Alternating-offers bargaining with one-sided uncertain deadlines: an efficient algorithm

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 172, Issue 8-9, 2008, Pages 1119-1157

  Gatti, Nicola ^a   Di Giunta, Francesco ^a   Marino, Stefano ^a  

^a POLITECNICO DI MILANO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Automated negotiations; Game theory; Multiagent systems

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS; REAL TIME CONTROL;

AUTOMATED NEGOTIATIONS; LINEAR UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

UNCERTAIN SYSTEMS;

EID: 41049100469     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2007.11.007     Document Type: Article

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