Enforcement of property rights and underdevelopment

Review of Development Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 391-405

  Dabla Norris, Era ^a   Freeman, Scott ^b  

^a INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPMENT THEORY; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; LEGAL SYSTEM; PROPERTY RIGHTS; UNDERDEVELOPMENT;

EID: 4143134356     PISSN: 13636669     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2004.00240.x     Document Type: Article

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