The Serbian opposition and civil society: Roots of the delayed transition in Serbia

International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 73-90

  Bieber, Florian ^a,b  

^a European Centre for Minority Issues   (Serbia)

^b CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Civil society; Democratization; Nationalism; NGOs; Party system; Serbia; Transition

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043094218     PISSN: 08914486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1025388926816     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. Joint Statement of the Serbian Opposition, January 2000, Betaweek, January 13, 2000.
2. Montenegro has not seen a change of government in the sense that the successor party to the League of Communists, the Democratic Party of Socialists, maintained power. The party did, however, transform itself and fragmented in 1997.
3. Additional factors to be taken into account, beyond the discussion here, are the weakness of the Milošević regime by late 2000 and the degree of negotiation between elements of the regime and the opposition before 5 October 2000. See Slobodan Antonić, "5. Oktoba i izgladi za demokratizaciju Srbije," Posebno izdanje, Srbija posle Miloš ević, Nova Srpska Politička Misao No. 1 (2001):9-25; Zoran Avramović, "Zašto je DOS uspeo da pobedi 24.9.2000," ibid., 29-32.
4. Additional factors to be taken into account, beyond the discussion here, are the weakness of the Milošević regime by late 2000 and the degree of negotiation between elements of the regime and the opposition before 5 October 2000. See Slobodan Antonić, "5. Oktoba i izgladi za demokratizaciju Srbije," Posebno izdanje, Srbija posle Miloš ević, Nova Srpska Politička Misao No. 1 (2001):9-25; Zoran Avramović, "Zašto je DOS uspeo da pobedi 24.9.2000," ibid., 29-32.
5. External factors have been instrumental, but will not be discussed here. The opposition and civil society organizations received considerable material and logistical support, as well as training from Western donors. See Vladimir Goati, "The Nature of the Order and the October Overthrow in Serbia," in R/Evolution and Order. Serbia After October 2000, ed. Ivana Spasić and Milan Subotić (Belgrade: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, 2001), 54.
6. On hybrid authoritarian regimes, see Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13 (April 2002): 21-36.
7. On this, see Nick Sitter, "When is a Party System? A Systems Perspective on the Development of Competitive Party Systems," Central European Political Science Review 3, 1 (2002):75-97.
8. Furthermore, Milošević had a considerably greater degree of legitimacy through the nationalist mobilization of the late 1980s than most other Communist leaders in Yugoslavia or Central and Eastern Europe. Slobodan Antonić, "Vlada Slobodana Miloševića: Pokušaj tipološkog odredjenja,ö Srpksa politička misao, No. 1 (1995):92-97.
9. Zoran Slavujević, "Borba za vlastu u Srbiji kroz prizmu izbornih kampanja," in Izborne borbe u Jugoslaviji (1990-1992), ed. Vladimir Goati, Zoran Dj. Slavujević, and Ognjen Pribičević (Belgrade: Radnička Štampa & Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1993), 84-89.
10. Milan Milošević, Politički Vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 165-67.
11. Dijana Vukomanović, "Nastanak političkih partija," in Partijski mozaik Srbije, 1990-1996, ed. Vladimir Goati (Belgrade: Beogradski Krug & AKAPIT, 1997), 29-39.
12. The Radical Party never was a full-fledged opposition party. In 1991-92 it was built up with the help of the regime through positive media reporting and possibly through financial support. In 1992-93 the SRS supported a socialist minority government and between 1998 and 2000 it joined first the Serbian and later the Yugoslav government and thus became a regime party.
13. Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 52-59.
14. Ognjen Pribićević, Vlast i opozicjia u Srbiji (Belgrade: B92, 1997).
15. Ibid., 54-59.
16. Results shown only for the Serbian members of the House of Citizens, the lower chamber of the parliament.
17. In 1992 SPO and DSS both participated together the with Civic Alliance in DEPOS.
18. In 1993 SPO, Civic Alliance, and New Democracy formed as the coalition DEPOS.
19. In 1996, DS, DSS, SPO, and Civic Alliance formed Zajedno. 1996 SPS ran in coalition with JUL and New Democracy
20. SPS ran in coalition with JUL and New Democracy in the 1997 elections. Both the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia boycotted the elections.
21. Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998. Volja Gradjana ili Izborna Manipulacija (Belgrade: CeSID, 1999), 285-99; idem, Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998. Addendum Elections 2000 (Belgrade: CeSID, 2001), 269-71.
22. Vladimir Goati, Izbori u SRJ od 1990. do 1998. Volja Gradjana ili Izborna Manipulacija (Belgrade: CeSID, 1999), 285-99; idem, Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998. Addendum Elections 2000 (Belgrade: CeSID, 2001), 269-71.
23. The terms moderate and radical opposition are used in the surveys of the Center for Policy Alternatives in order to differentiate between the DS and the other parties grouped around the Alliance for Change on one side and the SPO and DSS on the other. Srećko Mihailović, "Politička i stranačka identifikacija," in Javno mnenje Srbije. Iz mecrossed d signu razočarenja I nade, ed. Srečko Mihailović (Belgrade: CPA, 2000), 47.
24. Vreme, Nov. 13, 1999.
25. Zoran Kusovac, "Serbia's Inadequate Opposition," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 27, 2000.
26. The extensive criticism of NATO air strikes by Koštunica, for example, brought him more attention in the regime media in 1999. This rendered any attacks against him during the presidential campaign by the regime more difficult, as his nationalist credentials were beyond doubt. As a result the regime media engaged in personal attacks. Politika, Sept. 17-18, 2000.
27. Željko Cvijanović, "Kostunica's "Middle Way,'" IPWR Balkan Report, August 8, 2000; Democratic Party of Serbia, "Why does our party exist? What are our aims? How do we plan to achieve them? Excerpts from the program of the Democratic Party of Serbia" (Belgrade, n.d.), 40-41.
28. Željko Cvijanović, "Kostunica's "Middle Way,'" IPWR Balkan Report, August 8, 2000; Democratic Party of Serbia, "Why does our party exist? What are our aims? How do we plan to achieve them? Excerpts from the program of the Democratic Party of Serbia" (Belgrade, n.d.), 40-41.
29. Interview with Vojislav Koštunica, July 20, 2000.
30. Speech by Vojislav Koštunica at the last DOS pre-election convention, DSS Press Service, Sept. 20, 2000.
31. Political Team 2000, Newsletter 13 (2000).
32. Dušan Pavlović, "Svuda lako, u Srbiji nikako," Reporter, March 1, 2000.
33. CPA Weekly Analysis, May 28, 2000. In early 2000, the prominent Center for European Policy Studies was more optimistic: see Nicholas Whyte "Is the End Nigh? Change is Possible in Serbia," CEPS Commentary, Feb. 25, 2000. Also the International Crisis Group was somewhat more optimistic and put some the opposition weaknesses in perspective. See International Crisis Group, "Serbia's Embattled Opposition," May 30, 2000.
34. CPA Weekly Analysis, May 28, 2000. In early 2000, the prominent Center for European Policy Studies was more optimistic: see Nicholas Whyte "Is the End Nigh? Change is Possible in Serbia," CEPS Commentary, Feb. 25, 2000. Also the International Crisis Group was somewhat more optimistic and put some the opposition weaknesses in perspective. See International Crisis Group, "Serbia's Embattled Opposition," May 30, 2000.
35. CPA Weekly Analysis, May 28, 2000. In early 2000, the prominent Center for European Policy Studies was more optimistic: see Nicholas Whyte "Is the End Nigh? Change is Possible in Serbia," CEPS Commentary, Feb. 25, 2000. Also the International Crisis Group was somewhat more optimistic and put some the opposition weaknesses in perspective. See International Crisis Group, "Serbia's Embattled Opposition," May 30, 2000.
36. See Giovanni Satori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
37. The disunity of the opposition as a major hurdle in Serbia has been more frequently conceded by the opposition leaders themselves. See, for example, the statement of the president of Socialdemocracy, Vuk Obradović, in Danas, June 28, 2000.
38. Only Vesna Pešić of the Civic Alliance resigned voluntarily from her position as party president in 1999. Djindjić's takeover of the Democratic Party in 1993 was just one successful "coup" within a party, of which there were many throughout the 1990s.
39. This issue is more complex in the case of Kosovo Albanians, whose political system is completely separate from the Serb party system, with no co-operation. In addition, the exclusion from Serbian institutions by the regime, in combination with tolerating the Albanian parallel state structures, created an situation where both the political elite of Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian regime supported the status quo. See Shkelzen Maliqi, "The Albanian Movement in Kosova," in Yugoslavia and After. A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth, ed. David D. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (London & New York: Longman, 1996), 147.
40. Blic, Feb. 7, 2000.
41. Milan Milošević, Politički Vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 62-64; International Crisis Group, "Serbia's Embattled Opposition," May 30, 2000.
42. Milan Milošević, Politički Vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 62-64; International Crisis Group, "Serbia's Embattled Opposition," May 30, 2000.
43. I have argued elsewhere that there is a need to strive for a broader and less normative definition of civil society. See Florian Bieber, "The Other Civil Society in Serbia: Non-Governmental Nationalism. The Case of the Serbian Resistance Movement," in Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe, ed. Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde (London: Routledge, 2003).
44. Stejpan Gredelj, "The (Im)possibility of Establishing Civil Society in Serbia," in Serbia between Past and Future, ed. Dušan Janjić (Belgrade: Institute of Social Sciences & Forum for Ethnic Relations, 1995), 415.
45. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty. Civil Society and its Rivals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 193.
46. See Florian Bieber, Serbischer Nationalismus vom Tode Titoszum Sturz Miloševićs (Vienna: Peter Lang, forthcoming, 2003).
47. See Obrad Savić, "Die Parallele Welt. Die Belgrader NGO-Szene," in Verschwiegenes Serbien. Stimmen für die Zukunft, ed. Irin Šlosar (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 1997), 41-42. A number of articles by and on the "other Serbia" have been published in "Une Autre Serbie," Les Temps Modernes 49, no. 570-571 (1994).
48. See Obrad Savić, "Die Parallele Welt. Die Belgrader NGO-Szene," in Verschwiegenes Serbien. Stimmen für die Zukunft, ed. Irin Šlosar (Klagenfurt: Wieser, 1997), 41-42. A number of articles by and on the "other Serbia" have been published in "Une Autre Serbie," Les Temps Modernes 49, no. 570-571 (1994).
49. Some additional protests could be mentioned: for example a number of rallies and protests took place between the end of the Kosovo war and the fall of Milošević, such as the protests in response to the closing of Studio B and B292. Milan Milošević, Politički vodič kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), 58-59.
50. Although the protests in 1996-97 achieved the immediate goal, the recognition of the electoral success by the regime, the change of the regime failed and the opposition coalition dissolved. It would be thus misleading to label them successful.
51. On the protests, See Mladen Lazić, ed., Protest in Belgrade (Budapest: CEU Press, 1999).
52. For a general study of Otpor, see Vladimir Illić, Otpor. In or Beyond Politics (Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 2001).
53. The university law, in return, was a response of the regime to the student protests in 1996-97. See Sreten Vujović, "The Society, State and University in Crisis," Sociologija 60 (October-December 1997):481-507.
54. Otpor for example distributed "medals" to Belgrade citizens after the regime began to honor "heroes" of the Kosovo war. For further examples see http://www.otpor.net; http://www.otpor.com.
55. The usage of the clenched fist as a symbol consciously evokes fascist/communist symbology, reminiscent of the Slovene band Laibach and the "Neue Slowenische Kunst" (New Slovene Art) movement, which used similar techniques in the early 1980s in Slovenia. See Mark Thompson, A Paper House. The Ending of Yugoslavia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), 43-44.
56. Interviews with the Otpor activists Slobodan Homen (July 21, 2000) and Milja Jovanović (July 25, 2000).
57. Otpor, "Declaration on the future of Serbia," August 25, 1999; "Kongres Studentskog Pokreta Otpor: Ostao je bljutav ukus," Republika, March 5, 2000, 36.
58. Otpor, "Declaration on the future of Serbia," August 25, 1999; "Kongres Studentskog Pokreta Otpor: Ostao je bljutav ukus," Republika, March 5, 2000, 36.
59. See http://www.cesid.org.yu.
60. Miša Brkić, "Some Other Serbia: Group G 17 Plus," AIM Podgorica, June 28, 2000.
61. Glas Nedelje, October 19, 1999; Blic, July 19, 2000; Danas, April 15-16, 2000.
62. Glas Nedelje, October 19, 1999; Blic, July 19, 2000; Danas, April 15-16, 2000.
63. Glas Nedelje, October 19, 1999; Blic, July 19, 2000; Danas, April 15-16, 2000.
64. For a list of all the NGOs active in the campaign, see Izlaz 2000. Nevladine organizacije za demokratske i fer izbori (Belgrade: Fond Centar za demokratiju & Centar za razvoj neprofitni sektora & Gradjanske inicijative, 2001), 30-52.
65. This has been a particular challenge. While in other countries that saw the end of a semi-authoritarian regime, such as Slovakia and Croatia, voter participation in itself proved to be sufficient, Serbian experience with the electoral fraud in 1996 demonstrated the need for protests and other civil action to supplement the simple process of voting for the opposition.
66. This campaign was called "Vreme je" (It's time). See http://www.vreme-je.net.
67. Beta, July 28, 2000. In addition, Koštunica also attracted less hostile responses than many other opposition figures, such as Zoran Djindjić. See interview with Djindjić in Danas, August 26-27, 2000.
68. Beta, July 28, 2000. In addition, Koštunica also attracted less hostile responses than many other opposition figures, such as Zoran Djindjić. See interview with Djindjić in Danas, August 26-27, 2000.
69. For a detailed analysis, see Dejan Guzina, Nationalism in the Context of an Illiberal Multination State: the Case of Serbia, Ph.D. diss, Carleton University, Ottawa, January 2000.
70. The opposition agreement concluded in January 2000 was still a reflection of this. Betaweek, January 13, 2000.
71. G17plus, "Program Demokratske Opozicije Srbije za Demokratsku Srbiju" (Belgrade, 2000).
72. Additionally, Western donors and governments also have been instrumental in forging a united opposition.
73. One member of G17, Miroljub Labus, for example, became deputy prime minister of Yugoslavia, while the former executive director of the organization heads the Central Bank.
74. See for example NDI, Serbia Issue Poll, October 24, 1999.