Extended estimator approach for 2 × 2 games and its mapping to the Ising Hamiltonian

Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics

Volumn 71, Issue 1, 2005, Pages

  Ariosa, D ^a   Fort, H ^b  

^a EPFL   (Switzerland)

^b INSTITUTO DE FÍSICA   (Uruguay)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ISING HAMILTONIAN; ITERATED GAMES; PRISONER'S DILEMMA (PD) GAMES; SYSTEM CONNECTIVITY;

ECOSYSTEMS; GAME THEORY; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MAPPING; MARKOV PROCESSES; MATRIX ALGEBRA; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PHASE DIAGRAMS;

HAMILTONIANS;

EID: 41349084524     PISSN: 15393755     EISSN: 15502376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.71.016132     Document Type: Article

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