Health plan switching and attrition bias in the RAND health insurance experiment

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 309-317

  Nyman, John A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HEALTH; HEALTH CARE PLANNING; HEALTH INSURANCE; HOSPITALIZATION; HUMAN; INCOME; NOTE; OUTCOME ASSESSMENT; SOCIOECONOMICS;

EID: 41149139368     PISSN: 03616878     EISSN: 15271927     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/03616878-2007-062     Document Type: Note

References (9)

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2. Gruber, J. 2006. The Role of Consumer Copayments for Health Care: Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment and Beyond. Menlo Park, CA: Kaiser Family Foundation.
3. Manning, W. G., Jr., N. Duan, and E. B. Keeler. 1993. Attrition Bias in a Randomized Trial of Health Insurance. Unpublished manuscript. www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/ files/Attrite_2.pdf (accessed on December 10, 2007).
4. Manning, W. G., and M. S. Marquis. 1996. Health Insurance: The Tradeoff between Risk Pooling and Moral Hazard. Journal of Health Economics 15:513-654.
5. Newhouse, J. P., R. H. Brook, N. Duan, E. B. Keeler, A. Liebowitz, W. G. Manning, M. S. Marquis, C. N. Morris, C. E. Phelps, and J. E. Rolph. 2007. Attrition in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: A Response to Nyman. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 33:295-308.
6. Newhouse, J. P., and the Insurance Experiment Group. 1993. Free For All? Lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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8. _. 2007. American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 32:759-783.
9. Pauly, M. 1983. More on Moral Hazard. Journal of Health Economics 2:81-85.