The permissive law of practical reason in Kant's Metaphysics of morals

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 23, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 45-72

  Hruschka, Joachim ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN NUREMBERG   (Germany)

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EID: 4143131137     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:LAPH.0000004354.08266.d9     Document Type: Review

References (110)

1. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
2. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
3. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
4. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
5. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
6. Ius Naturae pars prior, §46 ("It is clear in natural law, and even in natural coercive law, that not only laws imposing obligations but also laws expressing permissions can be conceived"). In this paper, I have used the following sources: Gottfried Achenwall, Prolegomena Iuris Naturalis, 3rd edn. (1767); Ius Naturae pars prior, 6th edn. (1767); Immanuel Kant, "Zum ewigen Frieden" (1795) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VIII, pp. 341-386, trans. Mary Gregor, "Toward Perpetual Peace", in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 315-351; "Die Metaphysik der Sitten" (1797) in Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie-Ausgabe vol. VI, pp. 203-493, trans. Mary Gregor, "The Metaphysics of Morals", in Texts in German Philosophy (Cambridge/New York/Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Kant's works are cited according to the Academy edition (Akademie-Ausgabe) as: AA, volume, section, page, line number. In some cases I have modified the Gregor translations.
7. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §1, p. 245, l. 4-5.
8. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 1-2.
9. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §16, p. 267, l. 24-26.
10. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §22, p. 276, l. 19-20 and l. 33-34.
11. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
12. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
13. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
14. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
15. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
16. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
17. Kenneth Baynes, "Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract", The Monist 73 (1989), pp. 433-453; Reinhard Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht den Sachbesitz der Willkür einer anderen Person?", in Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), vol. IV, pp. 72-80; Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz, oder: Vernunft und Geschichte in Kants Rechtslehre", in R. Brandt (ed.), Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1982), pp. 233-285; Wayne F. Buck, "Kant's Justification of Private Property", in Bernard den Ouden (ed.), New Essays on Kant (New York/Bern/Frankfurt a.M.: Lang Publishers, 1987), pp. 227-244; Katrin Flikschuh, "Freedom and Constraint in Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice", History of Political Thought 20 (1999), pp. 250-271; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984); Wolfgang Kersting, "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz - Kants Lehre vom synthetischen Rechtssatz a priori", Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie (1981), pp. 31-51.
18. See e.g. Paul Guyer, "Kantian Foundations for Liberalism", Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 5 (1997), pp. 121-140.
19. My thesis is thus diametrically opposed to that of Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel in their The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), because my thesis maintains that property (pretax assets) does have a normative content, and therefore that taxation does need to be justified with regard to the person subject to the tax.
20. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §IV, p. 222, l. 27-28.
21. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §IV, p. 223, l. 5-6.
22. German criminal law, for example, prohibits failure to render aid to someone in distress in certain defined situations, see Strafgesetzbuch (Criminal Code), §323c. The same is true for a few states in the U.S.
23. The first to see the distinction between 'allowed' ('erlaubt') and 'merely allowed' ('bloß erlaubt') as Kant drew it seems to be Theodor Ebert, "Kants kategorischer Imperativ und die Kriterien gebotener, verbotener und freigestellter Handlungen", in Kant-Studien 67 (1976), pp. 570-583.
24. It is important to note that this article deals with law and not ethics. Although it might be healthier to drink milk than a soft drink, and thus be a duty of ethics, it is certainly not a duty of law. Indeed Kant gives us an indication that it is not even a duty of ethics: "But that man can be called fantastically virtuous who allows nothing to be morally indifferent (adiaphora) and strews all his steps with duties, as with man-traps; it is not indifferent to him whether I eat meat or fish, drink beer or wine, supposing that both agree with me. Fantastic virtue is a concern with petty details [Mikrologie] which were it admitted into the doctrine of virtue, would turn the government of virtue into tyranny." (Doctrine of Virtue, AA VI, §XVI, p. 409, l. 13-19).
25. Cf. Joachim Hruschka, Das deontologische Sechseck bei Gottfried Achenwall im Jahre 1767 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), pp. 45-47; Brian Tierny, "Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant", in Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001), pp. 381-399, 394-395; Walter Brinkmann, Praktische Notwendigkeit. Eine Formalisierung von Kants Kategorischem Imperativ (Paderborn: Mentis, 2003), pp. 87-88, fn. 114-116.
26. Cf. Joachim Hruschka, Das deontologische Sechseck bei Gottfried Achenwall im Jahre 1767 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), pp. 45-47; Brian Tierny, "Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant", in Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001), pp. 381-399, 394-395; Walter Brinkmann, Praktische Notwendigkeit. Eine Formalisierung von Kants Kategorischem Imperativ (Paderborn: Mentis, 2003), pp. 87-88, fn. 114-116.
27. Cf. Joachim Hruschka, Das deontologische Sechseck bei Gottfried Achenwall im Jahre 1767 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), pp. 45-47; Brian Tierny, "Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant", in Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001), pp. 381-399, 394-395; Walter Brinkmann, Praktische Notwendigkeit. Eine Formalisierung von Kants Kategorischem Imperativ (Paderborn: Mentis, 2003), pp. 87-88, fn. 114-116.
28. In the introductory chapter of the Prolegomena, §26 (op. cit., fn. 1), Achenwall uses the expression 'actio indifferens' for not required and not prohibited actions. In connection with juridical, as opposed to ethical, laws he uses instead the expression 'actio permissa' (Prolegomena, §63 and Ius Naturae I, §46 (op. cit., fn. 1)).
29. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, p. 223, l. 5-17. Kant goes on to say: "If so, the authorization would not relate to an action that is indifferent from the very beginning (adiaphoron); for, considering this type of action in terms of moral laws, no special law would be required for it." This conclusion to the above quoted text may seem to be saying that the permissive law would not be needed for any merely allowed action, or exactly the opposite of what I am claiming here. That interpretation, however, is incorrect. The German text is quite difficult to translate into English. In German it reads: "Wenn dieses ist, so würde die Befugnis nicht allemal eine gleichgültige Handlung (adiaphoron) betreffen; denn zu einer solchen, wenn man sie nach sittlichen Gesetzen betrachtet, würde kein besonderes Gesetz erfordert werden." The problem is partly with the translation of 'allemal'. Gregor translates it as 'always,' which is reasonable, but it could also mean, as I have translated it, 'from the very beginning,' meaning something like 'in itself.' In support of this translation one can note that when Kant first refers to morally indifferent actions, he adds in parentheses: "(indifferens, adiaphoron, res merae facultatis)." When he refers to the "action that is indifferent from the very beginning" he just adds "(adiaphoron)." Presumably Kant has different types of morally indifferent actions in mind, some of which indeed would not need a permissive law, namely actions that are adiaphora, like drinking milk (see fn. 13), but some of which might. As should become clear from what is to follow, some morally indifferent, or merely allowed, actions do need the permissive law, which is why Kant develops it later with respect to these actions in the Doctrine of Justice. Furthermore, if Kant thought one never needed a permissive law for any merely allowed actions, he presumably would not have said "If so, ..." and gone on to complicate matters unnecessarily, but rather would have said simply "No, we don't need a permissive law." For my purposes here, I only need to show that if permissive laws are needed at all, they are needed for merely allowed and not for allowed actions.
30. See as well "Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue", AA VI, §XVII, p. 409, l. 13-19, where Kant assumes that "morally indifferent things (adiaphora)" exist.
31. See Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz" (op. cit., fn. 6), pp. 244, 255; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (op. cit., fn. 6), pp. 133-134. Brandt's article can be credited for having drawn attention to the permissive law of practical reason.
32. See Reinhard Brandt, "Das Erlaubnisgesetz" (op. cit., fn. 6), pp. 244, 255; Wolfgang Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit (op. cit., fn. 6), pp. 133-134. Brandt's article can be credited for having drawn attention to the permissive law of practical reason.
33. Perpetual Peace, AA VIII, p. 347 fn., especially p. 348, l. 10-11.
34. It follows that when Kant speaks of something being 'allowed,' he is not always talking about a permissive law (lex permissiva). When "the subject" is "allowed" "to constrain everyone else ... to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §8, p. 256, l. 15-18) then this statement makes an exception from the prohibition against coercing others. The action is thus an allowed action (licitum) and not a merely allowed action, and the allowance is certainly not a lex permissiva.
35. Just as for Kant the concepts 'required action,' 'prohibited action,' and 'merely allowed action' are mutually exclusive when considered in pairs.
36. Achenwall, Ius Naturae I, §46 (op. cit., fn. 1). Achenwall uses the expression 'lex permittens,' to which he adds in parentheses the word "permissiva.'
37. See fn. 16.
38. "If so ..." See fn. 16.
39. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, p. 213, l. 14-26. In the Groundwork, Kant always uses the term 'will' (Wille), although sometimes the expression means what he later in the Metaphysics of Morals calls 'choice' (Willkür) and sometimes it means 'will' (Wille).
40. Johann Georg Walch, Philosophisches Lexicon (1726), col. 3030; 4th edn., Justus Christian Hennings (ed.), 2 vols. (1775) (reprint 1968), vol. II, col. 1708.
41. Joseph William Singer, Introduction to Property (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 2001), §8.5, p. 355. I am grateful to John Strait Applegate, Indiana University at Bloomington, School of Law, for his assistance with U.S. property law.
42. In Germany this right was introduced through the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz, March 15, 1951, Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Gazette) I., p. 175.
43. In Germany this right was introduced through the Wohnungseigentumsgesetz, March 15, 1951, Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Gazette) I., p. 175.
44. For an interesting argument that he is, see: Jeremy Waldron, "Kant's Legal Positivism", Harvard Law Review 109 (1996), pp. 1535-1566.
45. Achenwall, Prolegomena, §90 (op. cit., fn. 1): "Appellatur nempe lex ... permittens, quod legislator vi talis legis facultatem largiatur, certam actionem tamquam permissam perpetrandi" (emphasis added).
46. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 1-6 (emphasis added).
47. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §IV, p. 222, l. 29; "Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue", AA VI, §II, p. 383, l. 5-6.
48. "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §IV, p. 222, l. 29; "Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue", AA VI, §II, p. 383, l. 5-6.
49. Kant calls a claim right the "moral faculty to put others under obligation." See "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §B, p. 237, l. 18; see also p. 239, l. 19-20.
50. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §9, p. 257, l. 25-27.
51. The concept, therefore, should not be confused with the concept 'voluntariness,' which designates only the physically possible but not the physically necessary actions. An action is voluntary if it results from the actor's will, free from any external force or constraint.
52. Achenwall, Prolegomena, §44 (op. cit., fn. 1).
53. Achenwall, Prolegomena, §90 (op. cit., fn. 1). The expressions Achenwall uses are 'lex iubens,' 'lex permittens,' 'actio iussa,' and 'actio permissa.'
54. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §16, p. 267, l. 24-25; §22, p. 276, l. 33.
55. Kant himself (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 246, l. 10-11) states that something is or is not "rightfully" "within my power." Wolfgang Kersting refers to this passage in "Freiheit und intelligibler Besitz" (op. cit., fn. 6), p. 37. Kersting sees that Kant means a legal empowerment in this passage, but Kersting does not see that the empowerment flows from the permissive law of practical reason.
56. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 6-7.
57. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 2-3. Kant speaks of an 'authorization' ('Befugnis'), which he has defined as facultas moralis.
58. "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §B, p. 230, l. 24-26.
59. Kant concludes that practical reason wills that the postulate hold as a principle from his analysis of ownership rights. For a full explanation of Kant's argument see, Mary Gregor, "Kant's Theory of Property", Review of Metaphysics 41 (1988), pp. 757-787.
60. "Permissio non est legis actio, quia qui permittit, non praescribit normam, nisi hac voce comprehendatur confirmatio juris alteri competentis, aut ejus introductio. Nam v. g. dum imperium patris, dominium civium &c. in legibus permittitur, per consequentiam alii vetantur, nec utentes suo jure turbent; Hoc pacto tamen permissio non est nova legis actio sed jam comprehenditur sub actu vetandi." Christian Thomasius, Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium, 4th edn. (1718) (reprint 1963), Lib. I. Cap. V., §VI, pp. 146-147 (emphasis added to the English translation). The final sentence of the Latin quote in English is: "But even then the permission is not a new act of law, but rather is already contained within a law of prohibition."
61. The context in which Thomasius made this comment is interesting because of its relevance to the so-called 'imperative theory.' According to the imperative theory, all legal provisions can be reduced to propositions that prohibit or require a certain action (Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th edn. (1991), pp. 253-257 with further citations). The name 'imperative theory' is new. The discussion is old. Grotius provides us with a corresponding thesis: "A permission is not an act of law but rather the negation of such an act unless the law obliges someone other than the person who has been granted a permission not to hinder the beneficiary of the permission." ("Permissio ... non est actio legis, sed actionis negatio, nisi quatenus alium ab eo cui permittitur obligat ne impedimentum ponat." Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Lib. I Cap. I, §9). A famous controversy over the legal nature of permissions ensued out of the Grotius quote. Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Grotius that permissions are not laws in the narrower sense. Jean Barbeyrac, translator and commentator of both, disagrees. This controversy was continued at the end of the eighteenth century. In Perpetual Peace, Kant takes a stance on it: Whether in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laws (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive law would involve necessitation to an action to which one cannot be necessitated to do, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. (Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 347, l. 34-p. 348, l. 10). Kant's commentator, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, reiterates the controversy in 1799 in detail. (G.S.A. Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie, vol. 2, 1st part (1799), Art. "erlaubt" (permitted), pp. 386-397, nos. 8-13 (pp. 390-394)). He ignores, however, Thomasius' position on the imperative theory indicated in the above quoted text. Had Mellin included Thomasius' opinion, he would have been able to understand Kant's interpretation of the permissive law in the Metaphysics of Morals as a power conferring norm. As Kant does later, Thomasius here sees the permissive law as a power conferring norm. Still Thomasius agrees with Grotius, whom he cites, assuming that permissive laws are not laws in the real sense. For Thomasius it is really only the commanding laws corresponding to the permissive laws which prohibit all others from interfering with the beneficiary of a permissive law while he is exercising his rights. According to Thomasius, the controversy over the proper character of the permissive laws is essentially a logomachy, a mere argument over words (op. cit., fn. 44, Lib. I., Cap. V. §VII p. 147). In Perpetual Peace, where Kant has a different conception of permissive laws than in the Metaphysics of Morals (as discussed in Part I. B., fns. 18-20 and accompanying text), he does not fully discount the idea that permissive laws have the nature of law ("I wanted only to draw the attention of teachers of natural law to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions ..." Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 348, l. 22-24 (emphasis added)). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant shows that permissive laws qua power conferring norms logically relate to merely allowed actions. On the nature of permissive laws as laws, and thus on the imperative theory, he wastes no more words, because he is no longer interested in participating in a logomachy.
62. The context in which Thomasius made this comment is interesting because of its relevance to the so-called 'imperative theory.' According to the imperative theory, all legal provisions can be reduced to propositions that prohibit or require a certain action (Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th edn. (1991), pp. 253-257 with further citations). The name 'imperative theory' is new. The discussion is old. Grotius provides us with a corresponding thesis: "A permission is not an act of law but rather the negation of such an act unless the law obliges someone other than the person who has been granted a permission not to hinder the beneficiary of the permission." ("Permissio ... non est actio legis, sed actionis negatio, nisi quatenus alium ab eo cui permittitur obligat ne impedimentum ponat." Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Lib. I Cap. I, §9). A famous controversy over the legal nature of permissions ensued out of the Grotius quote. Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Grotius that permissions are not laws in the narrower sense. Jean Barbeyrac, translator and commentator of both, disagrees. This controversy was continued at the end of the eighteenth century. In Perpetual Peace, Kant takes a stance on it: Whether in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laws (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive law would involve necessitation to an action to which one cannot be necessitated to do, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. (Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 347, l. 34-p. 348, l. 10). Kant's commentator, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, reiterates the controversy in 1799 in detail. (G.S.A. Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie, vol. 2, 1st part (1799), Art. "erlaubt" (permitted), pp. 386-397, nos. 8-13 (pp. 390-394)). He ignores, however, Thomasius' position on the imperative theory indicated in the above quoted text. Had Mellin included Thomasius' opinion, he would have been able to understand Kant's interpretation of the permissive law in the Metaphysics of Morals as a power conferring norm. As Kant does later, Thomasius here sees the permissive law as a power conferring norm. Still Thomasius agrees with Grotius, whom he cites, assuming that permissive laws are not laws in the real sense. For Thomasius it is really only the commanding laws corresponding to the permissive laws which prohibit all others from interfering with the beneficiary of a permissive law while he is exercising his rights. According to Thomasius, the controversy over the proper character of the permissive laws is essentially a logomachy, a mere argument over words (op. cit., fn. 44, Lib. I., Cap. V. §VII p. 147). In Perpetual Peace, where Kant has a different conception of permissive laws than in the Metaphysics of Morals (as discussed in Part I. B., fns. 18-20 and accompanying text), he does not fully discount the idea that permissive laws have the nature of law ("I wanted only to draw the attention of teachers of natural law to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions ..." Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 348, l. 22-24 (emphasis added)). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant shows that permissive laws qua power conferring norms logically relate to merely allowed actions. On the nature of permissive laws as laws, and thus on the imperative theory, he wastes no more words, because he is no longer interested in participating in a logomachy.
63. The context in which Thomasius made this comment is interesting because of its relevance to the so-called 'imperative theory.' According to the imperative theory, all legal provisions can be reduced to propositions that prohibit or require a certain action (Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th edn. (1991), pp. 253-257 with further citations). The name 'imperative theory' is new. The discussion is old. Grotius provides us with a corresponding thesis: "A permission is not an act of law but rather the negation of such an act unless the law obliges someone other than the person who has been granted a permission not to hinder the beneficiary of the permission." ("Permissio ... non est actio legis, sed actionis negatio, nisi quatenus alium ab eo cui permittitur obligat ne impedimentum ponat." Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Lib. I Cap. I, §9). A famous controversy over the legal nature of permissions ensued out of the Grotius quote. Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Grotius that permissions are not laws in the narrower sense. Jean Barbeyrac, translator and commentator of both, disagrees. This controversy was continued at the end of the eighteenth century. In Perpetual Peace, Kant takes a stance on it: Whether in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laws (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive law would involve necessitation to an action to which one cannot be necessitated to do, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. (Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 347, l. 34-p. 348, l. 10). Kant's commentator, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, reiterates the controversy in 1799 in detail. (G.S.A. Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie, vol. 2, 1st part (1799), Art. "erlaubt" (permitted), pp. 386-397, nos. 8-13 (pp. 390-394)). He ignores, however, Thomasius' position on the imperative theory indicated in the above quoted text. Had Mellin included Thomasius' opinion, he would have been able to understand Kant's interpretation of the permissive law in the Metaphysics of Morals as a power conferring norm. As Kant does later, Thomasius here sees the permissive law as a power conferring norm. Still Thomasius agrees with Grotius, whom he cites, assuming that permissive laws are not laws in the real sense. For Thomasius it is really only the commanding laws corresponding to the permissive laws which prohibit all others from interfering with the beneficiary of a permissive law while he is exercising his rights. According to Thomasius, the controversy over the proper character of the permissive laws is essentially a logomachy, a mere argument over words (op. cit., fn. 44, Lib. I., Cap. V. §VII p. 147). In Perpetual Peace, where Kant has a different conception of permissive laws than in the Metaphysics of Morals (as discussed in Part I. B., fns. 18-20 and accompanying text), he does not fully discount the idea that permissive laws have the nature of law ("I wanted only to draw the attention of teachers of natural law to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions ..." Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 348, l. 22-24 (emphasis added)). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant shows that permissive laws qua power conferring norms logically relate to merely allowed actions. On the nature of permissive laws as laws, and thus on the imperative theory, he wastes no more words, because he is no longer interested in participating in a logomachy.
64. The context in which Thomasius made this comment is interesting because of its relevance to the so-called 'imperative theory.' According to the imperative theory, all legal provisions can be reduced to propositions that prohibit or require a certain action (Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th edn. (1991), pp. 253-257 with further citations). The name 'imperative theory' is new. The discussion is old. Grotius provides us with a corresponding thesis: "A permission is not an act of law but rather the negation of such an act unless the law obliges someone other than the person who has been granted a permission not to hinder the beneficiary of the permission." ("Permissio ... non est actio legis, sed actionis negatio, nisi quatenus alium ab eo cui permittitur obligat ne impedimentum ponat." Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Lib. I Cap. I, §9). A famous controversy over the legal nature of permissions ensued out of the Grotius quote. Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Grotius that permissions are not laws in the narrower sense. Jean Barbeyrac, translator and commentator of both, disagrees. This controversy was continued at the end of the eighteenth century. In Perpetual Peace, Kant takes a stance on it: Whether in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laws (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive law would involve necessitation to an action to which one cannot be necessitated to do, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. (Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 347, l. 34-p. 348, l. 10). Kant's commentator, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, reiterates the controversy in 1799 in detail. (G.S.A. Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie, vol. 2, 1st part (1799), Art. "erlaubt" (permitted), pp. 386-397, nos. 8-13 (pp. 390-394)). He ignores, however, Thomasius' position on the imperative theory indicated in the above quoted text. Had Mellin included Thomasius' opinion, he would have been able to understand Kant's interpretation of the permissive law in the Metaphysics of Morals as a power conferring norm. As Kant does later, Thomasius here sees the permissive law as a power conferring norm. Still Thomasius agrees with Grotius, whom he cites, assuming that permissive laws are not laws in the real sense. For Thomasius it is really only the commanding laws corresponding to the permissive laws which prohibit all others from interfering with the beneficiary of a permissive law while he is exercising his rights. According to Thomasius, the controversy over the proper character of the permissive laws is essentially a logomachy, a mere argument over words (op. cit., fn. 44, Lib. I., Cap. V. §VII p. 147). In Perpetual Peace, where Kant has a different conception of permissive laws than in the Metaphysics of Morals (as discussed in Part I. B., fns. 18-20 and accompanying text), he does not fully discount the idea that permissive laws have the nature of law ("I wanted only to draw the attention of teachers of natural law to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions ..." Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 348, l. 22-24 (emphasis added)). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant shows that permissive laws qua power conferring norms logically relate to merely allowed actions. On the nature of permissive laws as laws, and thus on the imperative theory, he wastes no more words, because he is no longer interested in participating in a logomachy.
65. The context in which Thomasius made this comment is interesting because of its relevance to the so-called 'imperative theory.' According to the imperative theory, all legal provisions can be reduced to propositions that prohibit or require a certain action (Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6th edn. (1991), pp. 253-257 with further citations). The name 'imperative theory' is new. The discussion is old. Grotius provides us with a corresponding thesis: "A permission is not an act of law but rather the negation of such an act unless the law obliges someone other than the person who has been granted a permission not to hinder the beneficiary of the permission." ("Permissio ... non est actio legis, sed actionis negatio, nisi quatenus alium ab eo cui permittitur obligat ne impedimentum ponat." Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Lib. I Cap. I, §9). A famous controversy over the legal nature of permissions ensued out of the Grotius quote. Samuel Pufendorf agrees with Grotius that permissions are not laws in the narrower sense. Jean Barbeyrac, translator and commentator of both, disagrees. This controversy was continued at the end of the eighteenth century. In Perpetual Peace, Kant takes a stance on it: Whether in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae) and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae), there could also be permissive laws (leges permissivae) of pure reason has hitherto been doubted, and not without grounds. For laws as such involve a ground of objective practical necessity, whereas permissions involve a ground of the practical contingency of certain actions; thus a permissive law would involve necessitation to an action to which one cannot be necessitated to do, and, if the object of the law had the same meaning in both kinds of relation, this would be a contradiction. (Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 347, l. 34-p. 348, l. 10). Kant's commentator, Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, reiterates the controversy in 1799 in detail. (G.S.A. Mellin, Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie, vol. 2, 1st part (1799), Art. "erlaubt" (permitted), pp. 386-397, nos. 8-13 (pp. 390-394)). He ignores, however, Thomasius' position on the imperative theory indicated in the above quoted text. Had Mellin included Thomasius' opinion, he would have been able to understand Kant's interpretation of the permissive law in the Metaphysics of Morals as a power conferring norm. As Kant does later, Thomasius here sees the permissive law as a power conferring norm. Still Thomasius agrees with Grotius, whom he cites, assuming that permissive laws are not laws in the real sense. For Thomasius it is really only the commanding laws corresponding to the permissive laws which prohibit all others from interfering with the beneficiary of a permissive law while he is exercising his rights. According to Thomasius, the controversy over the proper character of the permissive laws is essentially a logomachy, a mere argument over words (op. cit., fn. 44, Lib. I., Cap. V. §VII p. 147). In Perpetual Peace, where Kant has a different conception of permissive laws than in the Metaphysics of Morals (as discussed in Part I. B., fns. 18-20 and accompanying text), he does not fully discount the idea that permissive laws have the nature of law ("I wanted only to draw the attention of teachers of natural law to the concept of a lex permissiva, which reason presents of itself in its systematic divisions ..." Perpetual Peace (op. cit., fn. 1), AA VIII, p. 348, l. 22-24 (emphasis added)). In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant shows that permissive laws qua power conferring norms logically relate to merely allowed actions. On the nature of permissive laws as laws, and thus on the imperative theory, he wastes no more words, because he is no longer interested in participating in a logomachy.
66. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §4, p. 247, l. 18-21.
67. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 246, l. 5-8.
68. Reinhard Brandt ("Das Erlaubnisgesetz", op. cit., fn. 6, p. 260) is of the opinion that the "second formulation" - "that is, a maxim by which, if it were to become a law, an object of choice would in itself (objectively) have to belong to no one [German: "herrenlos sein" - English: "belonging to no one," "masterless"] (res nullius) is wrongful" - applies only to things, because one can talk about "only things, but not another human being's choice and status" as "belonging to no one" (herrenlos sein). Brandt reiterates his position in: Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht", op. cit., fn. 6, p. 77, where he states that "neither my choice nor my status are 'res nullius'" and thus the "postulate is for the 2nd and 3rd categories of objects irrelevant." Brandt's position seems to me to be incorrect. If I acquire something, I am the person to whom it belongs, regardless of whether it is a contractual claim or a relationship of relevance under family law. Indeed, Kant carefully distinguishes between someone to whom something 'belongs' (German: 'Herr' or English: 'master,' meaning the 'herus' in the 'societas herilis') on the one hand, and 'owner' ('Eigentümer,' i.e. 'dominus') on the other; see Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §17, p. 270, l. 10-23 and §30, p. 283, l. 10-p. 284, l. 5. 'To belong to no one' ('herrenlos sein') means 'not to have a master' (or someone to whom something belongs) and not, as is perhaps more common today, 'to be without an owner.' Accordingly the 'res' in 'res nullius' must be translated as 'object' and not, as Brandt translates it, as 'thing.' The distinction in German is between 'Gegenstand' and 'Sache'; in English between 'object' and 'thing.' Although 'things' have owners, 'objects,' as in, for example, 'the object of my affections' do not necessarily. They however still can belong to someone. And it is precisely 'objects of my choice' that Kant uses here and not 'things of my choice.'
69. See, e.g., Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §20, p. 274, l. 1-5. Interesting here are the two meanings of the German word 'Vermögen.' Normally, it would be translated into English as 'assets.' In German, however, the word in its original meaning reflects a capacity to do something. If I have a bank account, for example, one can say I have assets in the account, but in German the meaning of 'Vermögen' indicates that (because of those assets) I have a capacity to act (I could buy a watch or computer) I would not otherwise have.
70. Doctrine of Justice, §AA VI, p. 257, l. 25-27.
71. Some duties I have do not correspond to rights someone else has. I have a duty of charity (see Doctrine of Virtue, AA VI, §§29-31, pp. 452-455), for example, but that duty does not correspond to any right the recipient of that charity has against me. Indeed, even if I promise to make a donation to someone, that does not mean the promisee has a right to force me to fulfill that promise, at least not before a civil social order has been established (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §37, pp. 297-298).
72. See Black's Law Dictionary, B. Garner (ed.), 7th edn. (1999) at "claim": "any right to payment or to an equitable remedy ... a demand for money or property to which one asserts a right ... the means by which a person can obtain a privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right ..."
73. See also "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §III, p. 219, l. 31-p. 220, l. 18. The statement "pacta sunt servanda" ("contracts are to be fulfilled") is, as Kant emphasizes, a principle of the Doctrine of Justice.
74. Brandt disagrees. ("Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht", op. cit., fn. 6, p. 77). As a consequence of his interpretation of the postulate of practical reason (as criticized in fn. 48), Brandt claims that Kant uses four different postulates, namely one for the ownership of things and one each for the acquisition of things, the acquisition of contractual claims, and the acquisition of family law claims (ibid. at p. 74). Yet the Kant texts Brandt cites from the Metaphysics of Morals (ibid. p. 74), namely for the acquisition of things AA VI, p. 258, l. 24-25; p. 264, l. 30-35; p. 268, l. 25; for the acquisition of contractual claims AA VI, p. 273, l. 22-29; for the acquisition of rights to persons akin to rights to a thing AA VI, p. 276, l. 32-34, both linguistically and contextually relate to the one postulate formulated in §2 of the Doctrine of Justice. Indeed in almost all of them Kant uses the definite article 'the,' implying reference back to the postulate formulated in §2. The one linguistic problem Brandt points out (ibid., p. 73, fn. 6), namely that Kant uses the indefinite rather than the definite article ('a' postulate rather than 'the' postulate) in the passage on the acquisition of contractual rights at AA VI, p. 273, l. 22, need not concern us, because in this passage it may well be that Kant does not mean the postulate in §2, but rather the categorical imperative that I ought to keep my promise. I say "it may well be" because the reference in the Kant text is not entirely clear. The Mary Gregor translation (op. cit., fn. 1) of this passage, for example, supports the interpretation that Kant means the categorical imperative. Furthermore, in §13 on the acquisition of things, Kant expressly refers back to the postulate in §2 (AA VI, p. 262, l. 15-16). That poses a problem for Brandt's interpretation because this reference indicates that at the very least Kant applies the same postulate for the acquisition of things as he does for the ownership of things. Brandt tries to solve this problem by claiming that an "unknown redactor" inserted this reference into the Kant text (ibid., p. 77, fn. 11). With all due respect for the many textual changes in the Kant texts contemporary scholars have more or less successfully made, this claim seems both unfounded and unnecessary to understand Kant's true intentions.
75. See supra fns. 4 and 5.
76. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §22, p. 276, l. 26-28.
77. "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §B, p. 237, l. 24-26.
78. "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §B., pp. 237, l. 27-238, l. 11.
79. See fn. 42 and accompanying text.
80. See Part III and in particular at fns. 41-42.
81. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 6-8.
82. This first aspect is somewhat parallel to the "duty of rightful honor (honestas iuridica)," which Kant discusses in the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §A, p. 236, l. 24-30. My awareness of the duty of rightful honor is what makes me a legal subject. I am a moral subject (person) through my awareness of the moral law. Being a moral subject, however, does not mean that I am also a legal subject with claim rights. Kant is familiar with the idea of claim rights at least from Achenwall, see Prolegomena (op. cit., fn. 1), §44, where the author speaks of a "ius sujective sumtum." I first become a legal subject when I am aware of my duty "in relation to others," as Kant says, "to assert myself as a human being," "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §A, p. 236, l. 25-26. The right discussed in the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice" is the innate right to freedom, which Kant calls the internal mine or yours. The innate right to freedom, however, does not include the rights to external objects of choice such as property. Through recognizing the permissive law I can be vested with further rights that relate to the external, rather than merely to the internal, mine or yours.
83. This first aspect is somewhat parallel to the "duty of rightful honor (honestas iuridica)," which Kant discusses in the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §A, p. 236, l. 24-30. My awareness of the duty of rightful honor is what makes me a legal subject. I am a moral subject (person) through my awareness of the moral law. Being a moral subject, however, does not mean that I am also a legal subject with claim rights. Kant is familiar with the idea of claim rights at least from Achenwall, see Prolegomena (op. cit., fn. 1), §44, where the author speaks of a "ius sujective sumtum." I first become a legal subject when I am aware of my duty "in relation to others," as Kant says, "to assert myself as a human being," "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice", AA VI, §A, p. 236, l. 25-26. The right discussed in the "Introduction to the Doctrine of Justice" is the innate right to freedom, which Kant calls the internal mine or yours. The innate right to freedom, however, does not include the rights to external objects of choice such as property. Through recognizing the permissive law I can be vested with further rights that relate to the external, rather than merely to the internal, mine or yours.
84. That is the "will" "from which the laws proceed"; see "Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals", AA VI, §IV, p. 226, l. 4.
85. Kant speaks of the "will (of each)," inter alia to use the land of the entire earth in §16 of the Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, p. 267, l. 6.
86. Kant refers (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §10, p. 259, l. 16-17) to "prior tempore, potior iure" only in connection with the first acquisition of land, but he applies the principle, as can be seen from the soon to be quoted passage in §2 of the Doctrine of Justice, to all of the legal institutions of interest here. The legal principle itself can be found in Liber sextus of Pope Bonifaz VIII, and even earlier in the Codex of Emperor Justinian. See Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 3rd edn. (1983), p. 162 (No. P 98) and p. 175 (No. Q 72).
87. Kant refers (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §10, p. 259, l. 16-17) to "prior tempore, potior iure" only in connection with the first acquisition of land, but he applies the principle, as can be seen from the soon to be quoted passage in §2 of the Doctrine of Justice, to all of the legal institutions of interest here. The legal principle itself can be found in Liber sextus of Pope Bonifaz VIII, and even earlier in the Codex of Emperor Justinian. See Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 3rd edn. (1983), p. 162 (No. P 98) and p. 175 (No. Q 72).
88. Kant refers (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §10, p. 259, l. 16-17) to "prior tempore, potior iure" only in connection with the first acquisition of land, but he applies the principle, as can be seen from the soon to be quoted passage in §2 of the Doctrine of Justice, to all of the legal institutions of interest here. The legal principle itself can be found in Liber sextus of Pope Bonifaz VIII, and even earlier in the Codex of Emperor Justinian. See Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, 3rd edn. (1983), p. 162 (No. P 98) and p. 175 (No. Q 72).
89. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 5-6 (emphasis added).
90. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §3 Note (1821).
91. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263.
92. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §18, p. 271.
93. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §27, pp. 279-280.
94. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §28, pp. 280-281.
95. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263, l. 17-19.
96. Ius Naturae (op. cit., fn. 1) I, §46.
97. See supra fn. 44 and accompanying text.
98. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 247, l. 4-6.
99. Ibid., l. 5-6.
100. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §§14, 15, pp. 263-270.
101. I can be harmed by third parties with respect to my contractual relations if, for example, they encourage my promisor to breach our contract. Conduct of this kind imposes liability on the third party for intentional interference with contractual relations, see Restatement 2d Torts, §§766, 766A, 766B. In Germany it gives the non-breaching party a right to damages under §826 Civil Code. The same is true for direct interference with the marriage relation under §§683, 684, Restatement 2d Torts, and for direct interference with the relation of parent and child under §700, Restatement 2d Torts. Furthermore, a spouse has a tort claim against someone who commits a tort against the other spouse under 693, Restatement 2d Torts, and a parent has a tort claim against someone who commits a tort against the parent's child under §703, Restatement 2d Torts. Brandt does not address this aspect of the permissive law (Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht", op. cit., fn. 6, p. 76). I am grateful to Mark F. Grady, George Mason University School of Law, for assistance with U.S. tort law in this area.
102. I can be harmed by third parties with respect to my contractual relations if, for example, they encourage my promisor to breach our contract. Conduct of this kind imposes liability on the third party for intentional interference with contractual relations, see Restatement 2d Torts, §§766, 766A, 766B. In Germany it gives the non-breaching party a right to damages under §826 Civil Code. The same is true for direct interference with the marriage relation under §§683, 684, Restatement 2d Torts, and for direct interference with the relation of parent and child under §700, Restatement 2d Torts. Furthermore, a spouse has a tort claim against someone who commits a tort against the other spouse under 693, Restatement 2d Torts, and a parent has a tort claim against someone who commits a tort against the parent's child under §703, Restatement 2d Torts. Brandt does not address this aspect of the permissive law (Brandt, "Enthält Kants Vertragsrecht", op. cit., fn. 6, p. 76). I am grateful to Mark F. Grady, George Mason University School of Law, for assistance with U.S. tort law in this area.
103. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263, l. 26-27.
104. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §15, p. 264, l. 17-22.
105. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263, l. 23-24. The first occupation of a piece of land is unilateral. Contracts are based on a "bilateral" will. Neither a unilateral nor a bilateral will (on the terminology, cf. as well Doctrine of Justice, §10, AA VI, p. 260, l. 7-8) can impose any obligation on third parties.
106. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263, l. 23-24. The first occupation of a piece of land is unilateral. Contracts are based on a "bilateral" will. Neither a unilateral nor a bilateral will (on the terminology, cf. as well Doctrine of Justice, §10, AA VI, p. 260, l. 7-8) can impose any obligation on third parties.
107. Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §14, p. 263, l. 24-25 (emphasis added).
108. The obligation is contingent because it is not necessary according to practical reason that I buy this piece of land rather than that, contract with this person rather than that, marry this woman rather than that, or assume parental power over this child rather than that. What is necessary according to practical reason is that the institutions of property ownership, contractual claims, marriage rights, and parental power be established and concretized. How they are specifically concretized in an actually existing legal order is contingent, and thus dependent on positive acts in the real world that are legally effective to buy the specific land I chose to buy, to close the contract I chose to close, to marry the person I chose to marry, or to assume parental over the child over whom I chose to assume parental power (through procreation or adoption).
109. This extension is necessary so that freedom will not deprive itself of freedom, a contradiction in itself (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 246, l. 9-19). For an explanation of this passage, see Mary Gregor, "Kant's Theory of Property", op. cit., fn. 43.
110. This extension is necessary so that freedom will not deprive itself of freedom, a contradiction in itself (Doctrine of Justice, AA VI, §2, p. 246, l. 9-19). For an explanation of this passage, see Mary Gregor, "Kant's Theory of Property", op. cit., fn. 43.