette, Guillaume R ^a   Roth, Alvin E ^b   Ünver, M Utku ^c  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 41749118530     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00121.x     Document Type: Article

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