Why Have Brazilian Legislators Decided to “Clean Up Their Sidewalks”?: The Influence of the Brazilian Political Institutions on the Process of State Reform

Handbook of Global Political Policy

Volumn , Issue , 2022, Pages 535-567

  Pereira, Carlos ^a  

^a NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043079317     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780429272004-27     Document Type: Chapter

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