Why Richard Brandt does not need cognitive psychotherapy, and other glad news about idealized preference theories in meta-ethics

Journal of Value Inquiry

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 373-394

  Zimmerman, David ^a  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043086967     PISSN: 00225363     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:INQU.0000013348.62494.55     Document Type: Review

References (63)

1. See G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
2. George Nakhnikian, "On the Naturalistic Fallacy," in Morality and the Language of Conduct, Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian, eds., (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), p. 149.
3. See Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105, January 1995, "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open-question argument," Nous 29, 1995, and "Brandt's Notion of Therapeutic Agency," Ethics 110, July 2000.
4. See Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105, January 1995, "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open-question argument," Nous 29, 1995, and "Brandt's Notion of Therapeutic Agency," Ethics 110, July 2000.
5. See Connie Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," Ethics 105, January 1995, "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open-question argument," Nous 29, 1995, and "Brandt's Notion of Therapeutic Agency," Ethics 110, July 2000.
6. Moore, op. cit., p. 60.
7. See J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, George Sher, ed., (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), ch. 2.
8. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), pp. 111-112.
9. Richard Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
10. Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XII, March 1952, p. 329.
11. David Lewis, "Dispositional Theories of Value II," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society suppl. vol. 63, 1989, pp. 113 & 116.
12. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 417; Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review XCV, April 1986, pp. 173-174; Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LV, March 1995, p. 109; and Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons" in Rational Action, R. Harrison, ed., (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 18-19.
13. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 417; Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review XCV, April 1986, pp. 173-174; Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LV, March 1995, p. 109; and Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons" in Rational Action, R. Harrison, ed., (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 18-19.
14. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 417; Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review XCV, April 1986, pp. 173-174; Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LV, March 1995, p. 109; and Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons" in Rational Action, R. Harrison, ed., (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 18-19.
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 417; Peter Railton, "Moral Realism," Philosophical Review XCV, April 1986, pp. 173-174; Michael Smith, "Internal Reasons," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LV, March 1995, p. 109; and Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons" in Rational Action, R. Harrison, ed., (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 18-19.
16. See Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 19-20.
17. See Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Towota, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," in Essays on Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Berys Gaut, "The Structure of Practical Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
18. See Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Towota, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," in Essays on Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Berys Gaut, "The Structure of Practical Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
19. See Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Towota, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," in Essays on Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Berys Gaut, "The Structure of Practical Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
20. See Nicholas Sturgeon, "Moral Explanations," in Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Towota, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985); Richard Boyd, "How To Be a Moral Realist," in Essays on Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988); David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and Berys Gaut, "The Structure of Practical Reason," in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
21. Nakhnikian, op. cit., p. 157.
22. Sturgeon, op. cit., and Boyd, op. cit.
23. Sturgeon, op. cit., and Boyd, op. cit.
24. Brandt, op. cit., p. 113.
25. Ibid., pp. 11 & 113.
26. Ibid., p. 113.
27. Rosati, "Brandt's Notion of Therapeutic Agency," p. 784.
28. See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 18-22, and Norman Daniels, "Two Accounts of Theory Acceptance in Ethics, in Copp and Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 120-140.
29. See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 18-22, and Norman Daniels, "Two Accounts of Theory Acceptance in Ethics, in Copp and Zimmerman, op. cit., pp. 120-140.
30. Gibbard, op. cit., p. 20.
31. Brandt, op. cit., p. 113.
32. Gibbard, op. cit., p. 21.
33. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
34. Ibid., p. 21.
35. Gibbard, op. cit., ch. 4, esp. pp. 64-76.
36. Ibid., p. 113.
37. Ibid., p. 110.
38. Ibid., p. 117.
39. Ibid., ch. 6.
40. Ibid., p. 144.
41. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
42. See Daniel Dennett, "Why the Law of Effect Will not Go Away," Journal of the Theory of Social Behavior 5, 1974.
43. See Martin Hoffman, "Empathy, Role Taking, Guilt and Development of Altruistic Motives," in Moral Development and Behavior: Theory Research and Social Issues, T. Likona, ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1976).
44. Brandt, op. cit., p. 141.
45. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 126.
46. Brandt, op. cit., p. 130.
47. Hoffman, op. cit., p. 135.
48. Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives and Full-Information Accounts of the Good," p. 317.
49. See ibid., p. 307.
50. Ibid., p. 323.
51. David Sobel, "Full Information Theories of Well-Being," p. 809.
52. See David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
53. See Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full Information Accounts of the Good," pp. 307-311.
54. See ibid., p. 310, note 38, and Sobel, op. cit., p. 808.
55. See ibid., p. 310, note 38, and Sobel, op. cit., p. 808.
56. See Mark Timmons and Terry Horgan, "Troubles for New Wave Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived," Philosophical Papers 21 (1992), pp. 153-175.
57. Rosati, "Persons, Perspectives and Full-Information Accounts of the Good," p. 312.
58. Rosati, "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open-question argument," pp. 58-59.
59. Ibid., p. 59.
60. See Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 305-312. Also see, Rosati, ibid., p. 49.
61. See Stephen Darwall, "Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction," in Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches, Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 305-312. Also see, Rosati, ibid., p. 49.
62. See Williams, op. cit., p. 19.
63. Rosati, "Naturalism, Normativity, and the Open Question Argument," pp. 63-64.