Pity's pathologies portrayed: Rrousseau and the limits of democratic compassion

Political Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 519-546

  Boyd, Richard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

Author keywords

Compassion; Democratic theory; Difference; Identity; Jean Jacques Rousseau; Pity

Indexed keywords

EID: 4043051518     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591703258118     Document Type: Review

References (102)

1. Judith Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Harper, 1988), vol. 2, pt. 3, 564. This generalized compassion perhaps stems, as Tracy Strong argues, from the kind of equality and transparency that democracies alone permit. Tracy Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Osks,CA.: Sage, 1994), 145-46.
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J. P. Mayer (New York: Harper, 1988), vol. 2, pt. 3, 564. This generalized compassion perhaps stems, as Tracy Strong argues, from the kind of equality and transparency that democracies alone permit. Tracy Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Osks,CA.: Sage, 1994), 145-46.
4. Nietzsche's complaints about modern compassion are complex. Most conspicuous is his contempt for pity as a "sickness" or "nausea" endemic to democratic society. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, esp. "Preface," 5-6; III, 14. But he also alludes to a kind of noble or aristocratic "mercy," borne of the pathos of distance and the "consciousness of power," as a fitting attitude of the powerful toward the weak or "parasites" beneath them. Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, 10. Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, V, 201-2; VII, 225.
5. Nietzsche's complaints about modern compassion are complex. Most conspicuous is his contempt for pity as a "sickness" or "nausea" endemic to democratic society. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, esp. "Preface," 5-6; III, 14. But he also alludes to a kind of noble or aristocratic "mercy," borne of the pathos of distance and the "consciousness of power," as a fitting attitude of the powerful toward the weak or "parasites" beneath them. Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, 10. Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, V, 201-2; VII, 225.
6. Nietzsche's complaints about modern compassion are complex. Most conspicuous is his contempt for pity as a "sickness" or "nausea" endemic to democratic society. Friedrich Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, esp. "Preface," 5-6; III, 14. But he also alludes to a kind of noble or aristocratic "mercy," borne of the pathos of distance and the "consciousness of power," as a fitting attitude of the powerful toward the weak or "parasites" beneath them. Nietzsche, Genealogy, II, 10. Cf. Beyond Good and Evil, V, 201-2; VII, 225.
7. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976), esp. pp. 28-29, 35-37, 54, 68.
8. On this latter point about how, notwithstanding their veneer of compassion, modern democracies may still vent their cruelty upon those who are outside or alien, see Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I, 11, p. 40: the same men who are held so sternly in check inter pares ... and who on the other hand in their relations with one another show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship - once they go outside, where the strange, the stranger is found, they are not much better than uncaged beasts of prey.
9. Nancy Hirschman, "Sympathy, Empathy and Obligation," in Feminist Interpretations of David Hume, ed. Anne Jaap Jacobson (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 174.
10. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For a treatment of the more general problem of "affect" in democratic theory, which raises questions about this characterization of Habermas and problematizes the strict antinomy between reason and affect, see Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?" Political Theory 28 (2000): 38-63.
11. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For a treatment of the more general problem of "affect" in democratic theory, which raises questions about this characterization of Habermas and problematizes the strict antinomy between reason and affect, see Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?" Political Theory 28 (2000): 38-63.
12. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For a treatment of the more general problem of "affect" in democratic theory, which raises questions about this characterization of Habermas and problematizes the strict antinomy between reason and affect, see Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?" Political Theory 28 (2000): 38-63.
13. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1996); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For a treatment of the more general problem of "affect" in democratic theory, which raises questions about this characterization of Habermas and problematizes the strict antinomy between reason and affect, see Patchen Markell, "Making Affect Safe for Democracy?" Political Theory 28 (2000): 38-63.
14. Notably, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). This case has been recently made in similar terms but without reference to Rousseau by Maureen Whitebrook, "Compassion as a Political Virtue," Political Studies 50 (2002): 529-44.
15. Notably, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). This case has been recently made in similar terms but without reference to Rousseau by Maureen Whitebrook, "Compassion as a Political Virtue," Political Studies 50 (2002): 529-44.
16. Notably, Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). This case has been recently made in similar terms but without reference to Rousseau by Maureen Whitebrook, "Compassion as a Political Virtue," Political Studies 50 (2002): 529-44.
17. Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985); Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1996), esp. chap. 5.
18. Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985); Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society (New York: Basic Books, 1996), esp. chap. 5.
19. Consider, for example, the widely differing interpretations that make Rousseau into the apostle of compassion: Allan Bloom, "Introduction," in Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 17-20. Or, as Leo Strauss puts it, "Compassion is the passion from which all social virtues derive." Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 270; and those others who read Rousseau as the harbinger of contemporary democratic theory, James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
20. Consider, for example, the widely differing interpretations that make Rousseau into the apostle of compassion: Allan Bloom, "Introduction," in Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 17-20. Or, as Leo Strauss puts it, "Compassion is the passion from which all social virtues derive." Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 270; and those others who read Rousseau as the harbinger of contemporary democratic theory, James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
21. Consider, for example, the widely differing interpretations that make Rousseau into the apostle of compassion: Allan Bloom, "Introduction," in Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 17-20. Or, as Leo Strauss puts it, "Compassion is the passion from which all social virtues derive." Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 270; and those others who read Rousseau as the harbinger of contemporary democratic theory, James Miller, Rousseau: Dreamer of Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984).
22. On natural freedom, wholeness, and goodness as Rousseau's intended goals, see Strauss, Natural Right and History, 277-83. For a contrary view of the naturalness of human dependency, see Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
23. On natural freedom, wholeness, and goodness as Rousseau's intended goals, see Strauss, Natural Right and History, 277-83. For a contrary view of the naturalness of human dependency, see Joel Schwartz, The Sexual Politics of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
24. On thinking of liberal democracy as distinguished not by any particular set of political institutions but in terms of its commitment to these procedures and the intrinsic value of moral equality, see George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), esp. chaps. 2 and 3; on willfulness and individual agency as essential to a liberal democracy, see Richard Flathman, Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individualism in Political Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); as essential for a strong democracy, see Barber, Strong Democracy, chap. 6.
25. On thinking of liberal democracy as distinguished not by any particular set of political institutions but in terms of its commitment to these procedures and the intrinsic value of moral equality, see George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), esp. chaps. 2 and 3; on willfulness and individual agency as essential to a liberal democracy, see Richard Flathman, Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individualism in Political Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); as essential for a strong democracy, see Barber, Strong Democracy, chap. 6.
26. On thinking of liberal democracy as distinguished not by any particular set of political institutions but in terms of its commitment to these procedures and the intrinsic value of moral equality, see George Kateb, The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), esp. chaps. 2 and 3; on willfulness and individual agency as essential to a liberal democracy, see Richard Flathman, Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individualism in Political Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); as essential for a strong democracy, see Barber, Strong Democracy, chap. 6.
27. William Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), esp. xxiv-xxv, 158-60, 172-73;
28. William Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 144-45.
29. Unless otherwise noted, citations from Rousseau are to The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964); On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978); Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Charles Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979); and Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
30. Unless otherwise noted, citations from Rousseau are to The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964); On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978); Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Charles Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979); and Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
31. Unless otherwise noted, citations from Rousseau are to The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964); On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978); Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Charles Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979); and Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
32. Unless otherwise noted, citations from Rousseau are to The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964); On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978); Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Charles Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979); and Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
33. Unless otherwise noted, citations from Rousseau are to The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1964); On the Social Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978); Emile, or On Education, ed. and trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979); The Reveries of the Solitary Walker, ed., trans., and with an introduction by Charles Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979); and Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D'Alembert on the Theatre (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
34. For an excellent discussion of how natural pity is activated by the imagination and transformed into compassion, see David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 148-52. See also Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 182-87.
35. For an excellent discussion of how natural pity is activated by the imagination and transformed into compassion, see David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau, and Mary Shelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 148-52. See also Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 182-87.
36. Compare Arthur Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 93.
37. Clifford Orwin, "Rousseau and the Discovery of Political Compassion," in The Legacy of Rousseau, ed. Clifford Orwin and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 309.
38. Contrast the reading of Mira Morgenstern, for whom the "sweetness" of pity derives at least in part from the discovery of individual empowerment and independence. Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 65, 68-69.
39. Rousseau's choice of the term "commiseration" is noteworthy. Literally, "sharing the misery of another" - this may be the necessary condition for us to think about acting to relieve that misery, but it is, as we will see below, far from a sufficient condition for this kind of willful human agency.
40. Compare Alexis Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Pensée du Malheur: Apothéose du Désespoir (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1984), 183: "Le malheur devient un instrument de la pédagogie philosophique."
41. Compare Orwin, "Rousseau and the Discovery," 302, 307-8: "Within the context of Emile, the greatest importance of compassion is not to society but to Emile himself." Cf. John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1974), who assumes that the purpose of pity is to produce good for others and to serve as the foundation of a new social order (see esp. pp. 83-93).
42. Compare Orwin, "Rousseau and the Discovery," 302, 307-8: "Within the context of Emile, the greatest importance of compassion is not to society but to Emile himself." Cf. John Charvet, The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1974), who assumes that the purpose of pity is to produce good for others and to serve as the foundation of a new social order (see esp. pp. 83-93).
43. Compare C. N. Dugan and Tracy Strong, "Music, Politics, Theater and Representation," in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. 333, 339, 343.
44. Morgenstern has developed this point at greater length: Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity, esp. 35-47.
45. Marshall, Surprising Effects of Sympathy, 142.
46. Cf. Elizabeth Wingrove, who interestingly suggests that the theater represents not just a suspension of will, but a willing complicity in the crimes of others, Rousseau's Republican Romance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), esp. 175-76; for a more extended discussion of the performative aspect of sympathy in the theater, see Marshall, Surprising Effects of Sympathy, esp. 143-48.
47. Cf. Elizabeth Wingrove, who interestingly suggests that the theater represents not just a suspension of will, but a willing complicity in the crimes of others, Rousseau's Republican Romance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), esp. 175-76; for a more extended discussion of the performative aspect of sympathy in the theater, see Marshall, Surprising Effects of Sympathy, esp. 143-48.
48. Christopher Kelly offers a concise account of Rousseau's ambivalence toward the arts. "Rousseau and the Case against (and for) the Arts," in The Legacy of Rousseau, esp. 20-25.
49. There are major scholarly debates about the consistency of Rousseau's account of pity as either an immanent or an active virtue (or both), and my analysis addresses these controversies implicitly. But I am mainly concerned here with the related but distinct question of whether commiseration is ultimately experienced as "sweet" or "irksome."
50. Cf. Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 16-17.
51. Contrast the reading of Margaret Ogrodnick, Instinct and Intimacy: Political Philosophy and Autobiography in Rousseau (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 137. If my point here is correct, virtually all of what Jacques Derrida has written about the "maternal metaphor" for compassion in Rousseau is wrong. There is little textual evidence in Rousseau to suggest that children have a natural affection for their parents that is written into their hearts by God. And in the above-cited passages in the Second Discourse, Rousseau makes it clear that maternal or familial affection, like romantic love, arises only by habit or custom. Cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 173-75.
52. Contrast the reading of Margaret Ogrodnick, Instinct and Intimacy: Political Philosophy and Autobiography in Rousseau (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 137. If my point here is correct, virtually all of what Jacques Derrida has written about the "maternal metaphor" for compassion in Rousseau is wrong. There is little textual evidence in Rousseau to suggest that children have a natural affection for their parents that is written into their hearts by God. And in the above-cited passages in the Second Discourse, Rousseau makes it clear that maternal or familial affection, like romantic love, arises only by habit or custom. Cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 173-75.
53. Although her subsequent discussion leads in a different direction, this point is supported by the following observation of Elizabeth Wingrove: "Here the intensity of the spectator's reaction is rooted in its inability to differentiate itself from other beings." Rousseau's Republican Romance, 32.
54. Consider also Rousseau's example of the pongos, who take pains to cover the bodies of their dead with branches or leaves so that they don't have to be confronted by its presence. Second Discourse, 205n, 208n.
55. Derrida, Of Grammatology, 190.
56. Compare the similar point made by Wingrove, Rousseau's Republican Romance, 35.
57. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1968), chap. 13, pp. 184-85.
58. Compare Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 101: According to Rousseau, Hobbes had quite rightly recognized that in the pure state of nature there was no bond of sympathy binding the single individuals to each other. . . . According to Rousseau, the only flaw in Hobbes's psychology consisted in putting an active egoism in the place of the purely passive egoism which prevails in the state of nature. See also Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 298-99.
59. Compare Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), 101: According to Rousseau, Hobbes had quite rightly recognized that in the pure state of nature there was no bond of sympathy binding the single individuals to each other. . . . According to Rousseau, the only flaw in Hobbes's psychology consisted in putting an active egoism in the place of the purely passive egoism which prevails in the state of nature. See also Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 298-99.
60. Roger Masters seems to go even further than this in claiming that natural pity is not just "obscure," immanent, or aversive in the state of nature, but entirely nonexistent. Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), esp. 140-42.
61. Compare Marc Plattner, Rousseau's State of Nature: An Interpretation of the Discourse on Inequality (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1979), 84-87.
62. Hannah Arendt develops this point more fully, especially Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1968). The response of Martin Buber, who "felt no pity at all" for Eichmann because he could feel pity only "for those whose actions I can understand in my heart," is suggestive (cited in Eichmann in Jerusalem, 251). In this view, compassion for the guilty entails the recognition both of common humanity and of a similar susceptibility to evil in oneself. Absent any sense that one could have committed a similar crime, or indeed of the mental workings of the criminal, it is impossible to feel pity. Notice that in this view, contrary to Rousseau, it is the comprehensibility of deed itself, rather than our overriding compassion for the doer as a fellow, sensible being, that is determinative. Compare Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, II, 10, who notes that the cognitive ability to separate the deed from the doer is what allows modern compassion to come into full bloom.
63. Hannah Arendt develops this point more fully, especially Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1968). The response of Martin Buber, who "felt no pity at all" for Eichmann because he could feel pity only "for those whose actions I can understand in my heart," is suggestive (cited in Eichmann in Jerusalem, 251). In this view, compassion for the guilty entails the recognition both of common humanity and of a similar susceptibility to evil in oneself. Absent any sense that one could have committed a similar crime, or indeed of the mental workings of the criminal, it is impossible to feel pity. Notice that in this view, contrary to Rousseau, it is the comprehensibility of deed itself, rather than our overriding compassion for the doer as a fellow, sensible being, that is determinative. Compare Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, II, 10, who notes that the cognitive ability to separate the deed from the doer is what allows modern compassion to come into full bloom.
64. Martha Nussbaum has posited specific and helpful criteria under which we might wish to exercise compassion in lieu of justice. "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996): 27-58. Whitebrook has criticized these general criteria as too restrictive. However, her attempt to incorporate a greater degree of discretion, making compassion into a kind of "default position" not just for those who suffer or even those who deserve compassion, but for anyone who is "vulnerable," would seem to render compassion more open to this charge of its indiscriminacy. Cf. "Compassion as a Political Virtue," esp. 537, 540-42.
65. Martha Nussbaum has posited specific and helpful criteria under which we might wish to exercise compassion in lieu of justice. "Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion," Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996): 27-58. Whitebrook has criticized these general criteria as too restrictive. However, her attempt to incorporate a greater degree of discretion, making compassion into a kind of "default position" not just for those who suffer or even those who deserve compassion, but for anyone who is "vulnerable," would seem to render compassion more open to this charge of its indiscriminacy. Cf. "Compassion as a Political Virtue," esp. 537, 540-42.
66. Orwin has similarly described the difficulty of generalizing pity into a universal virtue because of its inherent partiality. "Rousseau and the Discovery," 307-8. Compare Emile, IV, p. 227 , where Rousseau himself raises the distinction between justice and compassion. While presumably one cannot be just without having compassion, simply being compassionate may not be enough to make one just. For a similar point, see Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 187, and the discussion of Derrida, Of Grammatology, 191.
67. Orwin has similarly described the difficulty of generalizing pity into a universal virtue because of its inherent partiality. "Rousseau and the Discovery," 307-8. Compare Emile, IV, p. 227 , where Rousseau himself raises the distinction between justice and compassion. While presumably one cannot be just without having compassion, simply being compassionate may not be enough to make one just. For a similar point, see Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 187, and the discussion of Derrida, Of Grammatology, 191.
68. Orwin has similarly described the difficulty of generalizing pity into a universal virtue because of its inherent partiality. "Rousseau and the Discovery," 307-8. Compare Emile, IV, p. 227 , where Rousseau himself raises the distinction between justice and compassion. While presumably one cannot be just without having compassion, simply being compassionate may not be enough to make one just. For a similar point, see Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 187, and the discussion of Derrida, Of Grammatology, 191.
69. Orwin has similarly described the difficulty of generalizing pity into a universal virtue because of its inherent partiality. "Rousseau and the Discovery," 307-8. Compare Emile, IV, p. 227 , where Rousseau himself raises the distinction between justice and compassion. While presumably one cannot be just without having compassion, simply being compassionate may not be enough to make one just. For a similar point, see Philonenko, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 187, and the discussion of Derrida, Of Grammatology, 191.
70. Stendahl, Red and Black (New York: Norton, 1969), 384-89.
71. See, for example, an early precursor of today's "compassionate conservatism" in Charles Murray, Losing Ground, American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
72. Judith Shklar notes many of these same limitations of pity as a political virtue. Judith Shklar, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Equality," in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, ed. Stanley Hoffman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), esp. 289.
73. Connolly, Identity/Difference, esp. xv, xxv-xxvi; idem, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 143-45.
74. Connolly, Identity/Difference, esp. xv, xxv-xxvi; idem, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 143-45.
75. Judith Shklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
76. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 144-45.
77. Rousseau's ultimate position with respect to the divergent pathways of cosmopolitanism and patriotism is beyond the scope of this essay. But in this context, we should not forget his contempt for those "supposed cosmopolites who, justifying their love of the homeland by means of their love of the human race, boast of loving everyone in order to have the right to love no one." "Geneva Manuscript," ed. Roger Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), 161-62.
78. Compare Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 286: To accept a gift is to admit one's inferiority; it is to incur an obligation to people whose kindness is a way of signaling social distance while insincerely glossing it over. The equality [Rousseau] wants - the reciprocity of free minds - excludes dependence of any kind, and in the first place the dependence created by the kindness of the benevolent.
79. Connolly, Identity/Difference, xiv.
80. Cf. Montaigne, "On Cruelty," whose natural sensitivity extends even to plants! Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays (London: Penguin, 1991), 488.
81. Rousseau's revelation of the self as an ungrounded and perfectible tabula rasa invites dilemmas of difference and recognition unknown to earlier thinkers. Once the self has become in Rousseau's hands nothing more than the "perfectible" reflection of conventional differences and cultural influences, true recognition can take place only under two equally unlikely sets of conditions: either between equals in the pure state of nature or within civil society, when two selves have been forged by an identical set of social influences. With the advent of civil society, the first possibility vanishes forever, and with the continuous process of civilization, the likelihood of the latter diminishes by the day.
82. Rousseau looks to be guilty of pursuing what Joan Tronto has criticized as a "morality first" strategy by conceiving of pity as ultimately best confined to private relationships between individuals rather than constitutive of the political bonds between citizens. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 158.
83. Here, I have in mind certain "communitarian critics" of liberalism such as Robert Bellah, Amitai Etzioni, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair MacIntyre. Even if they do not explicitly or uniformly call for more compassion (or more democracy!) as a remedy for these ailments of liberalism, they have presented a challenging criticism of the excessive thinness, legalism. neutrality, and sentimental inertness of liberal political theory.
84. Cf. Orwin, "Rousseau and the Discovery," esp. 298-99; Plattner, Rousseau's State of Nature, 128-32.
85. Cf. Orwin, "Rousseau and the Discovery," esp. 298-99; Plattner, Rousseau's State of Nature, 128-32.
86. By reading Rousseau here as a "critic of liberalism" and the primacy of private property, self-interest, and individual rights, I do not mean to suggest that his critique was not also applicable to aristocratic or courtly society.
87. Rousseau's stipulation that the sum of our obligations to our fellow citizens consists in refraining from causing them undue suffering is compatible with even the least flattering criticisms of contemporary liberal society by Bellah, MacIntyre, or Sandel. A market society characterized by self-interest, anomie, and atomization may prove the quintessential example of a world where we take no special pains to be cruel to others. Emphasizing both the thin obligations of fellow citizens to one another and the relative unlikelihood of even these minimal duties being recognized makes Rousseau among the most realistic of political theorists.
88. Cf. Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, who suggests that an immanent human "expansiveness" to identify with others forms the basis of patriotism, political community, and justice for Rousseau, esp. 170-71n. Compare Ogrodnick, Instinct and Intimacy, 135-38. Below, I raise questions not just about this possibility for Rousseau, but also and more importantly whether even this immanent expansiveness can overcome the problem of moral otherness.
89. Cf. Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, who suggests that an immanent human "expansiveness" to identify with others forms the basis of patriotism, political community, and justice for Rousseau, esp. 170-71n. Compare Ogrodnick, Instinct and Intimacy, 135-38. Below, I raise questions not just about this possibility for Rousseau, but also and more importantly whether even this immanent expansiveness can overcome the problem of moral otherness.
90. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ron Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995). For a characterization of the particularistic and affective dimensions of Rousseau's thoughts on patriotism, see Marc Plattner, "Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism," in The Legacy of Rousseau, esp. 187-93.
91. Cf. Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ron Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995). For a characterization of the particularistic and affective dimensions of Rousseau's thoughts on patriotism, see Marc Plattner, "Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism," in The Legacy of Rousseau, esp. 187-93.
92. Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 15-17, 21;
93. Ogrodnick, Instinct and Intimacy, 139-45.
94. Tzvetan Todorov, Frail Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau, trans. John T. Scott and Robert D. Zaretsky (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 29.
95. John T. Scott, "The Theodicy of the Second Discourse: The 'Pure State of Nature' and Rousseau's Political Thought," American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 708.
96. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 145.
97. Ibid., 147.
98. One problem with doing so is compassion's tendency to eclipse civic equality. See especially Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 90: Measured against the immense sufferings of the immense majority of the people, the impartiality of justice and law, the application of the same rules to those who sleep in palaces and those who sleep under the bridges of Paris, was like a mockery.
99. Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 93.
100. Arendt, On Revolution. 86-87.
101. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," esp. 503-6; Barber, Strong Democracy, esp. chaps. 6 and 8.
102. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," esp. 503-6; Barber, Strong Democracy, esp. chaps. 6 and 8.