The origins of Soviet ethnic cleansing

Journal of Modern History

Volumn 70, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 813-861

  Martin, Terry ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 4143147574     PISSN: 00222801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/235168     Document Type: Article

References (428)

1. Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (New York, 1949), p. 2.
2. British Foreign Office: Russia Correspondence reel 7 (1937), vol. 21107, p. 213 (hereafter cited as BFORC). See also Maclean, p. 33. Maclean filed a report to the embassy after his trip. The account in his book is a shortened, but entirely consistent, version.
3. BFORC reel 7, p. 214; see also Maclean, p. 34.
4. BFORC reel 7, p. 225; Maclean, p. 34.
5. BFORC reel 7, pp. 216-17; Maclean, p. 36.
6. Maclean, p. 37.
7. BFORC reel 6 (1937), vol. 21105, p. 221; Maclean, pp. 54-55.
8. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF) 5446/20a/493 (1937).
9. The standard works on Soviet ethnic cleansing briefly mentioned the 1937 Korean deportation. Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York, 1978), pp. 98-99;
10. Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities (London, 1977), p. 77.
11. The Finnish deportations are mentioned in Nikolai K. Deker and Andrei Lebed, eds., Genocide in the USSR (Munich, 1958), pp. 56-57,
12. as well as in the excellent article by Ian M. Matley, "The Dispersal of the Ingrian Finns," Slavic Review 38 (March 1979): 1-16.
13. In recent years, N. F. Bugai has published numerous document collections on the pre-World War II deportations. His findings are summed up in N. F. Bugai, L. Beriia-1. Stalinu: "Soglasno vashemu ukazaniiu" (Moscow, 1995).
14. See also Mikolaj Iwanov, Pierwszy narod ukarany: Polacy w zwiazku radzieckim, 1921-1939 (Warsaw, 1991);
15. Jean-Jacques Marie, Les peuples déportés d'union soviétique (Paris, 1995), pp. 21-33;
16. Michael Gelb, "The Western Finnic Minorities and the Origins of the Stalinist Nationalities Deportations," Nationalities Papers 24 (June 1996): 237-68,
17. and "An Early Soviet Ethnic Deportation: The Far-Eastern Koreans," Russian Review 54 (July 1995): 389-412.
18. Amir Weiner, "Excising Evil: The Soviet Quest for Purity and the Eradication of the Nationalist Movement in the Vinnytsia Region," in An Empire of Nations: The Soviet State and Its Peoples in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, in press.
19. Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii SSSR (05.09.35): 45/377.
20. For a good theoretical account, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N. Y., 1983).
21. For the specific case of diaspora nationalities, see John Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 393-408.
22. On this point, see Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994): 414-52.
23. For a detailed study of the Soviet nationalities policy and its consequences, see Terry Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire: Ethnicity and the Soviet State, 1923-1938" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1996).
24. For representative works, see Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies (London, 1953);
25. Conquest, The Nation Killers;
26. Alexandre A. Bennigsen and Enders S. Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago, 1979).
27. The most influential works are Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, Calif., 1993);
28. Slezkine; Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Refrained: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 23-54.
29. For a good comparative discussion of the origins of the term "ethnic cleansing" and the politics surrounding it, see Robert M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," Slavic Review 55 (Winter 1996): 727-48;
30. see also Akbar S. Ahmed, "'Ethnic Cleansing': A Metaphor for Our Time?" Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, no. 1(1995): 1-25.
31. For example, a title search of the OCLC WorldCat database on March 26, 1998, found twenty-seven books with "ethnic cleansing" in the title, all published after 1992. Eleven books deal with the wars in the former Yugoslavia and sixteen books with other historical or contemporary instances of the forcible removal of an ethnically defined population from a given territory. The wording of this definition is mine. It differs slightly from the definition of ethnic cleansing formulated by an official United Nations commission as "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons of another ethnic or religious group" (cited in Hayden, p. 732). In fact, ethnic cleansing rarely aims at complete ethnic homogeneity. The common practice is the removal of one or more stigmatized ethnic groups.
32. Brief and somewhat eclectic surveys are provided in Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, Ethnic Cleansing (New York, 1996), pp. 7-50;
33. Milica Zarkovic Bookman, The Demographic Struggle for Power: The Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World (London, 1997), pp. 121-46.
34. On ethnic cleansing in the nineteenth century, see Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims (Princeton, N.J., 1993);
35. Alan W. Fisher, "Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 35, no. 3 (1987): 356-71.
36. On the Balkan wars, see George F. Kennan, The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict (Washington, D.C., 1993).
37. Stephen P. Ladas, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York, 1932), pp. 18-20. In 1914, in response to Ottoman threats to deport their Greek minority away from the Aegean coast, Greece signed an agreement with the Ottoman Empire for an exchange of some of their respective Greek and Turkish minority populations. The outbreak of World War I prevented the implementation of this agreement. Ladas, pp. 20-23.
38. Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Oxford, 1995).
39. The standard work on these deportations has been written by Eric Lohr, "Internal Enemy Politics and the Nationalization of Imperial Space: Enemy Aliens within the Russian Empire during World War I" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, forthcoming), chaps. 2-3. I thank the author for letting me read and cite his manuscript.
40. For published accounts, see Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Deutschen im Zarenreich. Zwei Jahrhunderte deutsch-russische Kulturgemeinschaft (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 507-11;
41. Joshua Sanborn, "Drafting the Nation: Military Conscription and the Formation of a Modern Polity in Tsarist and Soviet Russia, 1905-1925" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1998), chap. 5;
42. "Dokumentyopresledovanii evreev," Arkhiv russkoi revoliutsii, tom 19 (Berlin, 1928), pp. 245-84.
43. For a fascinating discussion of the origins of various "cleansing" operations in Tsarist Russia and the revolutionary period, see Peter Holquist, "'To Remove' and 'To Exterminate Totally': Population Statistics and Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia," forthcoming in Suny and Martin, eds. (n. 9 above).
44. K. E. Lindemann, Prekrashchenie zemlevladeniia i zemlepolzovaniia poselian-sobstvennikov (Moscow, 1917). The expropriations technically targeted German "colonists" or poselian-sobstvennikov, an ethno-soslovie category that exempted Baltic German nobles and others.
45. William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 (Chicago, 1980), pp. 188-207.
46. William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 Ibid., pp. 206-7, 320-22;
47. Immanuel Geiss, Der Polnische Grenzstreifen, 1914-1918: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im ersten Weltkrieg (Lübeck, 1960).
48. Ladas, pp. 335-53. The Greeks of Istanbul and Turks of western Thrace were exempted. A 1919 treaty between Greece and Bulgaria also authorized a voluntary exchange of their respective minorities, which was consummated only after coercion was employed. Ladas, pp. 27-123. The formation of new states in east central Europe in 1919 led to a series of semivoluntary pressured emigrations. See Daria Stolz, "Forced Migrations in Central European History," International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (1992): 329.
49. Prior to October 1941, approximately 1.3 million Poles and Jews were deported from the western regions of Poland that were formally annexed and included in the German reich. Approximately 1.25 million Germans from eastern Europe and the Reich were then resettled in these regions. Joseph B. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1939-1945 (New York, 1946), pp. 3-366. On the continuity between Imperial German and Nazi policies in this region, see Hagen, pp. 320-22.
50. Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 103-27.
51. Tadeusz Piotrowski, Vengeance of the Swallows, pp. 23-102;
52. Jozef Turowski, ed., Zbrodnie nacjonalistow ukrainskich dokonane na ludnosci polskiej na Wolyniu, 1939-1945 (Warsaw, 1990).
53. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, pp. 404-14.
54. Schechtman, European Population Transfers, Ibid., pp. 415-24.
55. Bugai, L Beriia (n. 9 above), pp. 27-55. The remaining Finnish population in Leningrad oblast was also deported in 1941-42 (pp. 191-92).
56. Bugai, L Beriia Ibid., pp. 56-185. For earlier accounts, see Nekrich (n. 9 above);
57. and Conquest, The Nation Killers (n. 9 above).
58. Bugai, L. Beriia, pp. 163-250.
59. have included in this list only deportations based explicitly on ethnic criteria. The mass deportations from the annexed territories of Moldavia, western Ukraine and Belorussia, and the three Baltic republics overwhelmingly affected non-Russians, but the deported were targeted as class enemies or, more precisely, as "former people" (byvshie): former landlords, policemen, teachers, members of various political parties, officers, etc. (given Polish overrepresentation in these positions, they were also overrepresented in the deportations). On these deportations, see Bugai, L. Beriia, pp. 186-250;
60. and Deportatsii. Zakhidni zemli Ukrainy kintsa 30-kh-pochatku 50-kh rr. Dokiimenty, materialy, spohady. Tom 1. 1939-1945 rr. (L'viv, 1996).
61. For an archivally based discussion of this question, see Gennadi Kostyrchenko, Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin's Russia (Amherst, N. Y., 1995), pp. 248-306.
62. Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe, 1945-1955 (Philadelphia, 1962), pp. 35-37.
63. Germans were also expelled, without formal authorization, from Yugoslavia and Romania. On the atrocities suffered by the German population, see Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, The German Expellees: Victims in War and Peace (New York, 1993).
64. Schectman, Postwar Population Transfers, pp. 151-79;
65. Bohdan Kordan, "Making Borders Stick: Population Transfer and Resettlement in the Trans-Curzon Territories, 1944-1949," International Migration Review 31, no. 3 (1997): 704-50.
66. For excellent documents, see Deportatsii, pp. 294-647. Approximately 1.5 million people were relocated in the period 1944-46.
67. Kordan, pp. 712-17; Eugeniusz Misilo, Akcja "Wisla." Dokumenty (Warsaw, 1993).
68. At least on the Czechoslovak side, this exchange appears to have been voluntary. Almost all of the Soviet Union's Czechs and Slovaks emigrated, while about 4,500 of Czechoslovakia's 91,000 Ukrainians/Ruthenians and Russians emigrated. Schechtman, Poswar Population Transfers, pp. 43-49.
69. Schechtman, Poswar Population Transfers, Ibid., pp. 129-50, 341-62.
70. Ethnic cleansing, however, has been quite common in the new states of Africa and Asia. Joseph B. Schechtman, Population Transfers in Asia (New York, 1949);
71. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice (The Hague, 1995);
72. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 196-201. The collapse of Communism in the late 1980s, of course, triggered a resumption of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans and the Caucasus.
73. When murder itself becomes the primary goal, it is typically called genocide. On the term "genocide," see Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century (New Haven, Conn., 1981). Ethnic cleansing is probably best understood as occupying the central part of a continuum between genocide on one end and nonviolent pressured ethnic emigration on the other end. Given this continuum, there will always be ambiguity as to when ethnic cleansing shades into genocide, or pressured emigration into forced relocation. For a similar continuum, see Bell-Fialkoff (n. 18 above), p. 3.
74. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. One might add that the targets of ethnic cleansing may be citizens or noncitizens (I excluded actions against the latter from my survey). Ethnic cleansing may be carried out by states or by stateless armies (such as UPA). In multiethnic states, it may even be carried out by one ethnic group against another without state sanction or support.
75. On ethnic consolidation and ethnic dilution, see Bookman (n. 18 above), pp. 121-29.
76. For personal accounts of the deportations, see Tak eto bylo. Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR, 1919-1952 gody, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1993).
77. The many internationally sanctioned "population transfers" were not accompanied by intentional murder but had almost always been preceded, during the previous war, by the terrorization and massacre of the population to be deported.
78. The only exception to this statement would be the Red Army's actions in eastern Europe, where mass rape and violence were used indiscriminately to punish the local German population and to intimidate them into fleeing the territory of postwar Poland and Kaliningrad oblast. See de Zayas (n. 37 above); and Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), pp. 69-140.
79. The organization of the deportations is documented very well in Belaid kniga o deportatsii koreiskogo naseleniia Rossii v 30-40-kh godakh. Kniga pervaia (Moscow, 1992);
80. and Deportatsiia (n. 34 above).
81. As we shall see, the Soviet Union also engaged in ethnic consolidation. Forced assimilation, in contrast, was largely absent from Soviet nationalities policy.
82. Given the Red Army's presence in Poland and the participation of the Communist-dominated Lublin Committee, the Polish-Soviet population exchange was at least quasi-domestic.
83. The connection between ethnic cleansing and war is hardly confined to the Eurasian borderlands. See Panikos Panayi, ed., Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1993).
84. Again, on the controversy, see Hayden (n. 16 above); and Ahmed (n. 16 above).
85. Although a distinctive modern practice, ethnic cleansing would appear to be particularly common in transitional states (the late Ottoman and Russian Empires, the early Soviet Union, the newly formed states of eastern Europe) and often targets groups in transition from ambiguous ethno-estate identities (such as the ethno-religious millets in the Ottoman Empire or ethno-soslovie categories such as the German colonists in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union) to modern ethnic identities.
86. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'ednan' Ukrainy (hereafter TsDAHOU) fond 1, opis' 6, delo 396 (19.06.35), p. 166 (hereafter fond/opis' /delo [date]: page), 1/16/12 (29.09.35): 229, and 1/16/12 (04.11.35): 343.
87. For the same usage in later Soviet deportations, see Bugai, L. Beriia (n. 9 above), pp. 149, 164, 189, 190. Cleansing (chistka, ochistka) was a common term in the Bolshevik vocabulary, used in particular to refer to the routine expulsion of members of the Communist Party deemed unworthy, as well as to the arrest or deportation of members of various stigmatized population categories.
88. On Imperial Russian usage, see Lohr (n. 22 above), chaps. 2-3; Nazi German usage in the form of the term "judenrein" is well known; on Czechoslovak usage of the term "cleansing" (očista) for the general process of cleansing the state, which included the removal of all Germans, see Benjamin Frommer, "Unmixing Marriage in Postwar Czechoslovakia" (paper presented at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, April 1998). Cited with author's permission. Presumably many other perpetrators use the term "cleansing."
89. The Nazi German state is something of an exception here, since its goal was to form a territorially expanded German nation-state as the dominant core of a multiethnic empire. The Tsarist Russian Empire's deportation of Germans and Jews represented a radical intensification of its previously sporadic efforts to russify the western borderlands, but it should be pointed out that it was not accompanied by similarly aggressive russification measures elsewhere in the Russian Empire.
90. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), p. 605.
91. Ia. Kantor, Natsional'noe stroitel'stvo sredi evreev v SSSR (Moscow, 1934);
92. Allan Laine Kagedan, "The Formation of Soviet Jewish Territorial Units, 1924-1937" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1985), pp. 23-28;
93. N. F. Bugai, "20-e-50-e gody: Pereseleniia i deportatsii evreiskogo naseleniia v SSSR," Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 4 (1993), pp. 175-85.
94. GARF 1235/128/2 (1933): 110, 166.
95. GARF 1235/141/1531 (1933): 103.
96. Michael Gelb, "'Karelian Fever': The Finnish Immigrant Community during Stalin's Purges," Europe-Asia Studies 45 (1993): 1091-1116.
97. "V sovete natsional'nostei SSSR," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti, no. 1 (1930), p. 111.
98. TsDAHOU 1/20/2019(1925), p. 171;
99. "VUTsIK USSR," Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, nos. 5-6 (1928), pp. 218-19.
100. These are two of hundreds of similar quotations from OGPU informational reports. Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI) 62/2/882 (1927): 274,
101. and Rossiiskii Tsentr Khraneniia i Izucheniia Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (RTsKhIDNI) 62/2/1808 (1929): 134;
102. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire," pp. 521-58.
103. Gregory L. Freeze, "The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History," American Historical Review 91 (1986): 11-36.
104. George J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 (Bloomington, Ind., 1969).
105. Edward Dennis Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore, 1953).
106. S'ezdy sovetov RSFSR i avtonomnykh respublik RSFSR, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1959), pp. 434-36;
107. V. L. Genis, "Deportatsiia russkikh iz Turkestana v 1921 godu ('Delo Safarova')," Voprosy istorii, no. 1 (1998), pp. 44-58.
108. GARF 3316/64/220 (1926): 11-14ob.
109. GARF 3316/16a/177 (1924): 28-31. These statistics refer to the population within the post-1924 Kazakh ASSR borders.
110. GARF Ibid.
111. GARF 1235/140/127 (1926-28): 39.
112. GARF 3316/64/220(1926): 13. See also Genis, pp. 46-54.
113. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 532-48.
114. S'ezdy sovetov RSFSR i avtonomnykh respublik RSFSR, p. 718.
115. N. F. Bugai, "20-40-e gody: Deportatsiia naseleniia s territorii evropeiskoi Rossii," Otechestvennaia istoriia, no. 4 (1992), pp. 37-40.
116. For documents, see N. F. Bugai, "Kazaki," Shpion, no. 1 (1993), pp. 40-55.
117. For an excellent study of anti-Cossack actions on the Don, see Peter Holquist, "'Conduct Merciless Mass Terror': Decossackization on the Don, 1919," Cahiers du monde russe 38 (January-July 1997): 127-62.
118. Bugai, "Kazaki," pp. 52-55.
119. RTsKhIDNI 17/87/199 (1925): 96.
120. This was most dramatically evident in the treatment of Germans by the Makhno movement. See Dietrich Neufeld, A Russian Dance of Death: Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine (Winnipeg, 1977).
121. Baymirza Hayit, "Basmatschi": Nationaler Kampf Turkestans in den Jahren 1917 bis 7934 (Köln, 1992).
122. For example, see RTsKhIDNI 17/87/177 (1924),
123. and RTsKhIDNI 17/87/178 (1923-24).
124. GARF 3316/16a/22 (1923): 3-12;
125. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/339 (08.03.23): protokol 53/ punkt 6.
126. On the Imperial German borderlands, see Hagen (n. 24 above). On Imperial Russia, see Terry Martin, "The Empire's New Frontiers: New Russia's Path from Frontier to Okraina, 1774-1920," Russian History 19(1992): 181-201.
127. GARF 3316/16a/22 (1923): 4.
128. GARF Ibid., pp. 3-7;
129. also GARF 3316/64/218 (1925): 51.
130. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/511 (16.07.25): 71/34.
131. GARF 1235/120/11 (1925): 4.
132. GARF 374/27/594 (1925): 4.
133. GARF Ibid., p. 79;
134. TsDAHOU 1/16/1 (26.05.25): 178.
135. RTsKhIDNI 17/113/677 (12.11.28): 80/3, 107-9;
136. GARF 1235/120/11 (1925-26),
137. and GARF 3316/64/67 (1926-27).
138. TsDAHOU 1/20/2019 (1925): 10.
139. TsDAHOU 1/16/1 (1924-25);
140. see also, RTsKhIDNI 17/162/2 (26.03.25): 54/12, 94-98.
141. Gelb, "'KarelianFever'" (n.62above), pp. 1091-92.
142. Visti VUTsIK, no. 87 (17.04.24): 1.
143. Mykola Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy. Natsional'ne pytannia. Tom II. Chastyna Druha (Kharkov, 1931), pp. 153-59.
144. GARF 3316/64/933 (1931): 28.
145. RTsKhIDNI 62/2/2205 (1930): 6, 33-34;
146. RTsKhIDNI 62/1/829 (18.03.31) , 62/1/ 467 (30.04.28), 62/1/882 (27.06.31), 62/3/465 (15.01.29): 18-23.
147. Matley (n. 9 above), p. 5; Iwanov (n. 9 above), p. 72.
148. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/517 (27.08.25): 77/12.
149. RTsKhIDNI 62/2/1261 (1928): 1.
150. On measures taken, see RTsKhIDNI 62/1/1106 (27.02.33): 92-102,
151. RTsKhIDNI 62/1/467 (30.04.28): 240-49,
152. RTsKhIDNI 62/1/829 (18.03.31): 49-61.
153. On Hrushevskyi's return and last years in Ukraine, see Ruslan Pyrih, Zhyttia Mykhaila Hrushevskoho: ostannie desiatylittia, 1924-1934 (Kiev, 1993);
154. Iurii Shapoval and Volodymyr Prystaiko, Mykhailo Hrushevskyi i HPU-NKVD. Trahichne desiatylittia: 1924-1934 (Kiev, 1996).
155. Shapoval and Prystaiko, pp. 130-32.
156. RTsKhIDNI 62/1/467 (30.04.28): 248-49,
157. RTsKhIDNI 62/1829 (18.03.31): 51.
158. GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 4;
159. S.D. Anosov, Koreitsy v ussuriiskom krae (Khabarovsk-Vladivostok, 1928), pp. 7-8;
160. Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda. Tom VII (Moscow, 1928), p. 8.
161. Vsesoiuznaia perepis'. Tom VII, pp. 126-27. When one includes the city of Vladivostok, Koreans represented 22.4 percent of the population.
162. GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 6; Anosov, p. 29.
163. GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 4.
164. RTsKhIDNI 17/87/199 (1925): 96.
165. GARF 1235/140/141 (1924): 20-34;
166. for earlier efforts, see Belaia kniga (n. 49 above), pp. 40, 46-47.
167. The Moldavian ASSR had a Moldavian population of 170,263 out of a total population of 572,339 (29.7 percent Moldavian). A Korean ASSR with 152,424 Koreans out of 680,011 (22.4 percent) could have been formed, or a smaller territory with a Korean majority (85,299/157,438 = 52.4 percent) could have been established. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), p. 714.
168. GARF 1235/140/141 (1924-25): 42-47.
169. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 3.
170. GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 141ob.
171. GARF 1235/140/141 (1925): 54-75;
172. Belaia kniga, 46-49.
173. Gelb, "An Early Soviet" (n. 9 above), pp. 394-95.
174. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 25;
175. S. G. Nam, Koreiskii natsional'nyi raion: Puti poiska issledovatelia (Moscow, 1991).
176. Anosov (n. 106 above), pp. 80-84.
177. GARF 1235/120/60 (1927): 71-78;
178. Belaia kniga, 37-39;
179. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 28.
180. GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 144.
181. See the propaganda instructions in GARF 1235/120/60 (1928): 17-20. Anosov obliquely mentions resettlement. Anosov, p. 64.
182. GARF 1235/140/141 (1926): 144.
183. GARF 1235/140/141 (1928): 146-52.
184. GARF 1235/141/1356 (1931): 3,
185. GARF 3316/64a/1078 (1931): 5,
186. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 7-9.
187. RTsKhIDNI 62/2/1261 (1928): 1-17, 42-43, 75-76,
188. and RTsKhIDNI 157/5/83 (1927): 229-30.
189. From 1923 to 1926, around 20,000 Mennonites had been permitted to emigrate to Canada. They now sought to resume this movement. Captured German Materials (hereafter CGM), microfilm reel 4763 (11.10.29): L192465-75;
190. Harvey Dyck, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933 (New York, 1966), pp. 162-74;
191. Meir Buchsweiler, Volksdeutsche in der Ukraine am Vorabend und Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegsein Fall doppelter Loyalitaet? (Gerlingen, 1984), pp. 58-64.
192. Dyck, p. 163.
193. Ibid., p. 171.
194. CGM reel 5213 (01.08.29): K480944-49,
195. CGM reel 4763, L192270-475.
196. GARF 3316/64/759 (1929-30).
197. RTsKhIDNI 94/1/1 (1928): 625-85;
198. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 547-48.
199. RTsKhIDNI 17/113/786 (16.10.29): 126/6, 44.
200. GARF 1235/141/561 (1930): 59.
201. RTsKhIDNI 17/113/786 (16.10.29): 160/6, 42-46,
202. and RTsKhIDNI 17/113/822 (06.02.30): 181/4, 1-250;
203. GARF 1235/141/561 (1930), 3316/64/928 (1930), 3316/64/759-761 (1929-30).
204. For the OGPU's evaluation, see GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 95-98;
205. in general, see GARF 3316/64/760 (1930), 3316/64/928(1930), 3316/23/1356(1930): 14-15.
206. GARF 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6-6ob,
207. GARF 3316/23/1360 3316/64/928 (1930): 12-16.
208. GARF 1235/141/561 (1930): 135-37,
209. GARF 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6,
210. GARF 3316/23/1318 (1930): 12-15.
211. GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 79;
212. also quoted in GARF 3316/64/928 (1930): 15.
213. GARF 3316/64/1355 (1930): 19.
214. GARF 3316/64/928 (1930): 15.
215. GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 62-63.
216. GARF 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6,
217. GARF 3316/64/928 (1930): 12.
218. See the extensive statistical tables in Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (Oxford, 1996), pp. 100-180.
219. Hayit (n. 82 above), pp. 362-75.
220. Andrea Graziosi, "Collectivisation, revoltes paysannes et politiques gouvernementales a travers les rapports du GPU d'Ukraine de fevrier-mars 1930," Cahiers du monde russe 35 (1994): 437-632;
221. TsDAHOU 1/20/3184 (1930), 1/20/3195 (1927-30), 1/20/ 2522 (1927-31), 1/20/3185 (1930).
222. RTsKhIDNI 17/113/821 (06.02.30): 181/4;
223. GARF 1235/141/561 (1930): 10-12, 23, 201,
224. GARF 3316/16a/443 (1930): 10-12.
225. There are literally thousands of pages of documents devoted to this question. GARF 1235/141/561 (1930), 3316/64/928 (1930), 3316/64/968 (1929-30), 3316/64/759-761.
226. GARF 3316/16a/443 (1930): 1-2,
227. GARF 3316/64/760 (1930): 8-10.
228. TsDAHOU 1/20/3184 (1930): 17-18.
229. TsDAHOU 1/20/3184 (1930): 17;
230. GARF 3316/23/1318 (1930): 3, 15.
231. GARF 3316/64/928 (1930): 1.
232. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/8 (05.03.30): 119/5.
233. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/8 (11.03.30): 120/72.
234. TsDAHOU 1/16/7(13.03.30): 154.
235. For evidence the deportation did take place, see GARF 3316/23/1360 (1930): 6.
236. There may have been a Finnish deportation as well. The March 5 Politburo decree called for the OGPU to study the Leningrad border regions and propose measures. Groups in Finland claimed there was an ethnically targeted deportation. See The Ingrian Committee, The Ingrian Finns (Helsinki, 1935), p. 8.1 found no evidence to confirm this deportation (but I did not work in St. Petersburg archives), and Gelb also doubts that an ethnically targeted deportation took place.
237. Gelb, "Western Finnic Minorities" (n. 9 above), pp. 238-42.
238. GARF 3316/64/1284 (1932); Iwanow (n. 9 above), pp. 128-38.
239. See GARF3316/64/1078 (1931): 1-4, 20-53, 76-77;
240. GARF 374/27s/1076 (1929): 59-63;
241. A. Nugis, Protiv velikoderzhavnogo shovinizma i mestnogo natsionalizma (Khabarovsk, 1933), pp. 26-28;
242. GARF 3316/64/1078 (1931): 5ob;
243. Agi Zakir, "Zemelnaia politika v kolkhoznom dvizhenii sredi koreitsev dal'no-vostochnogo kraia," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti, nos. 2-3 (1931): 76-81.
244. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 40ob.
245. Haruki Wada, "Koreans in the Soviet Far East, 1917-1937," in Koreans in the Soviet Union, ed. Daac-Sook Suh (Honolulu, 1987), p. 40.
246. GARF 3316/16a/384 (1928): 1-2.
247. GARF 5446/15a/258 (1933): 41-42.
248. GARF 374/27s/1706 (1929): 8ob.
249. GARF 1235/141/359 (1929): 3.
250. GARF Ibid., pp. 3-4.
251. GARF 1235/141/1356 (1930): 18-19,
252. GARF 3316/64/1078 (1931): 83;
253. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (RGAE) 7486/42s/5 (1931): 113.
254. GARF 1235/141/1356 (1930): 18-19.
255. GARF Ibid., pp. 18-20;
256. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/777 (30.02.30): 118/8,
257. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/813 (15.02.31): 26/32.
258. GARF 3316/64/1078 (1931): 83.
259. GARF 5446/29/67 (1937): 18.
260. GARF 393/1s/283 (1929): 1.
261. TsDAHOU 1/16/8 (16.01.32): 167-73.
262. RTsKhIDNI 62/1/829 (10.03.31): 33.
263. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/8(20.04.30): 124/80,
264. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/11 (01.12.31): 78/80,
265. RTsKhIDNI (27.02.32): 90/45;
266. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/12 (16.04.32): 96/21.
267. TsDAHOU 1/16/8 (08.01.32): 136,
268. TsDAHOU 1/16/35 (21.03.31): 16;
269. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/8 (20.04.30): 124/80,
270. RTsKhIDNI 17/162/14 (19.04.33): 136/94;
271. "Spetspereselentsy-zhertvy 'sploshno kollektivizatsii,'" Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 4 (1994), p. 156.
272. RGAE 7486/42s/8 (1932): 42-55;
273. RGAE 7486/42s/5 (1931): 113;
274. GARF 5446/15a/262 (1934): 20;
275. GARF 5446/15a/258 (1933): 41-42.
276. George O. Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1923-1934 (Cambridge, 1992);
277. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 63-173.
278. RTsKhIDNI 17/69/58 (1927): 166.
279. Janusz Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929 (Edmonton, 1983). 178
280. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy. Tom II (n. 97 above), pp. 404-19. The decree promised the same for Soviet Belorussia.
281. James E. Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918-1933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1983);
282. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire," pp. 312-54.
283. Radziejowski, pp. 127-31.
284. Mykola Skrypnyk, Dzherela ta prychyny rozlamu v KPZU (Kharkov, 1928). 182
285. Jon Jacobson, When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), pp. 206-32.
286. Radziejowski, pp. 94-96.
287. Skrypnyk, Dzherela ta prychyny, p. 124.
288. RTsKhIDNI 17/69/58 (1927): 167.
289. For an account of this campaign, see Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire," pp. 566-82.
290. Skrypnyk, "Zlikviduvaty liuksemburgiianstvo," in (1925) Statti i promovy, pp. 75-76.
291. In 1928, Skrypnyk even tried to get Comintern backing for his position. M. Skrypnyk, Natsional'nyi vopros v programme kominterna (Kharkov, 1929), pp. 35-37.
292. 8 Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), p. 605.
293. RTsKhIDNI 81/3/99 (1932): 145-48.
294. RTsKhIDNI Ibid., p. 150.
295. RTsKhIDNI 81/3/214 (1932): 4.
296. Nobuo Shimotomai, "A Note on the Kuban Affair (1932-1933)," Acta Slavica Iaponica, no. 1 (1983), pp. 39-56;
297. E. N. Oskolkov, Golod 1932/1933: Khlebozagotovki i golod 1932/1933 goda v severo-kavkazskom krae (Rostov-na-donu, 1991);
298. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire," pp. 606-32.
299. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukriani: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv (Kiev, 1990), p. 121.
300. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukriani: ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv Ibid., pp. 292-93.
301. S. Kosior, Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi provedeniia natsional'noi politiki na Ukraine (Kharkov, 1933).
302. O. S. Rublov and A. Iu. Cherchenko, Stalinshchyna i dolia zakhidnoukrains'koi intelihentsii. 20-50-ti roku XXst. (Kiev, 1994).
303. Piotr Mitzner, "Widmo POW," Karta, no. 11 (1993),pp.21-23; Iwanov (n.9 above), pp. 351-56;
304. GARF 1235/128/3 (1933): 216-17.
305. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv, p. 293.
306. Oskolkov, pp. 55-60; RGVA 9/36/613 (1933): 6, 46.
307. RGAE 5675/1/33 (1933): 19.
308. Oskolkov, p. 52.
309. Buchsweiler (n. 126 above), pp. 64-71; CGM reel 5213 (25.05.32): K481339-41
310. CGM reel 5213 (06.06.32): K481348-50;
311. Nimtsi v Ukraini 20-30-ti rr. XX st. (Kiev, 1994): 179-85.
312. Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-1939 (New York, 1984), p. 36.
313. RTsKhIDNI 17/21/404 (03.08.34): 2, 18-21. Belorussian-speaking Catholics often considered themselves Poles and demanded Polish education for their children, a practice considered legitimate prior to 1934.
314. RTsKhIDNI Ibid., pp. 87-88.
315. RTsKhIDNI 77/1/425 (1934): 1.
316. TsDAHOU 1/16/13 (26.08.36): 104-9;
317. SZ (17.07.35): 45/377.
318. Leningradskaia pravda, no. 113 (23.05.35): 1;
319. BFORC reel 3 (03.06.35), vol. 19454, pp. 171-74.
320. TsDAHOU 1/16/11 (20.12.34): 316-17,
321. TsDAHOU 1/16/12 (23.01.35): 39.
322. 2,866 Polish and 1,903 German families. See GARF 5446/16a/265 (1935): 14.
323. TsDAHOU 1/6/396 (17.08.35): 46/30, 166.
324. TsDAHOU Ibid., pp. 166-67;
325. TsDAHOU 1/16/12(05.09.35): 267-68.
326. TsDAHOU 1/16/12 (16.10.35): 314.
327. GARF 5446/16a/265 (1935): 14-15.
328. GARF 5446/18a/209 (1936): 1;
329. TsDAHOU 1/16/12 (25.11.35): 346,
330. TsDAHOU 1/16/13 (15.03.36): 25;
331. RTsKhIDNI 17/42/186 (16.02.35): 6-10;
332. RTsKhIDNI 17/42/208 (31.03.36): 15.
333. Initially, the deported were not formally deprived of their civil rights but were, like the kulaks, settled in NKVD work settlements (trudposelki). Later they were formally reduced to the existing kulak status of spetspereselentsy. GARF 5446/18a/209 (1936): 30, 70-73;
334. Nikolaj F. Bugaj, "'Specjalna teczka Stalina' : Deportacje i reemigracja polakow," Zeszyty Historyczie, no. 107 ( 1993), pp. 137-38.
335. This is an approximation based on the 1926 census. By 1941, 70-80 percent of the Germans had been deported from the German Pulinskii raion. Buchsweiler (n. 126 above), p. 157.
336. B. V. Shyrko, "'Shkidnytstvo riznykh natsii,'" Arkhivy Ukrainy, no. 4 (1992), pp. 32-40;
337. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 757-59.
338. BFORC reel 3 (1935), vol. 19453, pp. 259-64,
339. BFORC reel 3 (vol. 19454, pp. 171-74;
340. BFORC reel 5 (1936), vol. 20349, p. 169,
341. BFORC reel 6 (1936), vol. 20353, pp. 14-17; The Ingrian Committee (n. 154 above), pp. 12-14;
342. Gelb, "Western Finnic Minorities" (n. 9 above), pp. 242-44;
343. N. F. Bugai, Iosif Stalin-Lavrentiiu Berii: "Ikh nado deportirovat'" (Moscow, 1992), p. 20. Iagoda had approved the deportation of 3,547 families, not all of whom were Finns.
344. The Ingrian Committee, p. 14.
345. BFORC reel 6 (1936), vol. 20353, p. 16.
346. Manley, p. 9. BFORC reel 16 (29.07.36), vol. 20353, pp. 14-17;
347. Gelb, "Western Finnic Minorities," p. 243.
348. Matley (n. 9 above), pp. 8-10.
349. GARF 3316/30/825 (1937);
350. BFORC reel 6 (29.07.36), vol. 20352, p. 24.
351. One did not need NKVD permission to enter Leningrad, only to reside in it.
352. "'Poshchadite zhe Rodinu i Nas'. Protesty akademika I. P. Pavlova protiv bol'shevistskikh nasilii," Istochnik, no. 1 (1995), p. 143 (letter from Molotov to Pavlov, March 15, 1935).
353. BFORC reel 5 (31.01.36), vol. 20349, pp. 169-70. The special suspicion against Soviet western national minorities is nicely illustrated by an informant of the British consul, who related that ballet dancers who socialized with the German consul were told to stop: "When they enquired who were the foreigners whom they were to avoid, they were told members of the German, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, and Polish consulates."
354. BFORC reel 5 (31.01.36), vol. 20349,p. 169.
355. "Koreitsy," Tak eto bylo, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1993), pp. 47-84;
356. Gelb, "An Early Soviet" (n. 9 above), p. 397.
357. GARF 5446/29/67 (1936): 42-43.
358. GARF Ibid., p. 18.
359. GARF 5446/29/67 (1937): 18-25.
360. RGVA 33879/2/181 (1938): 8-11.
361. Belaia kniga, 64-67;
362. RGVA 33879/2/181 (1937): 3-6.
363. GARF 5446/29/113 (1938).
364. Belaia kniga (n. 49 above), pp. 85-86, 88, 109-110.
365. Belaia kniga (Ibid.,p. 111.
366. GARF 5446/29/48 (1937): 156.
367. He noted that seven hundred dispersed Koreans remained to be rounded up. Approximately 11,000 Chinese were also deported with the Koreans, as were six hundred Poles, and several hundred Germans, Latvians, and Lithuanians were arrested. Nikolai F. Bugai, "Koreiskii vopros' na dal'nem vostoke i deportatsiia 1937 goda," Problemy dal'nego vostoka, no. 4 (1992), p. 158.
368. Belaia kniga, p. 133.
369. GARF 5446/29/48 (1937): 156.
370. GARF Ibid., p. 176.
371. Belaia kniga.p. 100;
372. GARF 5446/20a/509 (1937): 1-12.
373. Nimtsi v Ukraini (n. 202 above), p. 13.
374. GARF 5446/20a/933 (1937): 7-8,
375. GARF 5446/23a/50 (1938): 1-2;
376. Nikolai F. Bugai, "Kamin voiny: Repressii v otnoshenii sovetskikh kurdov," in Sovetskie kurdy: Vremia peremen (Moscow, 1993), p. 48;
377. "Kurdy," in Tak eto bylo, vol. 1, pp. 95-125;
378. GARF 5446/ 23a/29 (1938): 23. "Iranian" was actually not an ethnic term, but one that embraced Persians, Azerbaijanis, and Kurds who originated in Iran (even if they were now Soviet citizens), again pointing to the key role of cross-border ethnic ties.
379. GARF 5446/29/96 (1938): 1-10,
380. and GARF 5446/29/67 (1938): 52.
381. TsDAHOU 1/6/458 (19.11.37): 9/7, pp. 63-70.
382. Ukraine's Polish population declined by approximately 90,000 individuals and its German population by 40,000. In Belorussia, the Polish population declined from 119,881 in 1937 to 54,500 in 1939 (45.46 percent). Calculated (with adjustments for the inflated 1939 numbers) from Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 goda (Moscow, 1937), p. 94,
383. and Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1939 goda (Moscow, 1939), p. 68. However, these population losses may reflect arrests and executions during the Great Terror rather than deportations.
384. The terror did not target those stateless diasporas, whose coethnics did not live in concentrated communities adjacent to the Soviet Union, such as Jews, Assyrians, and Gypsies. Although they were treated with greater suspicion during the Great Terror, and some of their institutions were abolished, I have found no decrees specifically targeting them for repression. Nor have the statistics on the ethnic impact of the terror suggested they were targeted. According to Vaksberg, who had access to the former KGB archive in Moscow, the first specifically Jewish cases were initiated in 1939 after the Hitler-Stalin pact. Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin against the Jews (New York, 1994), pp. 80-102.
385. See also Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 782-85.
386. L. P. Belkovec, "Der Beginn des Massenterrors: Die Getreiderequirierung von 1934 im westsibirischen Deutschen Rayon," Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur der Russlanddeutschen, no. 4 (1994), p. 121;
387. Victor Chentsov, "Die deutsche Bevölkerung am Dnepr im Zeichen des stalinistischen Terrors," Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur der Russlanddeutschen, no. 5 (1995), pp. 11-13;
388. GARF 3316/30/831 (1936): 7-8,
389. GARF 3316/ 29/631 (1935): 18-19;
390. Nimtsi v Ukraini, pp. 186-87.
391. V. N. Khaustov, "Iz predystorii massovykh repressii protiv poliakov: Seredina 1930-kh gg," in Repressii protiv poliakov i pol'skikh grazlidan (Moscow, 1997), pp. 10-21;
392. Nikita Pietrow, "Polska operacja NKWD," Karta, no. 11 (1993), pp.24-27.
393. There was also a July 25, 1937, NKVD decree, which targeted exclusively foreign Germans working in military plants or in transport. Leningradskii martirolog, 1937-1938, tom 2 (St. Petersburg, 1996), pp. 452-53.
394. "Massovye repressii opravdany byt' ne mogut," Istochnik, no. 1 (1995), p. 125. The decree is reproduced in Pietrow, pp. 27-29. POV was a real underground organization formed during World War I to support Pilsudski's legions. It ceased operations in Poland in 1918 and in Ukraine in 1921. Arrests by the NKVD for membership in POV began during the 1933 Ukrainian terror and continued through the Great Terror. Mitzner (n. 197 above), pp. 21-23.
395. Both documents are reproduced in Iurii Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotarov, eds., ChK-HPU-NKVD v Ukraini: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty (Kiev, 1997), pp. 347-77.
396. N. V. Petrov and A. B. Roginskii, "'Polskaia operatsiia' NKVD 1937-1938 gg.," in Represii protiv poliakov (n. 249 above), p. 27. "Konsul'skie sviazi" were also a standard arrest category in the other national operations. See Chentsov, p. 14.
397. Petrov and Roginskii, pp. 29-34; Pietrow, p. 32; S. Bilokin, "Dokumenty z istorii NKVD URSR," Nashe mynule, no. 1 (1993), pp. 40-41.
398. Petrov and Roginskii, pp. 28-29.
399. Ibid., pp. 30-31. For decree 00447, see "Limity terroru," Karta, no. 11 (1993), pp. 8-15.
400. Tak eto bylo, vol. 1 (n. 228 above), p. 253.
401. "Limity terroru," p. 8; Petrov and Roginskii, p. 33. In July 1937, Stalin authorized the arrest of all Afghan citizens in Turkmenistan.
402. Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennykh Dokumentov (hereafter TsKhSD) 89/48/7 (25.07.37): 1.
403. Rastsyslav Platonav and Mikola Stashkevich, "Dzve aperatsyi suprats' 'vorahav naioda,'" Belaruski histarychny chasopis, no. 1 (1993), pp. 78-79.
404. Petrov and Roginskii, p. 28.
405. Ibid., p. 34.
406. Unless otherwise noted, all statistics in the following two paragraphs are taken from ibid., pp. 32-33, 37-38; and Pietrow (n. 249 above), pp. 33, 39-40.
407. This was the only information provided. The data follow the general pattern of greater severity in the west and lesser severity in the south.
408. For the national operations, no quotas were provided for executions and incarceration as they were with decree 00447, although all executions in both operations had to be ratified by central authorities (albeit in the most rote fashion). This is one possible reason for the higher execution rates in the national operations.
409. Platonav and Stashkevich, pp. 78-79.
410. Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 g. (n. 246 above), pp. 83-84. The targeting of diaspora nationalities is also confirmed by some recent evidence from Leningrad oblast.
411. Using the biographical information of the 7,750 individuals executed in Leningrad city and oblast in August, September, and October 1937, as listed in Leningradskii martirolog (n. 249 above) (the list is said to be almost comprehensive and so valid for statistical analysis), I calculated the percentage of each nationality relative to the percentage that would be expected based on their total representation in the population of Leningrad city and oblast. Although the national operations (except the Polish one, which began August 20) were just beginning and most executions would have been part of the decree 00447 operations, the diaspora nationalities were still disproportionately affected. The number of Poles executed was 2,204 percent of what would be expected based on their total representation in the population of Leningrad city and oblast. In other words, due exclusively to their ethnicity, Poles were 22.04 times more likely to be executed than non-Poles. For diaspora nationalities, the targeting was not yet so extreme: Finns 183 percent, Estonians 265 percent, Germans 245 percent, Latvians 161 percent. These figures would be much higher were the post-September 1937 executions included. Non-diaspora nationalities were mostly underrepresented: Russians 75 percent, Jews 50 percent, Tatars 19 percent. Ukrainians were slightly overrepresented at 137 percent and Belorussians highly overrepresented at 461 percent (second only to the Poles). I suspect this substantial Belorussian (and less substantial Ukrainian) overrepresentation is the result of two factors. First, many Belorussians (and a smaller number of Ukrainians) were Catholics, who in the 1920s declared themselves to be Poles and sent their children to Polish schools. Therefore, they were arrested in large numbers during the Polish operation. For instance, in Belorussia itself, Belorussians made up 47.3 percent of those arrested in the Polish operation (more than the Poles at 43.0 percent). They made up 14.2 percent of those arrested in the Polish operation statewide from September to November 1938, more than any other nationality except the Poles themselves (Ukrainians were next at 13.6 percent and Russians next at 8.8 percent). Second, Belorussia and Ukraine were home to the largest diaspora nationality populations, and therefore the NKVD was simply likely to be more active in those republics (the same would be true of Leningrad and the Far East). The published Gulag statistics for 1939 also show a substantial overrepresentation of diaspora nationalities and underrepresentation of indigenous nationalities. However, Ukrainians are slightly underrepresented and Belorussians only slightly overrepresented, which may reflect the higher execution rates of the Polish operation.
412. J. Arch Getty, Gabor T. Rittersporn, and Viktor N. Zemskov, "Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years: A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence," American Historical Review 98 (October 1993): 1028.
413. RTsKhIDNI 17/3/994 (11.12.37): 56/75, 56/76,
414. RTsKhIDNI 17/114/633 (01.12.37): 75/6, 75/7. There was one major exception: the Volga German ASSR and German schools within that republic were not abolished.
415. RTsKhIDNI 17/114/829 (01.12.37): 75/6, p. 122.
416. RTsKhIDNI 17/2/627 (11-12.10.37): 55-56.
417. This is a rough estimate. I do not have arrest figures for 1935-36, or comprehensive deportation figures for 1937-38. 271 On elite political explanations, see Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York, 1990).
418. On regional explanations, see J. Arch Getty, Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933-1938 (Cambridge, 1985).
419. For a "class-based" explanation, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford, 1994), pp. 163-70.
420. For the social explanation based on crime, see David Shearer, "Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin's Russia: A Reassessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression," Cahiers du monde russe 39 (1998): 119-48. This is, of course, not meant to be a complete catalog of factors leading to the terror.
421. Petrov and Roginskii (n. 253 above), p. 30.
422. Slezkine (n. 12 above); Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire" (n. 13 above), pp. 944-60.
423. On the liberal ideology of national self-determination and ethnic cleansing, see David Laitin, Ethnic Cleansing, Liberal Style, Mac Arthur Foundation Program in Transnational Security, Working Paper Series, no. 4 (Cambridge, 1995).
424. This is not to argue that all nationalities that were the subject of popular ethnic hostility were deported even in the North Caucasus. Dagestan had been the site of much ethnic conflict but experienced no deportations, whereas Kalmykia had seen little ethnic conflict and nonetheless the Kalmyks were deported.
425. For evidence that these operations were considered "cleansing" of border regions, see Bugai, L. Beriia (n. 9 above), pp. 149-50, 163-85.
426. Martin, "An Affirmative Action Empire," pp. 962-71.
427. Tak eto bylo, vol. 1 (n. 228 above), p. 253.
428. In addition to the January 1938 Politburo resolution on the Kharbintsy, see the NKVD targeting the Kharbintsy (modeled after the Polish decree 00485), "Operativnyi prikaz NKVD SSSR No. 00593, 20.09.37," Memorial-Aspekt, no. 1 (July 1993), p. 2.