Widening access while tightening control: Office-holding, marriages, and elite consolidation in early modern Poland

Theory and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 167-212

  McLean, Paul D ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043107635     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:RYSO.0000023446.08355.28     Document Type: Review

References (133)

1. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
2. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
3. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
4. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
5. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
6. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
7. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
8. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
9. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
10. For noteworthy examples, consider Richard Lachmann, Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transitions in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Bruce G. Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Roger V. Gould, Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Julia Adams, "The familial state: Elite family practices and state-making in the early modern Netherlands," Theory and Society 23/4 (1994): 505-539; Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic Revisited: Disciplinary Revolution and State Formation in Holland and Prussia," American Journal of Sociology 99/2 (1993): 265-316; Peter S. Bearman, Relations into Rhetorics: Local Elite Social Structure in Norfolk, England, 1540-1640 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993); John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434," American Journal of Sociology 98/6 (1993): 1259-1319. For a less network-driven agenda that still invites attention to elites and elite politics consider, for example, John Markoff, "Peasants Help Destroy an Old Regime and Defy a New One: Some Lessons from (and for) the Study of Social Movements," American Journal of Sociology 102/4 (1997): 1113-1142; and Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). For a noteworthy application of elite-network ideas to a non-European case, see Roger V. Gould, "Patron-Client Ties, State Centralization, and the Whiskey Rebellion," American Journal of Sociology 102/2 (1996): 400-429.
11. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
12. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
13. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
14. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
15. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
16. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
17. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
18. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
19. A classic example of the first focus is Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). An excellent recent example premised on the disposition of political institutional and military as well as economic structural forces is Thomas Ertman's Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Classic examples of the focus on class structure include Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Books, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1975); and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," Past and Present 70/1 (1976): 30-75. A list of classic research highlighting the successes and failures of self-interested state actors must include Charles Tilly's The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Margaret Levi's Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). For a coherent and comprehensive overview of trends in historical sociological research, see Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff's "Introduction" to their edited volume, Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, forthcoming).
20. Admittedly, the use of rational choice theory in historical sociology need not be premised on the idea that actors are substantively or self-consciously rational, but that patterns of historical outcomes can be understood as if actors were so acting. All the same, as Jack Goldstone suggests, there is reasonable justification for the criticism that some practitioners of rational choice theory in historical research may "grossly simplify the actual complexity of initial conditions in order to make deterministic calculations of social outcomes." Jack A. Goldstone, "Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology," American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 839.
21. I.e., providing the minutiae of particular ties, such as "who dined with whom," "who was friends with whom," how particular marriages were arranged, and the like. The classic example of such a treatment is Sir Lewis Namier's work, as for example in The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London: Macmillan and Co., 1929).
22. Lawrence Stone's The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) is a noteworthy and excellent forerunner. As I am trying to articulate the notion of an "open elite" and measure its applicability to the Polish case, see also his work with Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite? England, 1540-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
23. Lawrence Stone's The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965) is a noteworthy and excellent forerunner. As I am trying to articulate the notion of an "open elite" and measure its applicability to the Polish case, see also his work with Jeanne C. Fawtier Stone, An Open Elite? England, 1540-1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
24. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 139, 131. Very similar language is used by J. K. Fedorowicz, Maria Bogucka, and Henryk Samsonowicz, in their volume, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The language of tragedy is explicitly applied to the Polish case in Ertman's work (p. 266), and in Brian Downing's The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), at 140, 144, and 155; and is implicit in Daniel Chirot's claim that the Polish nobility woke up "too late" for reform in the introduction to the edited volume, The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 8.
25. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 139, 131. Very similar language is used by J. K. Fedorowicz, Maria Bogucka, and Henryk Samsonowicz, in their volume, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The language of tragedy is explicitly applied to the Polish case in Ertman's work (p. 266), and in Brian Downing's The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), at 140, 144, and 155; and is implicit in Daniel Chirot's claim that the Polish nobility woke up "too late" for reform in the introduction to the edited volume, The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 8.
26. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 139, 131. Very similar language is used by J. K. Fedorowicz, Maria Bogucka, and Henryk Samsonowicz, in their volume, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The language of tragedy is explicitly applied to the Polish case in Ertman's work (p. 266), and in Brian Downing's The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), at 140, 144, and 155; and is implicit in Daniel Chirot's claim that the Polish nobility woke up "too late" for reform in the introduction to the edited volume, The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 8.
27. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 139, 131. Very similar language is used by J. K. Fedorowicz, Maria Bogucka, and Henryk Samsonowicz, in their volume, A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The language of tragedy is explicitly applied to the Polish case in Ertman's work (p. 266), and in Brian Downing's The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), at 140, 144, and 155; and is implicit in Daniel Chirot's claim that the Polish nobility woke up "too late" for reform in the introduction to the edited volume, The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), 8.
28. Meanwhile, traditional diplomatic historical accounts of the Partition period have emphasized struggles for territory between contending neighboring states. For example, see Aleksander Gieysztor, Stefan Kieniewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir, and Henryk Wereszycki, History of Poland, trans. Krystyna Cekalska, Ilona Ralf-Suez, Janina Rodzinska, Leon Szwajcer, and Antoni Szymanowski (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), especially page 279; Jerzy Topolski, "Reflections on the First Partition of Poland (1772)," Acta Poloniae Historica 27 (1973): 89104; Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Harvard Historical Studies, volume XXIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915). For a critique of Wallerstein's argument on the basis of its weak correspondence with empirical evidence, see, for example, Jerzy Topolski, "Sixteenth Century Poland and the Turning Point in European Economic Development," in A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, 70-90.
29. Meanwhile, traditional diplomatic historical accounts of the Partition period have emphasized struggles for territory between contending neighboring states. For example, see Aleksander Gieysztor, Stefan Kieniewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir, and Henryk Wereszycki, History of Poland, trans. Krystyna Cekalska, Ilona Ralf-Suez, Janina Rodzinska, Leon Szwajcer, and Antoni Szymanowski (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), especially page 279; Jerzy Topolski, "Reflections on the First Partition of Poland (1772)," Acta Poloniae Historica 27 (1973): 89104; Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Harvard Historical Studies, volume XXIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915). For a critique of Wallerstein's argument on the basis of its weak correspondence with empirical evidence, see, for example, Jerzy Topolski, "Sixteenth Century Poland and the Turning Point in European Economic Development," in A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, 70-90.
30. Meanwhile, traditional diplomatic historical accounts of the Partition period have emphasized struggles for territory between contending neighboring states. For example, see Aleksander Gieysztor, Stefan Kieniewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir, and Henryk Wereszycki, History of Poland, trans. Krystyna Cekalska, Ilona Ralf-Suez, Janina Rodzinska, Leon Szwajcer, and Antoni Szymanowski (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), especially page 279; Jerzy Topolski, "Reflections on the First Partition of Poland (1772)," Acta Poloniae Historica 27 (1973): 89104; Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Harvard Historical Studies, volume XXIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915). For a critique of Wallerstein's argument on the basis of its weak correspondence with empirical evidence, see, for example, Jerzy Topolski, "Sixteenth Century Poland and the Turning Point in European Economic Development," in A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, 70-90.
31. Meanwhile, traditional diplomatic historical accounts of the Partition period have emphasized struggles for territory between contending neighboring states. For example, see Aleksander Gieysztor, Stefan Kieniewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir, and Henryk Wereszycki, History of Poland, trans. Krystyna Cekalska, Ilona Ralf-Suez, Janina Rodzinska, Leon Szwajcer, and Antoni Szymanowski (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), especially page 279; Jerzy Topolski, "Reflections on the First Partition of Poland (1772)," Acta Poloniae Historica 27 (1973): 89104; Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Harvard Historical Studies, volume XXIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915). For a critique of Wallerstein's argument on the basis of its weak correspondence with empirical evidence, see, for example, Jerzy Topolski, "Sixteenth Century Poland and the Turning Point in European Economic Development," in A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, 70-90.
32. Meanwhile, traditional diplomatic historical accounts of the Partition period have emphasized struggles for territory between contending neighboring states. For example, see Aleksander Gieysztor, Stefan Kieniewicz, Emanuel Rostworowski, Janusz Tazbir, and Henryk Wereszycki, History of Poland, trans. Krystyna Cekalska, Ilona Ralf-Suez, Janina Rodzinska, Leon Szwajcer, and Antoni Szymanowski (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe - Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), especially page 279; Jerzy Topolski, "Reflections on the First Partition of Poland (1772)," Acta Poloniae Historica 27 (1973): 89104; Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962); Robert Howard Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Harvard Historical Studies, volume XXIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1915). For a critique of Wallerstein's argument on the basis of its weak correspondence with empirical evidence, see, for example, Jerzy Topolski, "Sixteenth Century Poland and the Turning Point in European Economic Development," in A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864, 70-90.
33. I would venture to suggest few other cases have been so vigorously and one-sidedly stereotyped as this one. This development has roots in a strong native historiographical tradition associated with the Kraków school and the eminent eighteenth-century thinker Stanisław Staszić. Various scholars have argued that narratives of national history have had an especially meaningful impact on Poles and on contemporary Polish politics. See, for example, Adam Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1987); and Andrzej Kamiński, "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Citizens: Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?" in Poland and Ukraine Past and Present, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 47-48. For a classic statement of the stereotyping of historical narratives, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
34. I would venture to suggest few other cases have been so vigorously and one-sidedly stereotyped as this one. This development has roots in a strong native historiographical tradition associated with the Kraków school and the eminent eighteenth-century thinker Stanisław Staszić. Various scholars have argued that narratives of national history have had an especially meaningful impact on Poles and on contemporary Polish politics. See, for example, Adam Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1987); and Andrzej Kamiński, "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Citizens: Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?" in Poland and Ukraine Past and Present, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 47-48. For a classic statement of the stereotyping of historical narratives, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
35. I would venture to suggest few other cases have been so vigorously and one-sidedly stereotyped as this one. This development has roots in a strong native historiographical tradition associated with the Kraków school and the eminent eighteenth-century thinker Stanisław Staszić. Various scholars have argued that narratives of national history have had an especially meaningful impact on Poles and on contemporary Polish politics. See, for example, Adam Bromke, The Meaning and Uses of Polish History (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1987); and Andrzej Kamiński, "Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its Citizens: Was the Commonwealth a Stepmother for Cossacks and Ruthenians?" in Poland and Ukraine Past and Present, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1980), 47-48. For a classic statement of the stereotyping of historical narratives, see Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
36. For example, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 288, where Sarmatism is called "a morbid mythomania"; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1980), 144, where it is called "a cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual activity"; and Gieysztor et al., History of Poland, 215, where it is seen as oblivious to "any appearances of truth." The Orientalization of Eastern Europe, including Poland, is extensively discussed in Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). I discuss various scholarly views of Sarmatism and specific uses made of it in efforts at political mobilization and communication between factional leaders at greater length in Paul D. McLean, "Networks, Culture, and Political Mobilization in Eighteenth Century Poland," Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript.
37. For example, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 288, where Sarmatism is called "a morbid mythomania"; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1980), 144, where it is called "a cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual activity"; and Gieysztor et al., History of Poland, 215, where it is seen as oblivious to "any appearances of truth." The Orientalization of Eastern Europe, including Poland, is extensively discussed in Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). I discuss various scholarly views of Sarmatism and specific uses made of it in efforts at political mobilization and communication between factional leaders at greater length in Paul D. McLean, "Networks, Culture, and Political Mobilization in Eighteenth Century Poland," Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript.
38. For example, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 288, where Sarmatism is called "a morbid mythomania"; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1980), 144, where it is called "a cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual activity"; and Gieysztor et al., History of Poland, 215, where it is seen as oblivious to "any appearances of truth." The Orientalization of Eastern Europe, including Poland, is extensively discussed in Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). I discuss various scholarly views of Sarmatism and specific uses made of it in efforts at political mobilization and communication between factional leaders at greater length in Paul D. McLean, "Networks, Culture, and Political Mobilization in Eighteenth Century Poland," Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript.
39. For example, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 288, where Sarmatism is called "a morbid mythomania"; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1980), 144, where it is called "a cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual activity"; and Gieysztor et al., History of Poland, 215, where it is seen as oblivious to "any appearances of truth." The Orientalization of Eastern Europe, including Poland, is extensively discussed in Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). I discuss various scholarly views of Sarmatism and specific uses made of it in efforts at political mobilization and communication between factional leaders at greater length in Paul D. McLean, "Networks, Culture, and Political Mobilization in Eighteenth Century Poland," Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript.
40. For example, see Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, 288, where Sarmatism is called "a morbid mythomania"; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1980), 144, where it is called "a cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual activity"; and Gieysztor et al., History of Poland, 215, where it is seen as oblivious to "any appearances of truth." The Orientalization of Eastern Europe, including Poland, is extensively discussed in Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). I discuss various scholarly views of Sarmatism and specific uses made of it in efforts at political mobilization and communication between factional leaders at greater length in Paul D. McLean, "Networks, Culture, and Political Mobilization in Eighteenth Century Poland," Rutgers University, unpublished manuscript.
41. For a comprehensive treatment, see S. N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger, Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
42. For a few empirical examinations of the linkage between networks and careers in the generation of institutional change, see Harrison C. White and Cynthia A. White, Canvases and Careers: Institutional Change in the French Painting World (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Robert R. Faulkner, Music on Demand: Composers and Careers in the Hollywood Film Industry (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982); and Wayne E. Baker and Robert R. Faulkner, "Role as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry," American Journal of Sociology 97/2 (1991): 279-309.
43. For a few empirical examinations of the linkage between networks and careers in the generation of institutional change, see Harrison C. White and Cynthia A. White, Canvases and Careers: Institutional Change in the French Painting World (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Robert R. Faulkner, Music on Demand: Composers and Careers in the Hollywood Film Industry (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982); and Wayne E. Baker and Robert R. Faulkner, "Role as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry," American Journal of Sociology 97/2 (1991): 279-309.
44. For a few empirical examinations of the linkage between networks and careers in the generation of institutional change, see Harrison C. White and Cynthia A. White, Canvases and Careers: Institutional Change in the French Painting World (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965); Robert R. Faulkner, Music on Demand: Composers and Careers in the Hollywood Film Industry (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1982); and Wayne E. Baker and Robert R. Faulkner, "Role as Resource in the Hollywood Film Industry," American Journal of Sociology 97/2 (1991): 279-309.
45. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
46. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
47. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in
48. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
49. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
50. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
51. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
52. For programmatic statements of this approach, see Harrison C.White, Identity and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, "Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency," American Journal of Sociology 99/6 (1994): 1411-1454. For further statements and other examples of empirical research based on it, see Harrison C. White, "Network Switchings and Bayesian Forks: Reconstructing the Social and Behavioral Sciences," Social Research 62/4 (1995): 1035-1063; Ann Mische and Harrison White, "Between Conversation and Situation: Public Switching Dynamics across Network Domains," Social Research 65/3 (1998): 695-724; John W. Mohr and Vincent Duquenne, "The Duality of Culture and Practice: Poverty Relief in New York City, 1888-1917," Theory and Society 26/2-3 (1997): 305-356; Paul D. McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance: Agency, Networks, and Political Culture," American Journal of Sociology 104/1 (1998): 51-91; Christopher K. Ansell, Schism and Solidarity in Social Movements: The Politics of Labor in the French Third Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ann Mische, "Cross-Talk in Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link," in Social Movement Analysis: The Network Perspective, ed. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 258-280.
53. This point is cogently made by Ron Breiger in his oft-cited article, "The Duality of Persons and Groups," Social Forces 53 (1974): 181-190.
54. The various contributors to Mary Brinton and Victor Nee's The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) make a compelling case for the need to study institutions as the background (or even constitutive) rules, beliefs, and norms that enable various arenas of social action to operate. Yet institutions are conceived by a number of these authors in very general terms, with insufficient attention to local variation and to the pliancy with which actors apply multiple and diverse institutional materials. An exception is Rosemary Hopcroft's essay, "The Importance of the Local: Rural Institutions and Economic Change in Preindustrial England," The New Institutionalism in Sociology, 277-304.
55. The various contributors to Mary Brinton and Victor Nee's The New Institutionalism in Sociology (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) make a compelling case for the need to study institutions as the background (or even constitutive) rules, beliefs, and norms that enable various arenas of social action to operate. Yet institutions are conceived by a number of these authors in very general terms, with insufficient attention to local variation and to the pliancy with which actors apply multiple and diverse institutional materials. An exception is Rosemary Hopcroft's essay, "The Importance of the Local: Rural Institutions and Economic Change in Preindustrial England," The New Institutionalism in Sociology, 277-304.
56. This idea has been thoughtfully examined inside the social movements literature. See David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 464-481; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
57. This idea has been thoughtfully examined inside the social movements literature. See David Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 464-481; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, editors, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
58. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
59. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
60. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
61. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
62. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
63. On the notion of generalizing narratives, see Andrew Abbott, Time Matters: On Theory and Method (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159. On the topic of mechanisms, see Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Also consider the use of the term in the debate between Margaret R. Somers ("'We're No Angels': Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science,' American Journal of Sociology 104/3 (1998): 722-784) and Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter ("The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its Critics," American Journal of Sociology 104/3(1998): 785-816). Goldstone argues that similar conditions can lead to revolution or not depending on timing and on variable ecological factors such as levels of social and economic stress (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion, 145). Here one set of general factors can be plausibly distinguished from a set of accidental or coincidental factors. The spirit of this comment, to my mind, is that it is possible to develop generalized narratives, or at least components of stories, that can be applied, mutatis mutandis, across cases.
64. On this point, see Jerzy Michałski, "Les dietines aux XVIIIme siècle," Acta Poloniae Historica 12 (1969): 87-108; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, "The Origin and Development of the Polish Parliamentary System through the End of the Seventeenth Century," in Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Poland, ed. Samuel Fiszman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 13-50; Antoni Maçzak, Klientela: nieformalne systemy władzy w Polsce i Europie XVI-XVIII w. (Warszawa: Semper, 1994), especially 135.
65. On this point, see Jerzy Michałski, "Les dietines aux XVIIIme siècle," Acta Poloniae Historica 12 (1969): 87-108; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, "The Origin and Development of the Polish Parliamentary System through the End of the Seventeenth Century," in Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Poland, ed. Samuel Fiszman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 13-50; Antoni Maçzak, Klientela: nieformalne systemy władzy w Polsce i Europie XVI-XVIII w. (Warszawa: Semper, 1994), especially 135.
66. On this point, see Jerzy Michałski, "Les dietines aux XVIIIme siècle," Acta Poloniae Historica 12 (1969): 87-108; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, "The Origin and Development of the Polish Parliamentary System through the End of the Seventeenth Century," in Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Poland, ed. Samuel Fiszman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 13-50; Antoni Maçzak, Klientela: nieformalne systemy władzy w Polsce i Europie XVI-XVIII w. (Warszawa: Semper, 1994), especially 135.
67. See Andrzej Wyczański, "The Problem of Authority in Sixteenth-Century Poland: An Essay in Reinterpretation" in A Republic of Nobles, 91-108, especially 101, and see Fedorowicz et al.'s introduction to his essay, 93-94.
68. When external forces threatened Polish territory, but more commonly when groups of nobles felt their vaunted freedom was threatened by centralizing monarchs, the nobility could legally form into armed gatherings known as rokoszy (uprisings) or confederacjy (confederations).
69. One may compare Stone's description of the English case offered in his Crisis of the Aristocracy, 28ff.
70. Some extensive collection of occupants' names at the level of national offices may be possible, although such a collection effort would probably result in a markedly incomplete sample. Such offices would include podkomorz, starosta, sedzia, stolnik, podczas, pisarz, podsedek, and a variety of others, typically for each palatinate of the Commonwealth.
71. The liberum veto gave any deputy to the Sejm the right to reject legislation of which he or his sejmik did not approve and thereby to terminate the proceedings of the parliament, thus effectively entailing a requirement of unanimity for any legislation to pass. This voting procedure more or less completely paralyzed the national parliament for over one hundred years.
72. Kaspar Niesiecki, Herbarz Polski (Lipsk: Breitkopf & Haertel, 1839; reprint edition, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Artystyczne i Filmowe, 1979). Volumes two through ten of Niesiecki's work contain an alphabetical listing of family histories, providing information on heraldic insignias, biographical sketches - sometimes voluminous and sometimes sparse - of various family luminaries, and occasionally additional information on offices held by, or marriages contracted by, members of each family. I hope eventually to code these textually embedded data.
73. Also included in the coding were a few offices not technically entailing membership in the Senate but useful for comparative purposes, notably the leaders of non-Roman Catholic religious denominations and the marshals (speakers) of the chamber of deputies and of royal tribunals. As will become clear, by "office," I mean the combination of a particular rank with a particular province or region represented.
74. The office of hetman was the highest military office in the country, held by its occupant for life. In fact, there were four such offices - grand and field hetman for each of Poland and Lithuania - an arrangement designed to keep any one of these officials from having an irresistibly formidable power.
75. Włodzimierz Dworzaczek, Genealogia: Tablice (Warszawa: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1959).
76. Because it focuses on a subset of elite families, Dworzaczek's work constitutes a biased sample and almost certainly overstates the centrality of the selected families in the marital network. It is also skewed towards oversampling in the sixteenth century compared to the seventeenth and eighteenth; for example, the median year of marriage in his genealogical tables for the entire 1500-1795 period is 1634, slightly earlier than the halfway point of 1647-48. Furthermore, as Table 7 indicates, the share of senatorial offices held by his elites declines signifficantly over time, dropping considerably in the second half of the eighteenth century, again suggesting a sampling bias towards the sixteenth century.
77. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
78. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
79. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
80. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
81. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
82. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
83. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
84. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
85. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
86. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
87. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
88. For example, see Gieysztor et al., History of Poland; Norman Davies, God's Playground (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System: Towards a Model of the Polish Economy, 1500-1800, trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left Books, 1976); Jerzy Łukowski, "The Szlachta and the Confederacy of Radom, 1764-1767/68: A Study of the Polish Nobility," Antemurale XXI (Rome: Institutum Historicum Polonicum Romae, 1977); ibid., Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge 1991); ibid., The Partitions of Poland 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: Longman, 1999); Maçzak, Klientela; Henryk Olszewski, "The Essence and Legal Foundations of the Magnate Oligarchy in Poland," Acta Poloniae Historica 56 (1988): 29-50; Andrzej Pospiech and Wojciech Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' Acta Poloniae Historica 43 (1981): 75-100; Anna Sucheni-Grabowska and Małgorzata Zaryn, Miȩdzy monarcha̧ a demokracja̧: studia z dziejów polski XV-XVIII wieku (Warszawa: Wydawn. Sejmowe, 1994); Janusz Tazbir, "Polish National Consciousness in the 16th-18th Centuries," Acta Poloniae Historica 46 (1982): 47-72. Teresa Zielińska, Magnateria polska epoki saskiej: Funkcje urzȩdów I królewszczyzn w procesie przeobrażeń warstwy społecznej (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy Imienia Ossolińskich Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1977).
89. One needs to be careful here. Palatinates and castellanies are integrated into a single hierarchy of ranked offices; hence, for example, although palatinates in general are of higher prestige than castellanies, the castellany of Krakow exceeds all palatinates in prestige, while those of Wilno and Trock exceed most palatinates in prestige, and Niesiecki ranks them accordingly. I thus treat them often as a single system in the balance of the article. Somewhat differently, the prestige of bishoprics cannot be compared to the prestige of political offices in any straightforward way, although their occupants are known to have exercised considerable political power. As these offices are listed first in Niesiecki, I assigned them lower (i.e., higher ranked) numbers than the territorial offices, but this coding decision is largely moot, since there is no overlap in membership between the clerical and territorial office-holding groups. They are different systems of advancement (reinforced, of course, by the fact that clerics take no part in the elite marriage market). The same, however, is not true for the major ministerial offices. Niesiecki lists the occupants of these offices subsequent to the list of minor castellanies, and accordingly they have high numbers in my coding scheme, but it would be wrong to assume these offices are of less prestige; in fact, they were quite prestigious. Moreover, the ministerial offices were often (though not always) occupied by persons who concurrently held offices in the territorial system. Accordingly, we must consider the ministerial offices as having some signifficant additive value to the prestige their occupants enjoy in the overall office-holding system. This is a difficult quantitative issue to deal with, which I will turn to in subsequent research. It would be fascinating to assess empirically the relative status of such positions based on the typical moment at which such positions were interjected into political careers. Some links between the two systems are clear: for example, it is common to find the same person simultaneously Grand Hetman of the Crown and castellan of Kraków, respectively the preeminent military and political offices in the Commonwealth.
90. Niesiecki's wording in some instances effectively codes steps that could be considered retrograde, or perhaps more commonly, merely lateral: he notes sometimes, for example, that an occupant of a given office "wział " (took) a different office, rather than being promoted to it.
91. This pattern is also reflected in the fact that tenure in any particular office was, on average, significantly shorter for those who would go on to higher positions than for those whose senatorial career was composed of only one position. This should be more or less obvious if we assume all careers to be more or less equal in length, but substantively it does indicate that those who advanced were not just outliving their peers, but were moving up in preference over them.
92. Among these were Jan Gninski in the late 1600s, Stanislaw Potocki in the mid 1600s, and Otto z Chodcza in the early 1500s, each of whom held four different palatinates. Gninski's career is in fact one of the unusual cases of retrograde or ambiguously lateral moves among titularly identical offices.
93. Da̧mbski was the most noteworthy victim of the logic of "vacancy chains," whereby office-holders are blocked from promotion not so much by the paucity of their own skills as by the occupancy of all higher-ranked offices by men with some longevity of life ahead of them. On the notion of vacancy chains, see Harrison C. White, Chains of Opportunity: System Models of Mobility in Organizations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
94. The difference in average tenure between palatines and castellans is significant at better than a .01 level, and the difference between bishops and castellans is significant at a .001 level.
95. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
96. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
97. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
98. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
99. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
100. For example, for the case of Renaissance Florence, see John M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), and Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434-1494) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). For Stuart England, see Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy; and Stone and tone, An Open Elite? For seventeenth-century Languedoc, see William Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For contemporary America, see John F. Padgett, "Mobility as Control: Congressmen through Committees," in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 27-58.
101. The notable exceptions to this trend are 1633 (not a year in which a new reign began), 1737, and 1783. It is a puzzle that 1737 and 1783, on the face of it so similar in profile in terms of the group of new appointees, should be so different in terms of their actual character. The former marked the nadir in the strength of the Polish crown: Augustus III ruled as an absentee king, dispensing sinecures for the increase of his personal revenue, not political influence. The latter marked an infusion of new monarchist blood into the elite and a demographic shift catalyzing the development of a movement for administrative reform and an enlightened reform of Polish republicanism. As a result, analysis of patterns of flow into senatorial ranks can only go so far in explaining outcomes, since we also need to understand the spirit in which those recruitment efforts were undertaken. Increasing dispensation of offices may just as easily signify the extension of patrimonialist rule, as forestall or counteract it. Ertman makes this point for the case of early modern France. See his Birth of the Leviathan, 127ff.
102. When we calculate this average difference using only those cases for which firm year-of-entry data are provided by both Dworzaczek and Niesiecki, the mean difference is 9.82 years, but because precise and complete data are available almost exclusively for super-elite males, this figure cannot be taken as representative of the difference for the population of males as a whole.
103. Here I would simply underline Adams's argument that the logic of acquiring political power and the logic of securing the family patrimony were tightly connected in early modern Europe, with prospects or successes in one being tied logically to prospects or successes in the other, in part through nepotism, and in part through the "politics of marriage." Adams, "The Familial State," 505, 509.
104. Palatinates and castellanies were assigned office "numbers" 37 through 161 in the original coding of the data. The actual numbers reported here for average rank are based on this 37 through 161, highest through lowest, coding scheme.
105. We can also compare the types of promotion the super-elite enjoyed compared to the others. As noted earlier, two basic logics obtained for career advancement: moving within ranks between provinces, or moving across ranks within a province. Over the entire 1500-1795 time period, the super-elite were significantly more likely to obtain advancement through the first, more incremental logic than the second. Their upward mobility was accordingly not as dramatic as for select members of the non-elite, but of course they also more typically started from higher positions.
106. Jack Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 109ff.
107. See Antoni Ma̧czak, "Money and Society in Poland and Lithuania in the 16th and 17th Centuries," Journal of European Economic History 5/1 (1976): 69-104.
108. See Andrzej Wyczański, "The Problem of Authority in Sixteenth-Century Poland," 104, 105, 107.
109. Antoni Ma̧czak, "The Structure of Power in the Commonwealth of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 119, 121.
110. For a remarkable exploration of elite marriage strategies in one rich context, see Anthony Molho, Marriage Alliance in Late Medieval Florence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).
111. Table 5 documents the percentage of intermarriage for all cases with date of marriage and the male's year of entry into senatorial ranks estimable. Table 9 documents the percentage of intermarriage for all persons with estimable dates of marriage and coded region of residence, regardless of reliable estimation of date of entry into senatorial ranks.
112. Compare the findings of Padgett for the case of Florentine magnates in the fourteenth century. John F. Padgett, "Marriage and Elite Structure in Renaissance Florence, 1282-1500," paper presented at the 1994 Social Science History Association meetings, Atlanta, GA.
113. Hypogamy is typically used to refer to marriage across categories of wealth. I adapt it here to consider marriage across status categories, recognizing that the magnate versus ordinary noble distinction in Poland was not a formally recognized or codified distinction. See Ma̧czak, "The Structure of Power in the Commonwealth of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," for one of many statements to this effect. In more extensive writings, however, Ma̧czak insists that interpersonal behaviors that were formally permissible, such as clients referring to themselves as friends (przyjaciele) of their magnate patron, were not in fact practiced; for a client to refer to himself as a "friend" or "brother" (panie bracie, literally "Sir Brother") of his patron would be seen as an offense. Ma̧czak, Klientela, 257, 266. Ma̧czak's discussion (249-284) of the language and cognitive landscape of Polish patronage - a political arena divided into "friends" and "enemies" (przyjaciele i nieprzyjaciele), two-tiered political followings composed of "friends" and "servants" (przyjaciele i słudzy; also see Pospiech and Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' for details on this dual hierarchical structure), letters from patrons that feature both ritual expressions of gratitude towards clients and assertion of expectations of being well served by them - makes it clear how much it resembled other early modern European clientage systems. For comparisons in particular to the Florentine case, see Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426-1434 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), especially 83-104; and McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance."
114. Hypogamy is typically used to refer to marriage across categories of wealth. I adapt it here to consider marriage across status categories, recognizing that the magnate versus ordinary noble distinction in Poland was not a formally recognized or codified distinction. See Ma̧czak, "The Structure of Power in the Commonwealth of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," for one of many statements to this effect. In more extensive writings, however, Ma̧czak insists that interpersonal behaviors that were formally permissible, such as clients referring to themselves as friends
115. Hypogamy is typically used to refer to marriage across categories of wealth. I adapt it here to consider marriage across status categories, recognizing that the magnate versus ordinary noble distinction in Poland was not a formally recognized or codified distinction. See Ma̧czak, "The Structure of Power in the Commonwealth of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," for one of many statements to this effect. In more extensive writings, however, Ma̧czak insists that interpersonal behaviors that were formally permissible, such as clients referring to themselves as friends (przyjaciele) of their magnate patron, were not in fact practiced; for a client to refer to himself as a "friend" or "brother" (panie bracie, literally "Sir Brother") of his patron would be seen as an offense. Ma̧czak, Klientela, 257, 266. Ma̧czak's discussion (249-284) of the language and cognitive landscape of Polish patronage - a political arena divided into "friends" and "enemies" (przyjaciele i nieprzyjaciele), two-tiered political followings composed of "friends" and "servants" (przyjaciele i słudzy; also see Pospiech and Tygielski, "The Social Role of Magnates" Courts in Poland,' for details on this dual hierarchical structure), letters from patrons that feature both ritual expressions of gratitude towards clients and assertion of expectations of being well served by them - makes it clear how much it resembled other early modern European clientage systems. For comparisons in particular to the Florentine case, see Dale Kent, The Rise of the Medici: Faction in Florence, 1426-1434 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), especially 83-104; and McLean, "A Frame Analysis of Favor-Seeking in the Renaissance."
116. See, for example, Robin Fox, Kinship and Marriage: An Anthropological Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 239.
117. Discussion of this development is provided by many scholars, but one may in particular cite Daniel Stone's brief article, "The Cultural Life of Conservative Polish Nobles in the Late Eighteenth Century," East European Quarterly 9 (1975): 271-277.
118. The notion of "displacement" is Goldstone's. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 109.
119. Here I might note that I do not mean to ignore or refute the indisputable claim that non-noble intellectuals and members of the merchant class were important players on the political stage of the 1780s and 1790s. However, it would be a gross mistake to ignore the contributions of the Polish nobility to political consolidation and reform.
120. This point is effectively made by Jerzy Łukowski, Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 246-247.
121. Łukowski suggests the evolution of the meaning of Polish national identity away from co-extensiveness with "the nobility" and towards "the inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian lands" had begun soon after the First Partition (1772) and before 1791, and certainly before the period of romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century. Liberty's Folly, 234. See also Andrzej Walicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko, trans. Emma Harris (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
122. Łukowski suggests the evolution of the meaning of Polish national identity away from co-extensiveness with "the nobility" and towards "the inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian lands" had begun soon after the First Partition (1772) and before 1791, and certainly before the period of romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century. Liberty's Folly, 234. See also Andrzej Walicki, The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko, trans. Emma Harris (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
123. Norman Davies, "The Third of May 1791," in Fiszman, Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Poland, 1-12.
124. See Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System; Ma̧czak, "Money and Society in Poland and Lithuania in the 16th and 17th Centuries."
125. See Witold Kula, An Economic Theory of the Feudal System; Ma̧czak, "Money and Society in Poland and Lithuania in the 16th and 17th Centuries."
126. The term partia was understood in this period as signifying a personal following, or a cluster of families with such followings, rather than an organized political group. The king's Mémoires refer to marriages as "alliances" and regard them as strategic in the construction of this partia. Stanislaw August Poniatowski, Mémoires (St. Petersbourg: Imprimerie de l'Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1914), vol. I, p. 19; vol. II, p. 270.
127. The term partia was understood in this period as signifying a personal following, or a cluster of families with such followings, rather than an organized political group. The king's Mémoires refer to marriages as "alliances" and regard them as strategic in the construction of this partia. Stanislaw August Poniatowski, Mémoires (St. Petersbourg: Imprimerie de l'Academie Imperiale des Sciences, 1914), vol. I, p. 19; vol. II, p. 270.
128. For a discussion of the local bases of Polish factional politics, see M. J. Rosman, The Lords' Jews: Magnate-Jewish Relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth During the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Center for Jewish Studies, Harvard University and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1990). For a classic statement about the local basis of politics, see Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership Among the Swat Pathans (London: The Athlone Press, 1965).
129. For a discussion of the local bases of Polish factional politics, see M. J. Rosman, The Lords' Jews: Magnate-Jewish Relations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth During the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press for the Center for Jewish Studies, Harvard University and the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1990). For a classic statement about the local basis of politics, see Fredrik Barth, Political Leadership Among the Swat Pathans (London: The Athlone Press, 1965).
130. See John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434." A strikingly similar structural organization obtains in the Florentine economy of the same time period. See Paul D. McLean and John F. Padgett, "Obligation, Risk and Opportunity in the Renaissance Economy: Beyond Social Embeddedness to Network Co-Constitution, " in The Sociology of the Economy, ed. Frank Dobbin (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).
131. See John F. Padgett and Christopher K. Ansell, "Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434." A strikingly similar structural organization obtains in the Florentine economy of the same time period. See Paul D. McLean and John F. Padgett, "Obligation, Risk and Opportunity in the Renaissance Economy: Beyond Social Embeddedness to Network Co-Constitution, " in The Sociology of the Economy, ed. Frank Dobbin (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004).
132. This finding is not statistically significant for any given period, but it is statistically significant in the aggregate. All periods feature the same pattern of higher than expected frequencies on the main diagonal.
133. So, while I agree with Adams that marriage strategies and office-holding strategies are tightly linked, the Polish case seems to document better than the Dutch case that marriage strategies can change, and do so in a way that is highly meaningful for the character of the state.