Ruling commerce in the networld

Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 1996, Pages

  Spar, Debora ^a   Bussgang, Jeffrey ^b  

^a HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Open Market Inc ^*

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER NETWORKS; COMPUTER SYSTEM FIREWALLS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; INFORMATION ANALYSIS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INTERNET; LAW ENFORCEMENT; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; ONLINE SYSTEMS; PUBLIC POLICY; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

CYBERCOMMUNITIES; ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION; ONLINE TRANSACTIONS; ONLINE TRANSMISSIONS;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 4043148589     PISSN: 10836101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (11)

1. A related version of this article, entitled "Ruling the Net", appears in the May 1996 edition of Harvard Business Review.
2. Marxists, of course, would insist that the communal state represents the natural and desirable condition of economic organization. With a handful of exceptions, though, it is exceedingly difficult in the 1990's to find evidence of the long-term viability of an economic system based on communal rights.
3. The argument of this section draws extensively on the work and writings of Douglass C. North. See in particular, North, Structure and change in economic history (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981); and North and Robert P. Thomas, The rise of the western world: A new economic history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
4. The argument of this section draws extensively on the work and writings of Douglass C. North. See in particular, North, Structure and change in economic history (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1981); and North and Robert P. Thomas, The rise of the western world: A new economic history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).
5. In this context, it is interesting to note that at every major junction in the evolution of capitalism, the transformation of commerce has coincided with and been facilitated by a change in the structure of property rights and the incentives they create. Hunters and gatherers became farmers once they developed the means to protect "their" lands; feudal lords turned to commerce once they were allowed to own and bequeath property; and oceanic exploration flourished once the kings of Europe offered bounties for discovery and cleared the seas of pirates. Where property rights fail to develop, economic growth stagnates, as is the case in much of the less-developed world. Insufficient property rights can also explain the demise of Soviet-style commerce, where property rights were clear (all in the hands of "the people"), but did not establish the incentives necessary to fuel economic growth. What allowed the system to grow, by contrast, was a rigid structure of state-controlled disincentives (coercion). Once the coercive apparatus declined, so too did any substantial economic activity.
6. Anne Wells Branscomb, Who owns information, p.6.
7. See Otis Port, "Halting highway robbery on the Internet," Businessweek, October 17, 1994, p. 212; and Max Frankel, "Cyberights," New York Times, Magazine Section, February 12, 1995, p. 26.
8. See Otis Port, "Halting highway robbery on the Internet," Businessweek, October 17, 1994, p. 212; and Max Frankel, "Cyberights," New York Times, Magazine Section, February 12, 1995, p. 26.
9. Ralph Blumenthal, "Thieves in the idea marketplace," New York Times, Section 1, February 11, 1995, p. 13.
10. In a recent speech, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates described the future of "wallet PCs" from which customers would easily be able to "push a few buttons and transfer some electronic currency. The wallet PC is capable of replacing everything you carry with you, and more, so that getting messages, seeing the latest news...keeping track of your schedule, [and even] keeping hundreds of pictures of your children stored there [will be possible]." Bill Gates, "Vision 2005," speech at Fall Comdex, November 1994.
11. Technology Review, April 1995, p. 33.