Trust among strangers

Philosophy of Science

Volumn 71, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 286-319

  Bicchieri, Cristina ^a   Duffy, John ^b   Tolle, Gil ^c  

^a CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043061458     PISSN: 00318248     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/381411     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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